Aydin GuvenThe Kashmir conflict remains one of the most enduring and volatile territorial disputes in the world. Since the 1947 British withdrawal from the subcontinent, the region has been at the centre of multiple full-scale wars, numerous border skirmishes, and political crises between India and Pakistan.
The deadly attack in Pahalgam Valley of Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22, 2025, has once again brought the region into the spotlight. Although violence in Kashmir is not new, the nature of this attack — the deliberate targeting of civilians — reflects the ongoing resentment over India's revocation of Kashmir's special status in 2019.
Instead of prompting dialogue or efforts to ease tensions, the Pahalgam attack led to quick and serious responses that showed how weak the current mechanisms for managing India–Pakistan relations really are. Within hours, India announced its suspension of cooperation under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), and Pakistan declared it no longer felt bound by the Simla Agreement. These moves were not just diplomatic actions, they reflect shifts toward long-term strategic goals that extend beyond immediate retaliation.
From 1947 to present Kashmir
The recent attack in Kashmir cannot be understood without looking at the historical background, to the moment of partition in 1947. When the British left the Indian subcontinent, there were more than 560 officially recognised princely states. According to the partition plan, princely states like Jammu and Kashmir were expected to join either country based on factors such as geographic contiguity, ethnic-religious composition, and the will of the people.
In most cases, these decisions were relatively straightforward. But Kashmir stood apart: it was a region with an almost 90 percent Muslim majority, ruled by a Hindu Maharaja. On paper, its accession to Pakistan appeared inevitable. However, the Maharaja's initial hesitation created a vacuum, and then he turned to India, signing an Instrument of Accession that formally tied Kashmir's fate to New Delhi. India sent troops, controlled a great part of the region, and the first Indo-Pak war broke out.
Pakistan contests the accession to this day, asserting it was signed under duress. It argues the Hindu Maharaja had no right to determine the fate of a Muslim-majority population.
Following the 1947-48 war, Pakistan took control of roughly 30 percent of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which is now administered as Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. India controls the remaining 55 percent of the region, including Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, and Ladakh (by 1962, China had taken control of around 15–20 percent of the territory in Kashmir, which is known as Aksai Chin).
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In response, the United Nations Security Council passed resolutions calling for a ceasefire and a plebiscite to allow Kashmiris to determine their own future. Although first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru initially accepted the UN resolution and stated many times in public that he would implement the plebiscite, it was never held. As political realities hardened, so too did positions: India later rejected international mediation, insisting that Kashmir was an internal matter, while Pakistan insisted that the people of Kashmir should be allowed to decide for themselves.
This contradiction has never been resolved, and its weight still shapes every diplomatic move and military confrontation in the subcontinent.
Despite repeated diplomatic efforts, the Kashmir conflict triggered a new war in 1965, ending with the Soviet-brokered Tashkent Declaration, but tensions persisted. The 1971 war, rooted in Bangladesh's independence, led to the 1972 Simla Agreement — now suspended by Pakistan — which aims to stabilise relations by affirming the Line of Control and rejecting use of force. However, once again, it failed to prevent the 1999 Kargil war.
What lies behind the Pahalgam attack?
The recent attack in Pahalgam did more than claim innocent lives — it reignited deep-seated anxieties about the future of Kashmir’s identity, demography, and political autonomy. I believe that the underlying message from the attackers was a rejection of the demographic and political transformations set in motion by the Indian government since 2019.
On August 5, 2019, the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, guaranteed under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.
Article 370 had allowed the region to have its own constitution and granted it authority over all matters except foreign affairs, defence, and communications. Article 35A, introduced in 1954, reinforced this autonomy by letting the state define "permanent residents" and limit property rights.
These provisions protected Kashmir from demographic changes by preventing outsiders from settling in the region. In the years following the revocation, the Indian government introduced new domicile laws, allowing individuals to apply for residency. For many Kashmiris, this influx is perceived as an attempt to change the region's demography, diluting the region's Muslim-majority character and undermining its cultural identity.
