When a high-level Syrian delegation landed in Moscow on the last day of July, it marked a stunning turnaround in Russia’s ties with the war-torn country, where it backed the deposed Bashar al Assad through most of his despotic reign.

The visit by the Syrian foreign and defence ministers marked the first official trip to Russia by any official from Syria’s transitional government since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.

The visit unequivocally highlighted a sensitive recalibration in Russia-Syria relations, where Russia is no longer the undisputed powerbroker it once was under the Assad regime. 

Moscow now faces the imperative to transition from patron to negotiated partner, a shift that necessitates safeguarding its strategic interests without the dominance it previously enjoyed.

The fall of Assad's regime in December 2024 marked a profound shift in the dynamics of Russia-Syria relations; it was a watershed moment, ending an era where Russia had been his closest international backer. 

For years, Moscow was Assad’s closest ally. His continued grip on power was largely made possible by the Russian military, which carried out sustained air strikes against the opposition and civilians across cities and the countryside.

Having failed to prevent Assad's ultimate collapse, Russia now navigates a complex landscape where its previous dominance has demonstrably waned. 

The July 2025 visit of the Syrian delegation to Moscow, the first official engagement with the new government, underscored this recalibration. 

The Syrian leadership, while acknowledging Russia's continued strategic importance and Syria's deep reliance on Russian military and technical infrastructure, is actively pursuing a foreign policy of multi-alignment to diversify partnerships and avoid excessive reliance on any single power.

Moscow, on its part, is focusing on several key pathways to regain its footing and secure its long-term strategic interests in this evolving environment. 

These include a comprehensive review and adaptation of existing bilateral agreements, an aggressive pursuit of economic opportunities in Syria's post-war reconstruction, and the institutionalisation of cooperation through a new intergovernmental commission. 

Russian military bases also remain in Syria, and when opposition forces eventually seized Damascus, Assad fled—reportedly with the assistance of Russian forces—to Russia, where he lives now with his family.

Crucially, maintaining its critical military presence in Tartus and Hmeymim remains a core strategic imperative, albeit now subject to negotiation rather than assumed consent.

A new beginning

Despite the bitter history of their confrontation during the civil war, the visit by the Syrian delegation reflects a new and pragmatic approach from the transitional Syrian government under interim President Ahmed al Sharaa. 

As the Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al Shaibani put it, the aim was to “open a new page in bilateral relations”. According to the Syrian state agency SANA, after meeting with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Syrian delegation was also received by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin.

Notably, the new government in Damascus did not demand the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces. 

Shortly after Assad’s ouster, al Sharaa said in an interview with Saudi state television channel Al Arabiya: “Russia is an important country and is considered the second most powerful in the world.” 

He emphasised that Syria and Russia share strategic interests. “All Syrian weapons are of Russian origin, and many power plants are operated by Russian experts. We do not want Russia to leave Syria the way some others do.”

Just one month after Assad's fall, on January 28, a Russian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Special Presidential Envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentyev visited Damascus. This marked the first official Russian visit since Assad’s removal. 

The delegation held in-depth talks with members of the transitional government, including al Shibani and then health minister Maher al Sharaa. 

In February, Putin held a phone call with Ahmed al Sharaa, which the Kremlin described as “constructive and businesslike”.

During the recent Moscow talks, the Russian side was represented not only by diplomats but also by Lieutenant General Aleksandr Zorin, the First Deputy Head of the General Staff’s Information Directorate and an experienced figure in Russian-Syrian negotiations. 

During the height of the Syrian civil war, Zorin played a key role in organising ceasefires, facilitating evacuations through the so-called “green buses,” and brokering local truces.

Also present on the Syrian side was Maher al Sharaa, Secretary General of the Presidential Office and brother of interim leader Ahmed al Sharaa. A graduate of a medical academy in Voronezh city of Russia, Maher is seen as someone with deep knowledge of Russian institutional dynamics.

A central theme of the discussions was the reassessment of existing bilateral agreements. 

As Foreign Minister Lavrov explained, “Numerous contracts and memorandums were signed in recent years, many under entirely different political and economic circumstances. We agreed to carry out a comprehensive review of all existing agreements. Some contacts had taken place before, but today we decided to establish this process on a regular basis.”

The first concrete example of such a reassessment came earlier this year, when the Syrian government annulled an investment agreement signed in 2019 with a Russian company for the management of the Tartus seaport. Control of the port was later transferred to an Emirati operator.

Following his meeting with Lavrov, al Shibani confirmed that the two sides had agreed to revise and adapt prior agreements “to the new reality,” and expressed hope that Russia would play a constructive role in Syria’s post-war economic recovery "in accordance with international law and the interests of Syrian society”.

What’s at stake? 

Russian media portrayed the Moscow meetings as the symbolic start of a new phase in bilateral relations. 

However, they remained silent on two potentially controversial issues: whether the Syrian delegation raised the question of Russia paying compensation for damage caused by its military intervention. 

And whether it requested assistance in recovering the assets looted by Bashar al Assad — assets many believe were moved abroad with the help of Russian intelligence services.

Instead, Lavrov expressed gratitude to the new Syrian authorities for safeguarding Russian facilities and personnel. He described the talks as “very useful” and noted that the Syrian delegation had additional meetings planned across Russian institutions. 

Al Shaibani echoed this optimism, stating that the visit “embodied the shared desire to open a new chapter of cooperation.” He also noted an agreement to establish a new intergovernmental commission.

According to Russian sources, the discussions focused not only on political and military issues but also on trade, economic cooperation, and regional stability. 

Of particular note is the question of Syria’s post-war reconstruction. 

This eagerness signals a strategic push to involve Russian companies in lucrative reconstruction projects, potentially through offers of "favourable financing, expertise, or resources". 

Russia's past economic strategy in Syria was often transactional and ultimately proved insufficient. Its current desire to actively participate in reconstruction efforts suggests a recognition that long-term influence in post-conflict states requires deep economic integration. 

By embedding itself in Syria's future prosperity, Russia aims to create new dependencies and shared economic interests that can underpin its strategic presence, moving beyond a reliance on purely military leverage. 

This shift from military dominance to economic integration is vital for establishing a more resilient and sustainable form of influence.

A list of countries and companies cleared to participate has reportedly been compiled, and among the many Turkish, Saudi, Emirati, and French firms included, not a single Russian company is listed. 

Moscow now appears eager to take its share as well.