Yunus MaziFollowing the federal elections, Germany has entered a new phase of seeking political stability amid the phenomenal rise of the hard-right in the country’s socio-political landscape.
The Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) emerged as the strongest party with 28.5 percent of the vote, while the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) secured second place with 20.8 percent – its strongest performance to date.
The Social Democratic Party (SPD), by contrast, achieved just 16.4 percent, marking the worst result in its history.
After nearly six weeks of negotiations, the CDU/CSU and SPD agreed to form a grand coalition. CDU leader Friedrich Merz is expected to be elected chancellor in early May.
At the core of the coalition agreement lies the goal of easing the debt brake for defence spending and creating a special fund of €500 billion for infrastructure investment.
"It is frightening that a country like Germany has such a high level of support for a right-wing party," says a Turkish resident of Cologne.
New government, old fears
It’s not just the structure of the new government that is changing – the balance of power within the opposition is shifting as well. In a poll conducted on April 9, 2025, the AfD rose to 25 percent while the CDU/CSU fell to 24 percent.
This trend confirms that the AfD has evolved from a temporary protest movement into a lasting political force. The party’s rise is largely attributed to migration, security, and economic uncertainty.
While the AfD remains strongest in eastern Germany, it is gaining ground in the west – increasing pressure on the centrist parties.
Ulrich Schlie, Henry Kissinger Professor of Political Science at the University of Bonn, emphasises this challenge.
“The persistently high support for the AfD, fueled by dissatisfaction with the established parties, is a major challenge for democratic competition,” he tells TRT World.
“It increases the pressure to actually solve identified problems and to maintain party distinctions so that voters still have real alternatives.”
The Merz government is expected to pursue a stricter migration policy than its predecessor – the so-called “traffic light” coalition. Coalition negotiations led to an agreement on a “return initiative” for refugees from Syria and Afghanistan, aligning with Merz’s call for a “paradigm shift” in migration policy.
This marks a clear victory for the CDU/CSU over the more migration-friendly SPD.
Ulrich Brückner, Professor of European Studies at Stanford University’s Berlin Center, also sees this as a deep-rooted dilemma.
“The CDU and CSU have become vulnerable to pressure from the SPD, as shown by the coalition negotiations,” he tells TRT World.
“At the same time, both parties are doomed to succeed if they want to prevent an AfD election victory. The conditions for a successful term are no better than before, but it’s also not inevitable that this coalition will fail.”
Additionally, the government plans to implement security-focused measures under the banner of “combating Islamism”, which may disproportionately affect the Muslim population.
In 2023, Germany recorded at least 1,926 anti-Muslim incidents, including 88 attacks on mosques. This trend illustrates a rightward shift by the CDU in an attempt to reclaim societal influence – a move that carries serious risks for social cohesion and democratic values.
For many migrants and Muslims in Germany, the shift is deeply unsettling. What is presented as a “security agenda” increasingly feels like institutionalised suspicion – reinforcing stereotypes and eroding civil liberties. The line between policy and prejudice is becoming dangerously thin.
The rise of the AfD and the rightward drift of centrist parties reflect a broader societal hardening. For those who believed Germany had learned from its past, these developments are a stark warning: exclusionary politics are no longer fringe – they are becoming the norm.
Cracks in transatlantic foundation
The return of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025 has ushered in a new phase of uncertainty for transatlantic relations.
For an export-oriented country like Germany, this development is strategically significant. According to 2024 data, the US overtook China as Germany’s largest trading partner, with a trade volume of €252.8 billion.
This has intensified Berlin’s efforts to establish a more balanced and functional relationship with Washington.
Despite the Trump administration’s continued protectionist stance toward China, economic relations between the US and Germany remain fraught with uncertainty.
The CDU/CSU-SPD coalition has therefore emphasised the “outstanding importance” of the transatlantic partnership and is seeking close cooperation with North America.
Brückner is certain that Merz will maintain strong ties with the US.
“Merz is…the most transatlantic chancellor in German history. He will try to preserve the close relationship,” he says.
Merz’s prioritisation of Europe further underscores that Germany’s interests are not solely bilateral with the US but are deeply intertwined with European unity.
Roland Bathon, a freelance journalist specialising in Eastern Europe and Russia, agrees that the next German government will strive to maintain good relations with the US, despite the Trump presidency:
“Despite all the differences with the Trump administration, the CDU/CSU as the larger coalition partner and chancellor party remains fundamentally transatlantic in orientation,” Bathon tells TRT World.
