Worldview is an editorial series by TRT Global featuring in-depth interviews with leading academics, diplomats, and policymakers, bringing expert perspective on global affairs.

As power dynamics in Eurasia shift, the European Union has been steadily expanding its footprint in Central Asia —a region once considered peripheral to its interests. The first EU–Central Asia Presidential Summit marked a public milestone, but the real story is one of gradual, strategic recalibration, predating both Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.  

According to Professor Rick Fawn, this is no abrupt pivot. The EU’s growing engagement stems from years of groundwork, exemplified by its 2019 Central Asia strategy—formulated well before the current spike in geopolitical tension. Once marginal, the region is now a potential energy partner and central to the EU’s vision of a resilient, more westward-facing Eurasia.

The EU’s Global Gateway targets Central Asia as part of a wider push for sustainable infrastructure and a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road. But delays have put Europe at a disadvantage. 

“The EU talked for years about a Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan,” Fawn says. “China moved first, securing a vital energy route. Today, Turkmen hydrocarbons are a key supply for China.” The lesson is crucial: in geopolitics, speed and decisiveness matter. 

Race for influence

As the EU works to strengthen its strategic presence in Eurasia, a pressing question emerges: can the Global Gateway compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially in Central Asia? 

According to Professor Fawn, the answer lies between optimism and realism. The EU’s initiative is bold, but it comes more than a decade after China began reshaping the region through the BRI. 

Launched in 2013 in Kazakhstan, the BRI signalled China’s deep interest in the region and its role as a corridor to the South Caucasus and Europe. Since then, Beijing has built extensive infrastructure and pulled surrounding populations into its economic orbit. Fawn says Western policymakers have often underestimated the extent of this deep engagement.

He recalls co-authoring a 2022 policy article with a former US State Department colleague, advocating for a Western “on-ramp” into the region. 

“We focused on the South Caucasus, especially after the 2020 war, where Azerbaijan liberated much of the territory under Armenian occupation. Since then, I’ve seen real infrastructural development there, which shows how serious Azerbaijan is. Our message was clear: the West must respond.” 

Fawn also adds that there was a rare continuity between the Trump and Biden administrations on global infrastructure through the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), to counter the BRI. 

Still, key opportunities were missed. He cites Georgia’s Anaklia port project, once set to be led by an American consortium, but later taken over by a Chinese one after the deal collapsed. “Now, China will have a port on the Black Sea,” Fawn says. “That’s significant: it boosts China’s position at the Middle Corridor’s endpoint and marks a lost chance for the West.” 

Türkiye’s enduring presence 

Any serious discussion of connectivity and influence in Central Asia must include Türkiye, a country with both strategic geography and deep historical and cultural ties. For Professor Fawn, this connection is more than theoretical or symbolic. 

“After many years of travel across the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Mongolia, I’ve consistently been struck by Türkiye’s strong cultural and linguistic presence,” he says.

“Statues and parks named after Ataturk, Turkish universities, and a broad network of alumni educated in Türkiye reflect decades of outreach. Many across the region speak Turkish, thanks to early initiatives supporting language study and academic exchange,” Fawn adds. 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Türkiye moved quickly to establish a foothold in these emerging markets. Turkish construction firms, retailers, and consumer goods became everyday features in economies transitioning from central planning. 

“The Soviet system was a deficient economy,” Fawn remarks. “Türkiye helped fill that Gap, and still plays a major role in the region, the influence is very strong in everyday economic life.”

In this context, complementary cooperation between the EU and Türkiye in the region appears not only possible but increasingly necessary. “The idea of cooperation between the EU and Türkiye is both good and possible,” he says, adding that “Türkiye’s embedded cultural and economic ties combined with the EU’s infrastructure ambitions, the two actors are well positioned to reinforce one another if they can align their efforts.”

Azerbaijan’s strategic confidence

At the centre of this evolving landscape lies the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route—a route that threads from Central Asia through the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus, ultimately linking to European markets. For the EU, this corridor is not just a logistics path; it is essential to energy diversification and a geopolitical lifeline.

Azerbaijan is stepping up its diplomatic and strategic outreach. Professor Fawn, having participated in conferences hosted by the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy and the Centre for the Analysis of International Relations, describes its foreign policy as dynamic and outward-looking.

Azerbaijan, a major energy producer and vital transit hub, sits at a pivotal crossroads for Caspian and Central Asian resources. The Türkiye–Azerbaijan axis is fast becoming a stabilising force and a driver of connectivity, especially as new infrastructure initiatives emerge and gather momentum. 

