Over the course of recent weeks, the intensifying human catastrophe that is Gaza has elicited a range of condemnations from civil society and different governments, including those in the West that have been hitherto reticent to express harsh condemnation.

In the UK, Foreign Secretary David Lammy has expressed sentiments that sparked renewed scrutiny of Britain’s stance towards Israel. He noted that the UK "will go further in taking measures against Israel… if the intolerable situation continues". 

Moreover, a YouGov opinion poll was released today indicating that around half the British public back a range of sanctions on Israel. The UK government will undoubtedly respond in some fashion, with rumours circulating that new sanctions are being discussed, and have been for some time.

But does this signal a meaningful shift in UK foreign policy? Or will this be attacked as merely symbolic posturing, devoid of genuine and substantive consequence?

Potential measures

Academics such as Israeli professor Omer Bartov, one of the world’s leading experts on genocide studies, has publicly concluded that what Israel is carrying out in Gaza is genocide, in the pages of The New York Times, no less.

British judge, Baroness Kennedy, has also publicly concluded the same on British radio. In British academia, media, civil society, but also in government and policy circles, the conclusion that Israel’s war on Gaza has become genocidal is hardly uncommon. Privately, many in senior positions of political and governmental authority recognise the same.

Given that widespread sentiment, which matches the facts on the ground in Gaza due to Israeli action, there is naturally a great deal of pressure on the UK government to translate harsher rhetoric on Israel into action. 

Several concrete steps are indeed available in this regard. These range from symbolic gestures to significant legal and diplomatic measures:

• Suspension of arms exports: The UK has historically licensed hundreds of millions of pounds worth of arms to Israel. A substantial suspension and cancellation of many such licenses took place last year, but many still remain, particularly F-35 parts. Suspending or revoking these licenses would be a major, though not unprecedented, escalation in diplomatic pressure.

• Stronger support for international legal investigations: The UK could give more public support to the International Criminal Court, which has faced an inordinate amount of pressure in recent months. The UK should also publish the official legal response to the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) finding that the occupation of Palestinian territories is unlawful; this is a demand that more than 100 UK parliamentarians themselves recently made.
  
  But more than that, the UK could publicly join South Africa’s case at the ICJ, which has accused Israel of genocide. Such a message would place a great deal of pressure on Israel’s political establishment.

• Further proscriptions of extremist Israeli ministers and settler groups: Given increasing international concern over the role of far-right ministers in inciting violence, the UK could go much further in the designation of other ministers in Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, beyond Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.

  In particular, sanctioning the Defence and Foreign Ministers, considering their increasingly bellicose and far-right rhetoric, would send a definitive message. As for settler groups in the occupied West Bank, the entire settlement enterprise is illegal according to British law and policy. Any engagement with it could be a proscription-worthy offence. As it stands at the moment, UK charities can raise money for settlements - a controversial example came to light this past week.

• Recognition of Palestine: Long advocated by many within Labour and other European capitals, recognising Palestine as a state could carry symbolic and legal weight.

• Ban on settlement products: While the UK mandates labeling of goods from Israeli settlements, a full ban could follow models implemented in Ireland or proposed by the EU.

• Prosecutions: British officials could declare that Israeli officials or military personnel could be subject to prosecution, subject to evidence being provided. (Note the Portuguese case of an Israeli soldier being identified by civil society).
  
  Each of these steps, while fraught with political complications, is wholly within the scope of Britain’s foreign policy apparatus – they simply require political will.

The credibility gap

That is, of course, the question – does London have the political will to implement these steps? What are the reasons for this reticence?

As of yet, it is not particularly clear that Lammy’s increased rhetoric on Israel will lead to substantive policy change. No immediate actions followed his comments, and there was little indication, at least publicly, that there would be any forthcoming.

This is despite the fact that among Labour voters, Labour MPs, and the public more widely, there is anger at, and frustration with, the Israeli government for its actions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, not simply in Gaza recently, but also in the occupied West Bank.

Nevertheless, actual changes to policies are likely to face several major obstacles within the Labour Party, which currently governs the UK.

The first relates to the legacy of the Jeremy Corbyn era, during which the Labour Party faced criticism for its handling of anti-Semitism allegations—prompting subsequent leadership to invest significant effort in rebuilding trust with British Jewish communities.

The second relates to London’s alignment with Washington DC. There is a deep conviction that London’s strategic national interests, fundamentally, necessitate a deep alliance with the United States of America, and that if this alliance were to rupture, it would mean hugely negative consequences for the UK.

Washington DC, of course, is tremendously supportive of Israel and the Netanyahu government; the concern in London is that if the UK veers too critical of Tel Aviv, it could create unhelpful tensions with Washington DC.

Given how important the American element is in British security architecture, particularly when one considers not only the wider Arab world and Middle East, but also Russia and Europe, it’s not hard to see why London would be cautious about taking steps that might upset Washington.

The final reason seems to be a very personal one, in that the current Labour Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, is particularly invested in the UK-Israel relationship, despite wide violations by Tel Aviv of international law, be it in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Syria, or Iran. 

This may have come as a surprise due to Starmer’s background as a human rights lawyer, but it has been made clear time and again in the past two years. In that regard, a change in policy may be about making the right arguments, but it is also fundamentally about Starmer’s own personal convictions.

Breaking the dam is unlikely

Nevertheless, the UK government relies on the parliamentary Labour Party, and an increasing number of Labour MPs – as well as MPs from other parties – are decidedly unsatisfied by the UK’s stance on Israel.

This also seems to have been the impetus behind the UK’s proscription of two Israeli ministers, Ben Gvir and Smotrich, along with Canada, Norway, and New Zealand.

In this regard, it is likely that further proscriptions will take place, although it is not clear at what level or how many. Further measures on different Israeli settlers could also be in the making, although how many is also unclear.

Might there be more steps? Recognition of a Palestinian state remains possible – especially given that this was actually the established policy of Labour until relatively recently – but it would likely cause a level of tension with Washington DC that London may be unwilling to engage with at present.

Ceasing the F-35 parts sales would be unlikely, particularly after the UK government spent a great deal of time and effort in defending its position in court against challenges vis-à-vis this policy. As for joining the South African case at the ICJ, this would require a tremendous amount of political will, which seems absent.

As such, the risk remains that these recent statements, and even further proscriptions, are designed more to manage political optics than to deliver structural change. Unless backed up by substantial and tangible policy moves, they are unlikely to convince the wider public that there has been a genuine shift in British policy on Israel/Palestine.