In the aftermath of the unprecedented airstrikes last month on Iran’s nuclear facilities by the United States and Israel, Tehran’s leadership is now weighing a decision that could redraw the global nuclear order: withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

In line with this shift, Iran’s parliament last week passed a binding law mandating the suspension of all cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On July 2, President Masoud Pezeshkian formally ordered all executive institutions to comply with the legislation, signalling a serious escalation in Tehran’s nuclear posture.

Iranian officials argue that membership in a treaty unable to safeguard its core promises—particularly the protection of peaceful nuclear development—has lost its legitimacy.

Established in 1968, the NPT is built on three central pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 

Member states without nuclear weapons commit not to acquire them, nuclear-armed states pledge to move toward disarmament, and all members are guaranteed access to civilian nuclear technology under international safeguards. 

Iran, a signatory since 1970, has long insisted that its nuclear programme is civilian in nature—developed for energy production and medical research.

However, after recent attacks targeted its key nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, and Arak, Iranian leaders are publicly questioning the point of honouring a treaty that failed to protect them.

As Iran increased uranium enrichment—while still cooperating with IAEA inspectors—it entered stalled indirect talks with the US aimed at preventing weaponisation and lifting sanctions. 

Israel claims that Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities is an existential threat and launched strikes to degrade its programme when Tehran refused to halt enrichment on its own soil—a right protected under the NPT. 

According to analysts, the strikes also aimed to pressure Iran ahead of any final US decision on military action.

Legal rights, obligations, and the cost of withdrawal

In recent weeks, Tehran has escalated its rhetoric. Iranian officials have suspended cooperation with the IAEA, disabled surveillance cameras, and threatened to expel inspectors. 

A government spokesperson explicitly stated that Iran has the legal right to withdraw, provided it gives a three-month notice and cites extraordinary events that have jeopardised its national interests. 

The strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—which increase the risk of environmental contamination, radiation exposure, and damage to civilian populations—could well constitute such grounds.

Under international law, the joint US-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities were also highly questionable. 

Military intervention for the purpose of counter-proliferation must be authorised by a resolution of the United Nations Security Council and carried out with the legitimacy of international consensus. The use of force outside this framework—absent imminent threat or multilateral sanction—sets a dangerous precedent. 

It undermines the very architecture of international law and allows nuclear-armed states to act arbitrarily against non-nuclear ones, potentially incentivising proliferation rather than preventing it.

As an NPT member, Iran has several key rights: access to peaceful nuclear technology, protection under the IAEA safeguard system, and international recognition of its sovereign development of nuclear energy. 

At the same time, it has obligations: full transparency, non-diversion of nuclear material to weapons programmes, and cooperation with IAEA inspections. 

By walking away from the treaty, Iran would no longer be bound by these obligations and could pursue nuclear development free from international oversight—raising profound concerns about regional stability.

Strategic opacity and regional fallout

Iran’s abandoning of the treaty would make self-restraint on attacking more sensitive Israeli targets, such as the Dimona Nuclear plants, disappear.

In such a scenario, Iran might not only limit access for IAEA inspectors but also reconstitute its centrifuge operations in secret facilities. Without the reporting requirements of the NPT, Iran would not be legally obligated to disclose new nuclear sites or stockpile levels.

Compounding the issue is uncertainty over the current status of Iran’s enriched uranium. There is no credible evidence to suggest that the entirety of Iran’s stockpile—reportedly including some 400 kilograms of 60 percent-enriched uranium—was destroyed. 

No radiation has been detected, and reports have surfaced that Iran preemptively moved its most sensitive materials to undisclosed locations prior to the Fordow attack. If true, these reserves could now be used either as a bargaining chip or as the core of a potential weapons programme.

Should Iran formally suspend its NPT membership, the path to a nuclear weapon would, at least technically, be much clearer. 

With inspectors out of the country and oversight mechanisms deactivated, Iran could accelerate enrichment, install advanced centrifuge cascades in fortified sites, and obscure the process with strategic misinformation.

Already, conflicting statements from Iranian officials—some claiming the uranium stockpile was destroyed, others hinting it could still be used—suggest that Tehran may engage in an asymmetric game of ambiguity to confuse foreign intelligence services and sow doubt.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump recently declared, “Iran’s nuclear programme has been completely dismantled, and the last thing they are thinking about is building a bomb.”

However, this statement has sparked debate inside the United States, especially after a newly released Pentagon assessment contradicted the claim, suggesting that Iran retains the technical capacity and materials necessary to resume rapid weaponization if it chooses to do so.

But far from eliminating the threat, the joint US-Israeli attack may have created a far more complex security dilemma.

Instead of achieving containment, the strike has introduced a dangerous new variable: strategic opacity—the deliberate sowing of uncertainty about nuclear intentions to gain political and deterrent leverage.

By pushing Iran into a position where ambiguity becomes an asset, the attack has inadvertently opened the door to a less predictable and more volatile nuclear environment.

The joint US-Israeli strikes also triggered swift global condemnation. China and Russia labelled them unlawful escalations that threatened regional stability and set a dangerous precedent for attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities.

European Union leaders urged restraint and called on Iran to remain within the NPT framework, warning that abandoning diplomacy risks further proliferation and destabilisation.

In a region already shaped by suspicion and brinkmanship, Iran’s potential withdrawal from the NPT could set a powerful precedent, challenging the very foundation of international non-proliferation architecture. 

Whether this move is rhetorical leverage or a genuine pivot remains to be seen—but the consequences would reverberate far beyond the Middle East.