For much of the post-Soviet era, Georgia was a staunchly pro-Western state, courting NATO, aspiring to EU membership, and eyeing Russia warily. But the world has changed, and so too has Tbilisi’s foreign policy. 

In an increasingly fragmented and multipolar landscape, Georgia is pursuing a multi-vector approach that balances relations between East and West. 

This recalibration reflects not just regional pressures but global realignments. The unipolar moment of the 1990s has waned. The liberal international order is fraying, buffeted by China’s rise, Russia’s resurgence, and the relative retreat of the United States. Amid this uncertainty, Georgia is recalibrating its diplomacy. 

The shift began in the mid-2010s. The 2008 financial crisis, Western ambivalence toward Russian aggression, and Donald Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy all contributed to a growing sense in Tbilisi that it could no longer rely solely on Euro-Atlantic partners. Non-alignment and diversified diplomacy emerged as strategic necessities. 

A key feature of this evolving posture is Georgia’s deepening ties with non-Western powers, particularly China. The rise of Asia, led by China but flanked by India, has created new economic and strategic opportunities. 

In July 2023, Tbilisi signed a strategic partnership agreement, the first of its kind in the region at that time, with Beijing, the first of its kind in the South Caucasus. 

Mandarin is now offered in Georgian schools. A Chinese bank recently acquired a major Georgian lender. The two sides have also pledged to deepen bilateral trade, investment and general political relations. Chinese firms were also chosen in the tender to build a deep-sea port at Anaklia on the Black Sea shore. 

The timing of this partnership clearly shows that China increasingly backs the “Middle Corridor” concept, which casts Georgia as a crucial node linking East and West. The Black Sea, once peripheral, has become a crowded geopolitical arena. Russia, Türkiye, the EU, and now China, all have overlapping stakes.

The war in Ukraine has sharpened competition over strategic infrastructure. Transit routes, ports, pipelines, and railways now carry geopolitical weight alongside commercial value.

For Beijing, Georgia offers a launchpad for westward influence—its geographic position granting access to both Europe and Central Asia. Tbilisi, in turn, has cultivated deeper ties with Central Asian states that rely on Georgian infrastructure to reach European markets. Georgia’s role as a logistical hub is being quietly but steadily reinforced.

China increasingly views the Black Sea as a vital commercial and security artery, and Georgia as a key node in its Middle Corridor vision. From ports to railways, the region's infrastructure is becoming more contested and more critical.

But Georgia also looks beyond China. Tbilisi has built ever closer ties with Central Asian states, which serve as a vital corridor on the road to China.  

Georgia’s regional pragmatism

This pragmatism extends to Georgia’s immediate neighbours. Intra-Caucasus diplomacy is stirring.

Visits by Georgian officials to the region have become more commonplace. Trade and investment opportunities beckon, as well as Central Asia’s own interests in using Georgia’s ports and other infrastructure, such as railways, to reach the EU market.

In April, Georgia hosted a rare trilateral meeting of deputy foreign ministers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia aimed at strengthening cooperation and regional stability. Such diplomacy shows a growing interest in regional problem-solving.

The main goal of the meeting was to share the common interests and views of the three countries that will contribute to the strengthening of mutually beneficial cooperation and geopolitical stability of the region. The trilateral summit also aimed at establishing this new format for cooperation in the South Caucasus.

Georgia is not alone in reassessing its strategic posture. Shifts also have taken place in Armenia, which, disgruntled by Russia’s apparent lack of interest, has sought closer security and military links with India, France, the EU, the United States, and widened cooperation with Iran.

Ties with Gulf states are also expanding, as seen in the sale of Tbilisi’s dry port to a UAE-based firm.

While Tbilisi has intensified engagement with Central Asian states, relations with Türkiye, a long-time trading partner, have deepened. Since 2022, high-level meetings between Ankara and Tbilisi have intensified. Since 2022, when a radical shift in Georgia’s foreign policy began, the relations with Ankara have further expanded, as evidenced by high-level meetings. Even Yerevan has pushed for full normalisation with Türkiye.

Georgia has taken the most decisive turn toward multi-alignment and expansion of bilateral relations with non-Western powers, but that does not mean it is abandoning the West.

Diversifying Western foreign policy

Tbilisi is not completely shutting the door to integration into Western institutions. Georgia’s constitution still enshrines EU and NATO membership as strategic objectives.

Georgian officials have long emphasised the need to renew bilateral relations. The country (at least officially) remains committed to EU and NATO integration, as per the existing stipulation in the country’s constitution, which states that the country will strive to become a member of the EU and NATO.

The ruling Georgian Dream party no longer presents Euro-Atlantic integration as the only path forward. With Western sanctions a lingering threat and enlargement fatigue palpable in Brussels, Georgia is diversifying its international relations. 

Even relations with Russia, while fraught, have settled into a pragmatic rhythm. Diplomatic ties, severed in 2008, remain frozen. Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia continues to strain the relationship. But trade is booming—from $1.6bn in 2021 to $2.53bn in 2024.  

Much depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Yet even if Russia emerges strengthened, fundamental issues such as Georgia’s occupied territories will keep relations cool.  

Georgia’s strategic shift reflects the realities of a world where alliances are fluid. In such an environment, flexibility is an asset. The room for manoeuvre is narrow. Too much tilt toward Moscow or Beijing could risk alienating the West without securing lasting alternatives. 

The challenge for Georgia is to remain agile without becoming isolated, to diversify its partnerships without abandoning its principles. In the age of multipolarity, the cost of choosing sides may be greater than the price of balance.