The collapse of Bashar al Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, has triggered a seismic shift in Syria—one that Israel sees not as a crisis, but as an opportunity to reshape the region’s strategic landscape to its advantage.

In response, Israel is moving beyond its traditional security-driven approach, recalibrating its Syria policy to align with long-term strategic goals. The fall of Assad has not only dismantled the familiar 'devil we know' status quo but also introduced new uncertainties—chief among them, the rise of a leadership potentially aligned with Türkiye and the West, which could undermine Israel’s long-held security rationale for its presence in the occupied Golan Heights.

At the same time, Israel increasingly views a fragmented Syria—divided along ethnic and sectarian lines—as a more manageable and strategically favourable outcome. However, the Syrian government’s recent deal with the SDF, YPG/PKK terror group’s Syrian branch, to integrate them into state institutions represents a new challenge to this vision. This move signals an effort by Damascus to reassert national unity and could potentially disrupt Israel’s strategy of fostering divisions within Syria. Moreover, it may puncture Israel’s fragmented Syria policy by bringing a key US-backed entity closer to the central government.

This effort by Damascus aligns with the broader regional push—led by Türkiye and other actors—toward maintaining Syria’s territorial integrity, in direct opposition to Israel’s vision of a fragmented Syria.

Repeating the Lebanese case: From “good fence” to “good neighbour”

Israel’s evolving approach in the region increasingly reflects a pattern of territorial entrenchment, setting the stage for the gradual “Golanisation” of southern Syria—a trajectory shaped by both historical precedent and contemporary strategic imperatives.

Throughout the Syrian civil war, Israel’s primary security concern in Syria has been Iran-backed groups. Through its sophisticated Campaign Between Wars (MABAM, in Hebrew), Israel has conducted targeted attacks below the threshold of full-scale war, seeking to disrupt Hezbollah’s supply routes and prevent the production of advanced weapons systems inside Syria.

However, Iran’s soft power influence extends beyond the military sphere—deeply embedding itself in Syria’s regime, economy, and social fabric. This has posed a complex challenge for Israel, one it has sought to counteract through strategic interventions.

Israel’s approach draws from its historical Good Fence Policy, initiated in 1976 during the Lebanese civil war. A key aspect of this strategy was Israel's direct backing of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a primarily Christian militia that functioned as its proxy force in southern Lebanon. The SLA maintained security within Israel’s self-designated security zone until its withdrawal in 2000.

Under the guise of humanitarian assistance, Israel established cross-border relationships, like the one at Fatima Gate near Metula, providing medical aid and supplies to local populations, particularly those living in the south. This not only allowed Israel to strategically fill the security and governance void created by the conflict, but also helped cultivate local goodwill and enhance its regional influence. 

While the Good Fence Policy was originally framed as a humanitarian initiative, Israel’s prolonged presence in southern Lebanon ultimately contributed to Hezbollah’s rise—an outcome that remains a critical lesson for its current strategy in Syria.

Within this framework, Israel has pursued a dual-phased approach, leveraging smart power to advance its security and political interests. As Syria’s conflict dynamics increasingly resemble those of Lebanon, Israel has replicated familiar tactics, launching humanitarian operations inside Syria as early as 2013. These efforts later evolved into ‘Operation Good Neighbour’ in 2016.

Under this initiative, Israel sought to cultivate an ostensibly Western-aligned, liberal-leaning zone by providing humanitarian and military assistance to armed groups operating across a vast area encompassing Quneitra, Daraa, and As-Suwayda.

The long-term goal was to establish a foothold in these areas as a model for broader implementation across Syria. However, before the revolution, two key obstacles had hindered these plans: Türkiye’s expanding regional influence and Russia’s alliance with Assad.

In 2017, through Russian mediation, Israel accepted the regime’s return to southern Syria in exchange for keeping Iran-backed elements at least 80 kilometres from its borders, effectively limiting its own manoeuvrability in the region.

Fragmenting Syria: Israel’s long game in the south

The events following the October 7 attack exposed a stark reality; Israel’s contain-delay strategy under MABAM has failed to effectively deter Hezbollah and other Iran-backed elements in the region.

While the abrupt collapse of the Assad regime and the diminishing influence of Russia and Iran have yielded favourable security outcomes for Israel, they have also ushered in new strategic dilemmas. The most pressing concern is the emergence of a new Syrian leadership, that aligns with Türkiye and the West, representing Syria’s majority population and posing no direct military threat to Israel. Such a government could undermine Israel’s security-based justifications for its continued occupation of the Golan Heights.

Recognising this risk, Israel swiftly moved to delegitimise the new administration — labelling it as a ‘terrorist entity’ and launching strikes against the inherited military infrastructure under the pretext of security threats. Paradoxically, Israel has announced plans to double the population in the occupied Golan, vis-a-vis its growing security concerns, signalling a firm commitment to its invasion.

Having invested in the region for years, Israel sought to capitalise on Russia’s withdrawal by advancing beyond the occupation of the 1974 Disengagement Line and extending into water-rich areas of Daraa. Notably, these are the same lands where Israel conducted humanitarian operations since 2013, underscoring the long-term strategic nature of its involvement.

The official justification for this territorial expansion remains Israel’s security concerns and the protection of Druze communities. However, Israel’s actions send a clear message to Damascus: a warning that any attempt to reassert control over the south will be met with force.

At this stage, Israel’s long-term objective appears clear—it seeks to prevent the rise of a strong, unified Syria that could pose a future security threat. The most effective means of achieving this is through the fragmentation of Syria into weak, divided political entities, ensuring no central authority in Damascus can challenge Israel’s position in the north. 

This strategy also raises the possibility of Israeli control extending beyond the occupied Golan Heights, reinforcing the “Golanisation” of southern Syria—a trajectory shaped by historical precedent and contemporary geopolitical calculations.

Syria, Türkiye and Israel

Rooted in a security doctrine that predates its founding, Israel has long viewed Middle Eastern minority groups as integral partners in its security strategy. An essential component of Israel’s vision for a fragmented Syria is the structure that has now taken shape in the form of the PYD/YPG terrorist organisation.

This entity represents not only Israel’s broader ambition to reshape Syria’s political landscape but also reflects Israel’s historical outlook toward Kurdish groups in the Middle East. However, the recent Syrian-SDF agreement challenges this approach by potentially neutralising one of Israel’s key instruments for division in Syria.

Türkiye, on the other hand, remains a formidable and resolute force standing in opposition to Israel’s regional ambitions.

To counter Türkiye’s influence, Israel has pursued a hard power-driven yet carefully calibrated strategy, leveraging minority groups to expand its own regional footprint. Yet, Türkiye's strategic depth and close relations with Syria present significant obstacles to Israel’s objectives.

In a scenario where Israel achieves its strategic aims, Syria would find itself encircled—sectarian and ethnic enclaves to the east and west, the PYD/YPG along the Euphrates, and the Israeli-backed Druze communities to the south, and no viable access to the sea or any neighbouring country except Türkiye. This would render Syria weak and perpetually vulnerable, yet Türkiye's robust military and diplomatic clout would prevent any lasting destabilisation in the region.

Israel’s evolving approach in southern Syria underscores a broader geopolitical vision—one that prioritises territorial entrenchment, political fragmentation, and the cultivation of proxy alliances. However, Türkiye’s strategic countermeasures and its unwavering commitment to regional stability serve as a powerful check on Israel’s ambitions, ensuring that the "Golanisation" of Syria remains an unattainable outcome for Israel, despite its efforts to reshape the regional balance of power.