At first glance, it's difficult to imagine a more unexpected alliance: Israel, a traditional US ally, actively lobbies for the preservation of Russian military presence in Syria. This situation seemingly contradicts decades of tense relations between Tel Aviv and Moscow, especially during the Soviet era.
However, in today's turbulent and chaotic world, particularly within the Middle East landscape where Bashar al Assad's regime was recently overthrown and a new government came to power, Israel views Russia as a stabilising factor that helps maintain the regional balance of power.
TRT has previously reported multiple times on Russia's desire to maintain its bases in Syria. To make a long story short: this is essential for Moscow to both preserve its international prestige and support its military operations in Africa. The Syrian facilities serve as a crucial logistical hub for supplying Russian forces on the African continent.
Netanyahu's pragmatic approach
In the silent corridors of the Kremlin, the footsteps of Israeli Major General Roman Gofman, military secretary to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, recently echoed. His mission to Moscow wasn't widely publicised but was important for Israel's security strategy. According to reports, Gofman conducted a series of meetings with Russian officials, seeking to strengthen cooperation between the countries amid the transforming Syrian issue.
According to the Israeli media sources familiar with the content of these negotiations, Israel views the Russian presence in Syria as a factor of regional stability and aims to maintain the existing status quo.
Gofman's visit is just part of the notable warming between Moscow and Tel Aviv recently. Another significant step was Israel's invitation to the Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9, commemorating the defeat of Nazi Germany. Although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not plan to personally attend the event, Israel will be represented by Ambassador Simona Halperin, which is a significant diplomatic gesture.
In her comments to Russian media, Halperin emphasised the unchanging historical position of Israel: "Historical facts do not change due to geopolitical or other circumstances. In 2017, the Israeli Knesset decided that May 9 would be recognised as Victory Day."
Lobbying in Washington
According to recent Reuters reports, Israeli officials are conducting an active campaign, persuading the US to allow Russia to maintain military bases in Syria—the Mediterranean naval base in Tartus province and the Khmeimim air base in Latakia.
"Israel is lobbying the US for keeping Syria weak and decentralised, including allowing Russia to retain its military bases there to counter Türkiye’s growing influence in the country," four sources familiar with the efforts said.
Notably, during meetings with American officials, the Israeli delegation spoke so positively about the Russian presence that it caused surprise among the participants. Some American representatives objected that Türkiye, as a NATO member, would be a better guarantor of Israel's security. However, Israeli officials were "adamant" in their disagreement.
UN voting and strategic changes
A telling episode was the recent vote in the UN General Assembly, where Israel voted together with Russia and the US against a resolution supporting Ukraine. Recall that on February 25, Israel voted against a resolution condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine. This step reflects the cynical position of Israeli foreign policy, for which principles and values mean nothing, and leadership is exercised only depending on immediate interests.
Also, to understand these rapid geopolitical changes, one must consider the complex dynamics of the Syrian conflict. After the fall of the Assad's regime, Syria came under the control of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) led by Ahmed Alsharaa. Türkiye’s has supported the Syrian opposition from the beginning, thus quickly becoming a key ally of the new Syrian government.
Why does Israel prefer Russia to Türkiye?
Israel's strategic interests in this situation are determined by several factors.
First, Russia has maintained a relatively stable and predictable military presence in Syria since 2015. This stability is valuable for Israel, which prefers to deal with a predictable actor rather than a power vacuum that irreconcilable forces might fill.
There exists a conflict prevention mechanism between Israel and Russia in Syrian airspace. This agreement allows Israel to conduct air strikes on targets in Syria without Russian interference. If Russian bases were replaced by, say, Turkish forces, this freedom of action could vanish.
Notably, cooperation between Israel and Russia was evident even during Assad's regime. Russia's air defence systems deployed in Syria, including advanced S-300 and S-400 complexes, were never activated against Israeli military aircraft conducting hundreds of strikes on Iranian and Syrian targets. This tacit "non-aggression agreement" allowed Israel to protect its security interests without entering into direct conflict with Russia.
