In a quiet but consequential move, Iran has created a Defence Supreme Council, a wartime institution that fundamentally reshapes the way the country makes military decisions.
The new body, established this month, sidelines both the president’s cabinet and the civilian National Supreme Security Council, placing direct operational control in the hands of military elites from various branches of the Iranian armed forces—including the Revolutionary Guard Corps, (IRGC), the Army, and the Quds Force—who are closely aligned with the supreme leader.
The shift reflects a profound recalibration of Iran’s defence governance, signalling
that the country now sees itself in a sustained state of military emergency. It also marks a departure from decades of precedent, when military affairs were mediated by political institutions before reaching the highest echelons of power.
The establishment of the new council comes in the wake of the 12-day war between
Israel and Iran in June, a brief but brutal conflict that scarred cities on both sides and left strategic sites in ruins.
Iran’s missile brigades launched repeated salvos on Israeli military and economic targets, while Israeli aircraft and cyber operations struck deep inside Iran, crippling nuclear facilities and exposing vulnerabilities in Tehran’s air defences.
The war’s abrupt end came only after US intervention and coordinated strikes on
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, which forced both sides into a reluctant ceasefire. But in the days since, officials and analysts in both Tehran and Tel aviv have echoed the same refrain: this is a tactical pause, not a strategic peace.
Since the guns fell silent, both nations have raced to rebuild their military capacities.
Israel has imported bunker-busting munitions and THAAD air defence systems from the United States, and continues to refine its network of early warning radars.
Iran, meanwhile, is repairing damaged launchers and radars, replacing battered air defence systems, and accelerating missile production, which is now estimated to reach 300 ballistic missiles per month.
The Defence Supreme Council sits at the centre of this effort, designed to coordinate military operations, intelligence, and reconstruction under a single chain of command. This restructuring is widely interpreted as Tehran’s acknowledgement that the conflict exposed weaknesses not only in hardware but in decision-making processes.
Nuclear and proxy revival
By transferring authority to a smaller, militarised circle, the new council strengthens the role of figures close to Ayatollah Khamenei.
According to information from Tehran, Ali Larijani is expected to become the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, while Ali Akbar Ahmadian will manage strategic and special files — responsibilities that bridge the nuclear programme, cyber defence, and regional military operations.
Both Larijani and Ahmadian are considered trusted figures within Khamenei’s inner circle, with long-standing track records across political, security, and military arenas.
The timing of this consolidation is no accident. Iranian officials remain haunted by the high-profile assassinations on the first day of Israeli strikes, which killed key military figures in precision operations that many in Tehran attribute to deep infiltration (“nofuzi”) by foreign intelligence.
The Defence Supreme Council, by concentrating sensitive files among a smaller and more loyal circle, is a direct response to that breach of security.
Iran’s wartime posture is now clear: a rebuilding of nuclear capabilities, rearmament
of its missile forces, and the mobilisation of regional proxies to pressure Israel. The government has declared that dozens of young nuclear scientists are ready to resume reconstruction of damaged facilities, and tunnels at Natanz and Isfahan have been reopened.
In parallel, the council is reactivating Iran’s network of regional allies and proxy groups along Israel’s borders — from Hezbollah in Lebanon to militias in Syria and Gaza. Officials say this is intended to deter future Israeli strikes on Iranian territory by bringing the threat closer to Israel itself.
Israel has responded in kind, publicly warning that it possesses hundreds of missiles ready to prevent any resurgence of Iran’s nuclear program. The shadow of preemptive war continues to loom large over the region.
Security restructuring and strategic signalling
The creation of the Defence Supreme Council sends multiple signals at once.
Domestically, it tightens security against espionage and centralises control in a trusted military-ideological circle. Regionally, it projects readiness for another round of confrontation, whether through direct attacks or a return to shadow warfare and sabotage.
The very act of reopening bombed nuclear tunnels and accelerating missile production is a message that Tehran is not deterred but rather hardening for the future.
For the United States and its European allies, the new military architecture in Tehran complicates the search for a diplomatic off-ramp. As Iran prepares for all scenarios and Israel keeps its ‘preemptive threat’ alive, the margin for error narrows.
Analysts suggest that a win-win diplomatic compromise, one that addresses both Iran’s security concerns and Western fears of nuclear escalation, may be the only sustainable alternative to another cycle of war.
Otherwise, the region risks slipping into a permanent wartime footing, with the Defence Supreme Council entrenching Iran’s military-first strategy for years to come.