Therefore, the Pahalgam attack is both a reaction to and a consequence of these sweeping changes.
As Kashmir completes its second year of lockdown, the people most affected have been its daily wage workers, who have endured immense mental and financial stress.
The Resistance Front (TRF), the group that claimed responsibility for the attack, emerged shortly after the revocation of Kashmir's special status. In their statements, TRF consistently vowed not to allow non-locals to settle in Kashmir, warning that those contributing to what they describe as a "settler project" would be treated as legitimate targets.
The location of the Pahalgam attack also raises important questions about how it was carried out.
Pahalgam lies deep within the Kashmir Valley, more than 100 kilometres from the Line of Control. Given approximately 750,000 stationed Indian troops in the region, the heavy militarisation along the de facto border and the intense surveillance along infiltration routes, it seems unlikely that the attackers crossed directly from Pakistani territory before the attack.
Instead, it appears that they were either long-term infiltrators who had entered earlier and remained underground, or local recruits and organised within the region itself. Therefore, India’s accusation of Pakistani involvement may rest on weak grounds, as no clear evidence has been publicly presented to support the claim.
Weaponising water
The accusation against Pakistan quickly triggered a series of immediate responses. After the attack, India announced the suspension of Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which manages water sharing between India and Pakistan and has survived three wars (1965, 1971, 1999) and decades of hostility. According to the treaty’s Article 3, “Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers which India is under obligation to let flow”.
Unlike symbolic diplomatic measures such as closing borders or expelling diplomats, the suspension of the IWT carries much deeper implications, such as if India stops sharing crucial information and data on the release of water from its barrages and dams. This could cause floods in Pakistan, as has happened many times in the past.
Before discussing the potential consequences of suspending the IWT, it is important to consider whether India can practically stop the flow of water to Pakistan in the short term. At present, India lacks the infrastructure needed to block or divert these rivers for an extended period. Therefore, the suspension is unlikely to cause immediate disruptions to Pakistan’s water supply.
However, India has been actively building dams and storage facilities that could alter the natural flow of rivers over time. As these projects progress, the long-term impact of the suspension, particularly on Pakistan’s agriculture and energy sectors, could become much more significant.
For the long term, India's move could bring uncertainty for Pakistan's agriculture and energy sector, primarily due to its heavy dependence on the Indus River system. Nearly 70 percent of Pakistan's irrigated agriculture relies on the western rivers, which were allocated to it under the treaty.
Therefore, any reduction of water flow in the long term could disrupt Pakistan's crop cycles and lead to food insecurity. In addition, Pakistan's hydropower infrastructure, such as the Mangla and Tarbela dams, relies on the uninterrupted flow of these rivers. Altered seasonal flows or upstream storage by India could reduce electricity generation, worsening Pakistan’s existing electricity shortages.
However, in my view, the primary motivation behind India's actions goes beyond immediate retaliation. It reflects a broader effort to push for a revision of the IWT, a goal India has pursued for some time.
In this context, the suspension of the IWT is not surprising. Rather than a spontaneous reaction, it appears India is using the attack as an opportunity to advance its long-standing grievances over water-sharing arrangements. New Delhi has increasingly viewed the IWT as outdated and restrictive, and the current escalation may serve to further its strategic aims of renegotiating the treaty on more favourable terms.
The concerns increased after the 2016 Uri attack, when Modi declared, “blood and water cannot flow together,” signalling to politicise the IWT. Talks under the treaty were suspended, and India accelerated dam construction projects on rivers allocated to Pakistan. In January 2023, India formally issued a notice under Article XII of the treaty, seeking its modification because Pakistan was misusing dispute resolution mechanisms to delay Indian infrastructure projects.
The current suspension, therefore, did not arise in isolation; it is part of a broader, long-term strategy in which India is increasingly willing to challenge institutional frameworks it once upheld. By suspending its participation, New Delhi may be seeking to exert pressure on Pakistan, not just as retaliation for recent violence, but as a calculated move to force a renegotiation of the treaty and reshape it in line with India's evolving strategic priorities.
