The United States has bombed three key nuclear sites in Iran – Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz – intensifying the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran. President Donald Trump said in an address to the nation that the strikes “obliterated” the facilities. He warned of further action if Iran does not pursue peace. 

This latest development that involves the US follows the week-long Israeli-Iran confrontation that now grinds into its most dangerous phase yet, further heightening tensions across the Middle East. 

While Israel has portrayed the attacks since June 13 as essential to curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Tehran views them as an existential threat, challenging its sovereignty. 

Between the two warring actors, caught in the geopolitical slipstream, are the Gulf Arab states, now navigating a delicate and dangerous triangle between Iran, Israel, and the United States. 

As Tehran contemplates its next moves, Gulf capitals are acutely aware that their territories, home to US military bases and critical oil infrastructure, could become targets for retaliation. The threat of an Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly a third of the world’s seaborne oil flows, once again looms large, adding economic urgency to their security concerns. 

Then there is the insidious threat to the environment. A strike on Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor could unleash a catastrophic radiation leak, contaminating the Gulf’s waters and crippling the desalination plants that millions rely on. 

In a region already straining under political friction, such an ecological crisis would not just spill over borders; it would deepen them.

During the Obama years, the Gulf states watched uneasily as the prospect of a US–Iran rapprochement threatened to render them strategically obsolete. Under Trump, the fear is not of marginalisation, but of becoming unwilling participants in a conflict they cannot control.

In the immediate aftermath of the Israeli strike on Iran, and the US bombing of nuclear sites, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) issued coordinated statements condemning the violation of Iranian sovereignty, an unusually unified diplomatic stance that reflects mounting regional anxiety.

Notably absent, however, were any official statements from almost all GCC countries regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), underscoring the sensitivity and complexity of openly addressing nuclear issues amidst escalating tensions. 

Qatar called for restraint and an immediate halt to escalation, emphasising the need to return to diplomacy to avoid catastrophic consequences. Additionally, Oman and Iraq (a GCC observer) have assumed what one Western diplomat described as the role of “pro-Iran neutrals”, states that lean diplomatically toward Tehran while maintaining official neutrality. 

Oman, a past mediator in the US-Iran talks, strongly condemned the strikes, while Bahrain called for regional cooperation and peaceful dialogue to prevent further conflict and ensure stability.

In contrast, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and to a lesser extent Kuwait are seen as “pro-Israel neutrals”, nations whose security interests increasingly align with Israel and the US, despite public calls for de-escalation. 

Saudi Arabia condemned the violation of Iranian sovereignty and urged the international community to pursue a political resolution. The kingdom’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement recently saying that it hoped that the talks would enhance “peace in the region.”  

Behind this unified language, familiar fissures are beginning to reemerge. While all GCC members have publicly declared neutrality, diplomats and analysts note that individual states’ positions differ in subtle but significant ways. 

Scenarios behind the GCC stance

Over the past decade, several GCC countries have quietly hedged their bets, engaging diplomatically with Iran and broadening their security partnerships, aimed at reducing their dependence on Washington. 

Oman has acted as a trusted mediator in the US-Iran talks, while Qatar has been leveraging its role as a strategic partner in underwater oil and gas fields. Kuwait has maintained the posture as a peaceful neighbour with no historical tension or rivalry, and the UAE engages as a prominent economic conduit.

However, a major Iranian escalation, especially one that endangers US military installations or Gulf energy infrastructure, could rapidly reverse that trajectory, pushing the region back under the supervision of American military power. 

This moment of high tension could yield one of two starkly different futures for the region.

The more optimistic path envisions a turn toward deeper regional diplomacy, with GCC states acting as mediators to de-escalate the conflict. 

Having invested billions into diversifying their economies and securing energy exports, Gulf nations understand that sustained war directly threatens their core interests. 

The stability of oil prices, the protection of offshore and coastal infrastructure, and the unimpeded flow of maritime commerce through Hormuz are all high-stakes concerns. 

Behind closed doors, Qatar and UAE are reportedly offering Iran economic, diplomatic, or other incentives such as relief regarding the entities affected by the US sanctions or investment and trade facilitation to keep the Strait open and regional tensions contained.

The alternative is far bleaker: a retaliatory spiral that forces Gulf states into a closer military embrace with the US, despite longstanding ambivalence.

Gulf Arab states, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have engaged in quiet diplomacy with Iran to ease tensions and avoid regional escalation, with Abu Dhabi facilitating early US–Iran contacts and Riyadh seeking to reassure Tehran on security issues. 

Saudi Arabia is also reportedly open to concessions on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for US backing of its own nuclear ambitions. At the core of these efforts are economic priorities, especially for Saudi Arabia, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s development agenda is focused on sustained regional stability.

GCC’s push for UN involvement signals a preference for multilateral mediation to contain escalation. 

With major regional development and economic diversification projects at stake, the Gulf’s overriding priority remains de-escalation, regardless of any quiet support for Iranian setbacks.

Tehran’s past positions within the region

The region has seen this scenario before. Tehran’s retaliatory doctrine tends to be precise and symbolic, choosing targets that reflect the origin, not just the proximity, of hostile action.

Just last year, Tehran launched missiles at Israel’s Nevatim Air Base in both April and October, after Israeli air strikes hit its embassy in Damascus and assassinated a senior IRGC figure in Tehran. 

In 2022 and 2023, Iranian forces targeted alleged Mossad facilities in northern Iraq following sabotage operations in Iran. 

Following the 2020 US assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, Iran responded by launching ballistic missiles at the Ain al-Assad and al-Taji air bases in Iraq, both housing American troops. 

A year earlier, in 2019, Houthi drones, widely believed to be Iranian-supplied, crippled Saudi oil giant Aramco in a stunning attack that temporarily halved the kingdom’s oil production. 

That same year, unidentified drones struck near the Emirati port of Fujairah, a stark reminder that escalation in the Gulf often spills across borders, regardless of their direct involvement. 

Since 2017, Tehran has pursued a doctrine of strategic retaliation, targeting the origin points of attacks on its interests. Its first overt use of ballistic missiles was against ISIS positions in Syria in 2017. 

This was followed by strikes on the Ain al-Assad and al-Taji bases in Iraq, the launch sites for the drone that killed Soleimani. 

But now, Iran is unlikely to strike US bases directly within Gulf states, as recent reports suggest the latest attacks were launched from a US submarine in the Arabian Sea and from Diego Garcia island, both remote and technically outside the GCC’s direct jurisdiction. 

Nevertheless, the risk of Gulf states being drawn into the conflict remains disturbingly real. Whether through direct targeting, cyber disruption, political fallout, or a spillover in global energy markets, the GCC is completely unified.

Which specific Gulf state is most vulnerable, however, depends heavily on the form Iran’s retaliation takes and whether the US escalates further. Bahrain stands out as particularly exposed due to its small geographic size and the presence of a major US air base. Iraq, though not a GCC member, also remains highly accessible to Iranian retaliation, either directly or via proxy militias.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia could become a target if Iran encourages the Houthis to strike critical energy infrastructure, such as Aramco facilities, an echo of past attacks.

In the intricate chessboard of Middle Eastern power politics, neutrality is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain and increasingly dangerous to miscalculate.