“The government will try to minimise damage to transatlantic ties caused by growing political rifts between Washington and Berlin.”
Despite Merz’s strong pro-American rhetoric, Germany’s actual leverage over Washington remains minimal.
Trump’s protectionist policies and confrontational style expose how little weight Berlin carries on the world stage without American backing.
The CDU/CSU-SPD coalition speaks of “outstanding importance” and vows to preserve the partnership, but these are largely defensive moves. In reality, Germany has few options.
It cannot shape global policy, guarantee European security, or maintain economic resilience without the US. The transatlantic alliance, once a symbol of shared strength, now underscores Germany’s growing weakness in a world increasingly shaped by power politics rather than shared values.
At least 250,000 people show up in Munich to send a "strong signal in favour of diversity, human dignity, cohesion and democracy".
Turning point
Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, Germany has initiated a long-overdue shift in its defence policy.
The €100 billion special fund announced by former Chancellor Scholz is set to continue under the Merz government, and Berlin pledges a more active role within NATO.
But behind the rhetoric of strength lies a sobering reality: Germany’s military capabilities remain limited, its strategic autonomy virtually nonexistent.
According to Brückner, Merz will likely intensify this support.
“Rhetorically, Merz is a more determined supporter of Ukraine. In practice, the cost of this stance will be higher than it was for Scholz. Germany is rearming because it can no longer rely solely on US deterrence.”
Yet this rearmament is reactive, not strategic – a rushed effort to fill a gap left by Washington’s unpredictable stance.
Internal divisions within the coalition over Ukraine policy further weaken Berlin’s position.
Some voices still advocate dialogue over deterrence, sending mixed signals to both allies and adversaries.
Political scientist Schlie is convinced that the German government, in cooperation with the European Union, must ensure its own security in the long term.
“The EU must increase its efforts to avoid major disappointments in Ukraine after a ceasefire. We cannot afford zones of unequal security in Europe. Russia remains the greatest security challenge, which can only be managed through strong national defense as alliance defence,” he adds.
But without American leadership, Germany’s ambitions remain aspirations.
The uncomfortable truth is: Berlin still cannot act independently – and in a world where hard power matters again, that makes all the difference.
Türkiye – A factor of stability
In German foreign policy, Türkiye is regarded not just for its geographic proximity but, more importantly, for its role in NATO, its military capabilities, and its regional influence.
As the alliance’s second-largest military power and a key actor in migration, counterterrorism, and regional diplomacy, Ankara has become indispensable for Berlin.
Whether it’s managing migration flows, stabilising Syria, or ensuring NATO’s southern flank – Türkiye holds the keys to issues Germany cannot solve on its own.
Statements from Friedrich Merz indicate a more pragmatic and geopolitically oriented approach to relations with Türkiye.
Especially in light of the Ukraine war and instability in the Middle East, he underscores the need for strategic dialogue with Ankara. Closer cooperation with Türkiye is also planned for Syria’s reconstruction.
Schlie sees Türkiye as a key partner for Germany’s future:
“As a regional power in a newly emerging global order, Türkiye plays an even greater role. The German government would be well advised to intensify its relationship with Türkiye on all levels and engage in a real dialogue with this rising power,” he tells TRT World.
The new government’s coalition agreement frames Türkiye as a “strategic partner,” but the reality is starker: Germany has little leverage and even less room to manoeuvre.
With limited influence in its own neighbourhood, Berlin is forced to align itself with Ankara’s priorities, not the other way around.
“We can expect a continuation of Merkel’s strategy: rejecting EU membership but maintaining strong relations, recognising Türkiye’s strategic importance,” says Brückner.
The presence of Turkish-origin MPs and a planned integration policy network illustrate how Türkiye and its diaspora are increasingly viewed in both foreign and domestic political terms.
Although Merz has sent positive signals toward Ankara, the practical implementation of his rhetoric remains to be seen.
Ultimately, the Merz government must balance coalition dynamics while safeguarding Germany’s internal stability and Europe’s security.
Germany’s reliance on Türkiye underscores a broader weakness: without strong regional partners, its foreign policy risks becoming reactive, dependent, and directionless.
Germany's likely next chancellor faces the hard task of unifying a divided society, yet political activists warn his tenure could be a step toward deeper division.