As former deputy director of Israel's National Security Council, Eran Lerman, noted: "The fact that Russia has accepted the notion that this is what we are doing, tells you quite a lot about their respect for our military capability."
Russia's presence in Syria also acts as a counterweight to Iranian influence. Although Russia and Iran both supported Assad's regime, their interests don't always align. Moscow occasionally limited Iran's military entrenchment near Israeli borders, which corresponded to Israel's goal of preventing the strengthening of Iranian presence in Syria.
The Turkish factor in the new equation
Türkiye is actively strengthening its positions in the region, developing ties with the new Syrian leadership. Ankara declares its commitment to regional stabilisation, which fundamentally diverges from the interests of Israel, which seeks to extract maximum advantage from the chaotic situation in the Middle East, not shying away from ethnic cleansing, genocide, occupation, and annexation.
Since the beginning of Israel's invasion of Gaza, Ankara has substantially increased its diplomatic, media, political, and legal support for the Palestinian cause. Türkiye has also completely severed trade relations with Tel Aviv, which amounted to $9.5 billion, and significantly increased humanitarian aid to the besieged Palestinian exclave. It now becomes obvious that Türkiye's regional strengthening has concerned Israel so much that Tel Aviv is actively seeking opportunities even to maintain Russian presence in Syria as a counterweight to Ankara's influence.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recently noted the complexity of the new geopolitical situation in the region, where various powers seek to strengthen their influence. It is important for Israel to maintain a qualitative military edge (QME) in the region.
This concept assumes that Israel must maintain technological, military, and strategic superiority over neighbouring states and potential adversaries in the region. The US is legally obligated to support this Israeli superiority, which has been enshrined in American legislation since 2008.
The Israeli leadership views Russian bases as a factor capable of battling Turkish influence. Moreover, unlike Turkish presence, Russian military facilities in Syria, as the practice of recent years has shown, do not hinder Israeli military operations when it comes to pursuing their own interests.
Türkiye has become the main winner of the overthrow of Assad's regime. Ankara now faces priority tasks—normalising the internal situation in Syria, preventing violence and internal conflicts. A critically important priority is also completing the anti-terrorist campaign on Syrian territory to ensure its own national security. On December 9, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Syria has entered a "bright period" in its history.
US response and prospects
It remains unclear to what extent President Donald Trump's administration is considering accepting Israel's proposals. The US has said little about Syria since Trump took office, creating a policy vacuum that Israel seeks to fill. So far, Syria is of little interest to Trump. At the same time, Israel's rapprochement with Russia causes some concern among Western allies.
It is important to mention that the Russian military presence in Syria could help Moscow to preserve its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, challenging US naval and air operations.
It is also worth noting that Europe opposes Russian presence in Syria. Should the American administration view Israeli aspirations favourably, this could become yet another stumbling block in transatlantic relations.
"Many foreign ministers took this up to say that, you know, it should be a condition for the new leadership that they also get rid of the Russian influence there because it is a base where they also conduct their activities towards Africa and southern neighbours," European Union's top diplomat Kaja Kallas told journalists after a gathering of the EU's foreign ministers in Brussels.
"So we will raise this issue with the leadership when we have the meetings."
However, Israel appears willing to take this risk, seeing Russia as a lesser threat than the strengthening of Türkiye's regional positions.
A new geopolitical reality
Israel's lobbying for Russian presence in Syria is a vivid example of how traditional alliances can transform in the face of new challenges. The sharp warming of relations between Moscow and Washington also plays in favour of the Israeli leadership's plans. In the modern world, ideological dividing lines lose their significance, and strategic national security interests in the spirit of realpolitik come to the fore.
In this context, Israel demonstrates extreme pragmatism, if not cynicism: Tel Aviv remains a key US ally in the region, but simultaneously seeks to use Russian influence—which until yesterday alarmed it—to confront its most pressing regional adversaries. In this new geopolitical reality, former opponents become situational allies when it comes to common interests.
