By Aaliyah Vayez

South Africa’s Presidency of the influential G20 and active membership of the BRICS provides the country with ample opportunity to pursue strategic objectives that cut across domestic, continental and global South interests.

However, in the face of rising economic inequality, the ever-present threat of climate change and insurmountable gaps in sustainable development worldwide coupled with the consequences of shifting global power dynamics prompted by Trumpian policies, one must question whether platforms like the G20 and BRICS are not only useful tools for a state to face these challenges but whether they are fundamentally more effective than pursuing a realist outlook on international relations where every state acts solely in favour of its own interests. 

In South Africa’s case it becomes more of a balancing act of which forum to use to pursue which strategic objective and broadly, how to frame one’s choices as cohesive and in line with a state’s character on the international stage.

The risk of failing to achieve such balance cannot be understated in a critical time of global political shifts, from missed multilateral opportunities with real-time material consequences to the continuation of Africa’s historical image as ‘for the taking’ by the rich and powerful.

South Africa’s ability to achieve such balance in pursuit of strategic goals has undoubtedly already been tested by strained relations with the Trump administration, evidenced in the US’ limited presence at G20 engagements thus far and Trump’s recent snubbing of future such engagements, which may well have pushed the country to rethink its enthusiasm for multilateral cooperation. 

As the country has chosen to forge ahead with its approach to long-term cooperation through multilateral forums like the G20 and BRICS, the need for balance is ever present.

This piece will elaborate on how and why South Africa must pursue, amongst others, three strategic objectives in its membership of the G20 and core membership of the BRICS – namely, 1) championing of South-South cooperation in political and economic affairs, 2) reforming international financial institutions and trade flows, and 3) strengthening multilateral peace and security architecture.

In doing so, this article will highlight South Africa’s unique position in both the G20 and BRICS and further how urgently it must master this position to establish itself as a crucial actor in an ever-changing global political landscape.  

Championing South-South cooperation

To begin, we must acknowledge that the membership of BRICS and the G20 have changed significantly and, as a result, expose South Africa now more than ever before to the global South’s multiplex character of emerging economies and established powers, with countries representing diverse and varying interests alongside overlapping networks of cooperation and competition.

BRCIS no longer consists of only five members but has since expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates with an additional nine ‘partner’ countries (BRICS+).

Similarly, the G20’s membership has also changed following the admittance of the African Union as a permanent member in 2024, which served as a watershed moment for the future pursuit of continental interests at an international level.

As such, South Africa positions itself in groupings which represent most of the world’s population, generates a significant share of global GDP and an extensive lattice of intergovernmental cooperation. 

In both cases, the expansion of membership evinces a growing dissatisfaction with the current Western-dominated status quo and a fundamental willingness to reform this reality in favour of increased representation and inclusive decision-making.

However, the very diversity these forums are lauded for may continue to be a threat to their success as the number of interests and objectives pursued adds complexity to consensus-building as countries are expected to accommodate one another while striving for collective goals.

As such, South Africa must view this level of exposure with great opportunism to emerge as a consensus-builder between countries and their interests in the pursuit of collective goals. 

One such area in which this may be possible is the shared need to respond to and manage the consequences of the Trump administration’s attitude and actions toward international relations.

Amidst impulsive political statements and snap tariff announcements, countries may consider their membership to BRICS and the G20 as safe harbours to both reconsider their relations with the US and be assured by one another’s willingness to cooperate rather than following the US’ increasingly isolationist example or indulge in fragmentation. 

Differences in member state’s attitudes toward continued bilateral relations with the US are however likely to cause division over whether these groupings serve as a vehicle for an anti-US stance that may be designed to counter US actions and the systems which support them or simply forge ahead with agendas of transformative global governance without encouraging any form of fragmentation or geopolitical competition. 

While this may be a point of division as some countries push for a turn against rather than away from the West, it ultimately hinges on what kind of international landscape the majority of countries choose to pursue in the short- and long-term future which, as it stands, is underscored by a genuine commitment to dialogue and sustainable development that is representative of global South interests.

Here, South Africa must emerge as a proponent for cohesion of interests rather than a collision of states by fostering new and existing cooperation networks amongst emerging economies. 

This may be achieved by developing a nuanced understanding of newer BRICS and G20 members’ interests through dedicated engagement and later acting as a steering guide to these members in the art of ‘group diplomacy.’

The country may even suggest the use of BRICS as a pre-negotiation forum for policy positions pursued with western nations in the G20 and beyond.

This may result in newly forged bilateral relations that could seek to satisfy the country’s individual foreign policy goals as shared interests are uncovered but also, position South Africa as a binding global bridge-builder in the face of ongoing scepticism over internal contradictions as obstacles to informed policymaking.

Reforming international financial institutions 

Financial cooperation in the form of trade and investment amongst BRICS and G20 members have respectively grown significantly over the last decade – so much so that interest or willingness amongst member’s is hardly cause for concern.