One such initiative is the proposed Zangezur Corridor—a land connection linking mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan and onwards to Türkiye. It promises to unlock a new, unprecedented East-West passage across the region. 

However, the challenge lies in whether Armenia can effectively integrate into the region’s evolving infrastructure map. “Can Armenia get connected to this?” Fawn asks. “Or is it going to lose out again?” 

Fawn mentions the “Crossroads For Peace” initiative launched by Armenia in October 2023 to respond to the enormous recent change in the South Caucasus region and for Armenia to demonstrate its own readiness to connect, both east-west and north-south.

So, with large-scale infrastructure developments on the horizon and a potential transformation of the Middle Corridor into a true Eurasian artery, Armenia faces a critical decision point. Whether it becomes part of this emerging network—or remains on its margins which will have consequences for the generations to come.

The South Caucasus: Multiplayer chessboard 

No longer just a strategic crossroads, the South Caucasus has become a chessboard for a widening cast of global and regional actors, each pursuing their own agendas, rivalries, and interests to the table. As Professor Rick Fawn observes, the region’s importance now stretches well beyond its borders and immediate neighbours.

China, while geographically distant, has steadily expanded its influence through infrastructure projects, port deals, and cultural outreach, like funding Chinese language programs in Georgia. 

The European Union, too, has deepened its interest, particularly as Central Asia’s energy potential increasingly flows through the South Caucasus corridor. “Anything energy-related heading west goes through this region,” Fawn explains, “so the EU has a vested interest here.”

While US involvement has waned, regional powers remain active. Iran, alone among the region’s neighbours, maintains ties with all three South Caucasus states—a rare feat in a landscape of fluid alliances. “Often overlooked in the West,” Fawn says, “Iran is deeply present in daily life—from trade and cross-border traffic to goods on store shelves.” 

Armenia finds itself in an unusual position: at the edge of sweeping regional development initiatives that could shape Eurasian connectivity for decades. “They don’t have a regional ally other than Iran, which is a pariah in the West’s eyes,” Fawn says. “And you think from a Western point of view of what that signals,” he adds. 

Fawn also highlights the rising involvement of India and Pakistan, marking a further shift in the region’s multipolar reality. India has become Armenia’s leading arms supplier, replacing Russia its growing defence ties with Yerevan have complicated its once-strong tourism and trade relationship with Azerbaijan. 

“I was struck by how many Indian tourists I used to see in Azerbaijan,” Fawn says, “but now headlines are warning Indian nationals not to travel there. It’s a clear sign of how geopolitics can disrupt even people-to-people ties.”

In contrast, Azerbaijan maintains close ties with Pakistan, reinforced by shared regional stances and diplomatic backing. The India–Armenia and Pakistan–Azerbaijan axes illustrate how far-flung rivalries are now being played out in the South Caucasus and how the region, in turn, is shaping their rivalries.

“This is a region,” Fawn says, “where local and global politics are tightly interwoven. Historical, cultural, and religious ties don’t always translate into political alignment—and that’s precisely what makes the South Caucasus such a pivotal space in the emerging multipolar order.”

Pathways to a balanced Eurasian order

As new transit corridors, power centres, and regional alignments take shape across Eurasia, a broader question comes into focus: In this multipolar moment, will Eurasia remain a battleground for competing powers, or can it become a space for more inclusive and cooperative engagement?

Professor Fawn suggests the reality lies in between. “Rivalry is definitely part of the picture,” he says. “Even the EU, often seen as values-driven, has shifted toward a more geopolitical stance.” He cites the EU’s 2019 Central Asia strategy, which names competitors and sets out responses, reflecting a more realist mindset.

Fawn observes that recent developments in the South Caucasus—arms transfers, strategic realignments, and competing partnerships—reinforce this dynamic. “We’re seeing states, both large and small, act based on strategic interest. That’s classic realism.”

Yet Fawn sees room for hope. “There are also real opportunities for cooperation—genuine win-win scenarios,” he emphasises. He sees the South Caucasus as a region where infrastructure, trade, and connectivity can be leveraged not just for profit, but for peace. “Pipelines and transit routes aren’t only about energy. They’ve long been framed as tools of regional integration and stability.”

Fawn believes there’s a rare opportunity to reshape regional dynamics. He adds, “The credit goes to the Armenian government for recognizing this moment and seeking more constructive engagement.” 

In conclusion, Fawn argues that Eurasia’s future will not be shaped by rivalry or cooperation alone, but by a complex blend of both. “We’re in a moment where a different kind of regional order could emerge. One that is more holistic, more inclusive—and, for the first time in modern history, genuinely shared.”