After a prolonged and bitter standoff, Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers are back at the table, negotiating to mend their frayed relations.

The two countries have taken tentative steps toward normalisation, marked by the recent appointment of full-time ambassadors in each other’s capitals.

Credit for this diplomatic thaw largely goes to China, which hosted and facilitated an informal trilateral meeting of foreign ministers in Beijing on May 21. That gathering helped thaw the ice between Islamabad and Kabul.

Diplomatic circles in Pakistan see it as a “meaningful move”. While it falls short of full recognition of the Afghan Taliban as the legitimate rulers, it tacitly acknowledges them as the de facto government.  

Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar, who also holds the portfolio of foreign minister, announced the appointment of a full-time ambassador to Kabul while he was in Hong Kong.

This signalled a shift from Islamabad’s previous posture of waiting for a green light from the US-led Western bloc.

Though formal recognition remains elusive, the move reflects a significant shift in policy, one that aligns with growing regional acceptance of the Taliban government. 

China leads, others follow

China, which upgraded diplomatic ties with the Afghan Taliban in 2023, has already made huge investments, especially in Afghanistan’s mining sector.

Now Beijing enjoys influence in Kabul as it emerged as the biggest player in this land-locked nation following the departure of the US-led NATO forces.

China has also made Afghanistan part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is a flagship project of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This offers another reason for both Kabul and Islamabad to resolve their differences and instead exploit the economic, trading and investment opportunities. 

Meanwhile, regional shifts continue. Russia and Kazakhstan have removed the Taliban from their domestic terrorist list, and diplomatic sources say that Tajikistan is also expected to follow suit.  

Uzbekistan has already established a free economic zone on its border with Afghanistan, where Afghans are allowed a two-week visa-free entry.  

For Pakistan, the stakes are high. Improved security and infrastructure in Afghanistan could finally enable it to tap Central Asian trade and to meet its energy needs from Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The dream also includes building a railroad, connecting Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Weight of history 

However, the weight of history and geopolitics keeps the task of building normal and trustworthy ties between the two neighbours complicated, if not impossible.

Not long ago, Pakistan and Afghanistan were frequently exchanging cross-border artillery and barbs. Islamabad had been accusing the Afghan Taliban of harbouring anti-Pakistan militant groups, including the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), since they returned to power in Kabul in August 2021.

Pakistan also blamed Afghanistan for allowing secessionist nationalist groups to use its soil for carrying out attacks in its restive southwestern Balochistan province. Militant groups, including the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the TTP, also collaborate in carrying out terrorist attacks, which is a new phenomenon.   

Kabul denies these allegations and asks Islamabad to look inwards for the solution to its terrorism challenge.  

As the number of terrorist attacks increased inside Pakistan, Islamabad launched a series of punitive measures, which included the repatriation of undocumented Afghan refugees.

Since October 2023, more than 850,000 Afghans have been , despite appeals for restraint from rights groups and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

Pakistan still hosts more than three million Afghan refugees. They include 1.3 million who hold ‘Proof of Registration’ Cards and 800,000 or so who have Afghan Citizen Cards, but around one million are living illegally without any documentation.

Pakistan had been hosting the Afghan refugees since 1979, when the troops of the former Soviet Union first marched into Afghanistan. However, the rushed expulsion of refugees is only one flashpoint.

Pakistan is also fencing the 2,640 km long border with Afghanistan and enforcing a visa regime, a far cry from the past when Afghans crossed freely with minimal paperwork.

These restrictions also hurt cross-border Pashtun communities who share deep ethnic, cultural, and economic ties. The Taliban, predominantly Pashtun themselves, see these measures as hostile. 

Pakistan’s disappointment

Pakistan had hoped the return of the Taliban, its long-time ally during the US occupation, would ensure a friendly government in Kabul, unlike past pro-Western administrations that were aligned with New Delhi.

During the US-led NATO occupation of Afghanistan, the governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani maintained close ties with New Delhi, which operated diplomatic missions in Jalalabad and Kandahar, locations Islamabad accused of being used for espionage and sponsoring terrorism – charges denied by New Delhi.

For the Pakistani side, apart from the issues of terrorism and the fear of the renewal of the New Delhi and Kabul nexus, Afghanistan’s refusal to accept the Durand Line as the internationally recognised border also remains a concern.

This long-standing dispute dates back to 1893 but still shapes Afghan attitudes toward Pakistan’s Pashtun belt. 

Afghan Taliban’s limitations

For Islamabad, the most urgent issue is terrorism. But pressuring the Afghan Taliban to rein in the TTP is easier said than done. The leaders and foot soldiers of both these militias are graduates from the same Pakistani seminaries and they share identical ideology. They both had fought against the US-led NATO forces together.

There are also concerns among the Afghan Taliban that any move to limit the TTP activities may result in the drift of its fighters toward the Daesh, which is challenging both Afghanistan and Pakistan simultaneously.

Some Pakistani experts argue that Islamabad should avoid viewing Kabul solely through the lens of the TTP. Broader engagement – economic, diplomatic, and cultural – would create the environment needed to marginalise extremist groups. 

Upgrading diplomatic ties is indeed a step in the right direction. Pakistan and Afghanistan face a stark choice: continue a cycle of mistrust and conflict or embrace pragmatic diplomacy grounded in mutual economic and security interests. 

The reestablishment of ambassadorial ties may be a modest step, but it offers a rare opening. Both nations and the region stand to gain if they can walk through it together.