However, similarly to above, the US’ economic turn inwards provides a crucial moment for South Africa to bolster new and existing economic partnerships to make up for the loss of US trade, evidenced in the inevitably muted African Growth and Opportunity Act, and pending high tariffs.

With European countries in the G20 who have already expressed their willingness to fulfil gaps in cooperation left by the US, South Africa must embrace the opportunity to diversify its trading relations and encourage others to do the same by example.

More so, the G20 and BRICS provide South Africa the opportunity to further consolidate the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area as the world’s largest free-trade area that is indeed open for business.

The addition of Ethiopia and Egypt as BRICS members, and the African Union as a member of the G20, strengthens South Africa’s ability to do so without forgoing continental cooperation.

Doing so alongside active participation in ongoing efforts to increase trade in local currencies and normalise the use of cross-border payment systems, such as the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System, South Africa maintains its support for alternative financial flows and the diversification of currency reserves towards reduced reduce exposure to volatile financial dynamics and the risk of continued dollar dependency. 

Relatedly, South Africa must tackle a host of relatively newer financial challenges including climate finance as linked to sustainable development and mitigation efforts, and debt restructuring.

These issues are more likely where division of interests in multilateral forums may occur and therefore where South Africa must tread carefully to avoid isolation or all-talk-no-action.

For one, the terms of sovereign debt by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are as established as the institutions themselves which have historically rejected such reform, and the possibility of sharing the financial cost of climate change has largely been met with disappointment rather than commitment.

Despite this, South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa has expressed the country’s aim of building on existing G20 and Paris Club initiatives to support countries experiencing debt vulnerability, many of which are African countries.

Similarly, he has stated the country’s intention to mobilise more climate finance for developing countries through concessions and grants.

This aligns with a newly adopted BRICS framework on climate change and sustainable development which includes key commitments to a just transition, mitigation and adaptation strategies as well as carbon markets.

In doing so, South Africa can begin to offset the diplomatic and political consequences of the US moving away from climate finance and garner a collective willingness to address these financial challenges head on.  

Global peace and security architecture. 

In line with the country’s strong support for human rights and reconciliation post-Apartheid, the last two years have particularly cemented South Africa as a formidable supporter of international law and principles of human rights.

This is most recently seen in the country’s ongoing high-profile case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and pushing for reform of the UN Security Council – both of which have been met with mixed reactions from the global community, including members of the G20 and BRICS.

This is most prominently seen in reactions by the US to three specific policy positions namely the country’s geopolitical alignment with international actors that either pose a threat to the US’ national security or global hegemony including China and Russia, the implementation of domestic affirmative action policies which make the country’s business environment exclusionary and the perception that South Africa is indifferent to violence against white farmers.

Reactions have, amongst others, included the untimely dismissal of South Africa’s Ambassador to the US, Ebrahim Rasool, in March this year and the cessation of all US foreign assistance to South Africa – all of which have contributed to hostile relations between countries, a task which South Africa’s recently appointed Special Envoy to the US, Mcebisi Jonas, will have to cautiously contend with from day one. 

While South Africa’s actions and policy positionings may be controversial and at odds with Washington and others, the choice of ‘solidarity’ to be included in the theme of its G20 Presidency and this year’s BRICS agenda including a focus on a multilateral peace and security agenda clearly signal an opportunity for proactive and reactive governance rather than cower. 

As such, South Africa’s balancing act may not necessarily be in action but rather in managing the reactions of countries towards its existing stance on ongoing conflicts and crises as well as the present-day peace and security architecture.

That is, reactions from those countries which are engaged directly or indirectly in conflicts or have expressed support for those who are – which may result in South Africa’s isolation.

In this instance, it may benefit South Africa to strike a healthy balance between advocating for specific causes and broader promotion of recognised principles of peace and security, such as reconciliation through mediation, rule of law and human rights.

In doing so, South Africa may not be pushed into moral binaries but rather retain its diplomatic flexibility – a quality that must be preserved should the country want to rebuild relations with the US and its allies, without sacrificing its principles.

By strategically working towards championing South-South cooperation, reforming international financial institutions and trade flows, as well as strengthening multilateral peace and security architecture through work in the G20 and BRICS, South Africa may well achieve a constructive balance in making the most out of its unique position in these forums and fundamentally cement itself as a crucial and leading actor in an ever-changing global political landscape.

While there is no means of measuring its success in doing so, it may be worthwhile to note the country’s positions on these objectives in ongoing G20 engagements, the upcoming BRICS leaders’ summit in July, and the eventual passing on of the G20 Presidency to the US in November this year.

The author, Aaliyah Vayez is a political and security risk analyst who has represented South Africa in diplomacy and development at both national and international levels.

Disclaimer: The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of TRT Afrika.