China’s recent military parade marking the end of World War II Japanese surrender, sent a pointed message to Western capitals, particularly Washington: Beijing is unwilling to comply with what it sees as the Trump administration’s one-sided vision for a new world order. 

The show of force featured thousands of goose-stepping soldiers and a wide array of advanced weaponry – from submarine drones to the Dongfeng-61 intercontinental ballistic missile, capable of carrying multiple warheads, and the Dongfeng-5C, which can strike US soil from northern China. 

Just three days earlier, Xi Jinping had hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin. Leaders from Türkiye, India, Pakistan, and several Central Asian states attended. On parade day itself, Xi stood flanked by Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, underscoring Beijing’s tightening bonds with two of Washington’s main adversaries. 

During the summit, China and Russia also signed a critical energy deal to construct a new cross-border pipeline.  

These developments triggered Trump to post a sarcastic message on Truth Social: “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong-un, as you conspire against The United States of America”, a barb directed at Xi, with whom he has long claimed a “great relationship”.

‘Broader than just security’

Charlie Parton, the EU’s former First Councillor on China, and a senior associate fellow at Royal United States Institute (RUSI), a British think-tank, interprets both the SCO meeting and military parade “through the lens of anti-Americanism.” 

“It (China) is trying to establish an alternative global governance order, one which better reflects Beijing's rather than Washington's or Brussels' interests and values,” Parton tells TRT World. “The SCO meeting in Tianjin should be viewed in that light, one that is broader than just security.”

According to Parton, a leading Western expert on China, Beijing aims to create a world order which preserves some parts of the global system from which “it has benefitted and will benefit while keeping the organisational facade, such as the UN, WTO,” changing those international organisations’ “contents” in its favour. 

By contrast, Hongda Fan, a Chinese political scientist and professor at Shanghai International Studies University, frames China’s rising profile differently.

He views the SCO summit and the September 3 parade as offering “a potential option for future global development” not evidence of “plans for global domination.” 

According to Hongda, China’s influence is growing because “the positive impact of Western powers on the normal functioning of the world is significantly declining”. Many developing countries, he adds, see Beijing as a promoter, and even leader, of a more “equitable international community.” 

China: defender of international order 

Hongda insists that Beijing does not seek supremacy, but rather a fair international order not dominated by a single superpower. Unlike the US, which has “repeatedly undermined” international governance, China presents itself as defending the post-WWII system, which, he says, “once played a hugely positive role and remains effective in many respects today.”

Historical framing supports Beijing’s narrative. During WWII, China and the Soviet Union fought alongside the US, Britain and France against Axis powers. In the aftermath, they helped shape the international institutions of the postwar order. 

Yet, Hongda argues, as developing nations have risen, Washington and its allies have increasingly perceived their interests as threatened. This, he claims, has led them to make decisions that violate the very rules they once championed.  

“This is one of the key reasons for the current chaos in the international community,” he says. “Beijing believes that the international order should serve all nations, not just a small group. In this sense, Beijing believes that the post-WWII world order needs to be maintained, while also requiring necessary reforms”.

Altay Atli, an international relations lecturer at Koc University, echoes this view. “The existing system was not working. But it has become even more dysfunctional with America's recent unilateral initiatives,” he says.

According to Atli, the SCO summit and platforms such as BRICS reflect a deepening demand for an alternative global order, with China now clearly in the lead thanks to its growing military and economic clout. 

Does China offer a G2 to the US?

Kadir Temiz, President of ORSAM and a faculty member at Istanbul Medeniyet University, sees China’s display of strength not just as anti-American theatre but as a message: “It is now a grown force, who should have an equal say on global matters.” 

Unlike the 1990s, when Beijing accepted a junior role as the world’s manufacturing hub, by the 2010s China had become the world’s largest producer and exporter, threatening Washington’s economic dominance.

Temiz argues that China now seeks a “new type of great power relations”, comparable in some respects to the US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War, though not identical.

“Their offer to Washington is not something like US-Soviet rivalry, but a kind of G2 model where the two most powerful states can form a partnership on technological, economic and political issues.” 

Whether such a partnership can remain cooperative, Temiz says, depends on China’s economic and technological capacity, and on its ideological appeal.

Despite showcasing its military power alongside Putin and Kim, Temiz and other experts agree that Beijing has no interest in forming a military alliance against Washington.  

While China’s army has modernised significantly, Beijing is still no match for America’s global military presence with 800 bases across the world and 10,000 aircraft carriers patrolling seas and oceans of the globe.

Instead, Beijing leans on soft power: trade, infrastructure projects, and financial ties. “Military confrontation is no longer a fundamental feature of relations between major powers,” says Hongda. “In other words, a major power that relies on military confrontation as a means of achieving national development will find it difficult to achieve success."