Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian this week approved a legislation, which effectively ends Tehran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the nation’s nuclear programme. 

The move came after the US carried out unprecedented strikes on Iran’s major nuclear facilities, which Washington claims pushed back Tehran’s plans by up to two years.

Iran, a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), says that it has the right to develop a peaceful nuclear programme.

But Israel, which has not signed the NPT, and some Western countries accuse Tehran of attempting to build a nuclear bomb through uranium enrichment.

After Iran’s latest move to suspend cooperation with the nuclear watchdog, experts in Western capitals and Israel are deliberating on Tehran's next move – from potentially withdrawing from the NPT to seeking negotiations with the US and European states for another nuclear deal. 

Ghoncheh Tazmini, a Canadian-Iranian political analyst and writer of several books on Iranian politics, feels that the suspension of IAEA cooperation does not signal that Iran is planning to pull out of the NPT.

“(Instead) it reflects a profound breakdown of trust born of coercion and armed aggression, not treaty rejectionism,” Tazmini tells TRT World.

Iran had called for a nuclear weapons‑free Middle East and cooperated with the IAEA, allowing inspections of its facilities.  

But, Tazmini adds, its goodwill was met with Israeli sabotage operations, the assassination of its scientists, cyber‑attacks, Western sanctions and lately military strikes while even actual talks with the US were underway, according to Tazmini. 

All this behaviour emanating from Israel and its allies has “eroded” principles of trust and good faith, forcing Tehran to react by suspending its cooperation with the international nuclear watchdog, she says. 

“Iran’s mistrust of Western-led institutions is not a rejection of transparency or non-proliferation. It reflects a major crisis of trust in international norms and institutions, exacerbated by coercive diplomacy and repeated violations of Iranian sovereignty,” Tazmini says. 

“The question we should be asking is not whether Iran will suspend cooperation, but whether the global order offers Iran any credible incentive, protection, or guarantee in return for its cooperation — one that cannot be unilaterally overturned. So far, it hasn’t.” 

A softer withdrawal from the NPT? 

Other experts assess Tehran’s IAEA suspension as a measured response to Israeli and US strikes on its nuclear facilities, which some see as a clear violation of international law that forbids any state to attack nuclear facilities of other countries. 

In 2009, IAEA members – including the US, the UK and France – unanimously adopted a decision, which prohibited “armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction” devoted to peaceful purposes. So far, the IAEA has not found enough evidence that Iran’s nuclear programme aims to build an atomic bomb. 

“Iran chose not to take the most serious decision of leaving the NPT, but for now sufficed with a decision one level below it,” says Omer Ozgul, an expert on Iranian security policies and a former Turkish army officer, who had worked as a military attache in Tehran in late 2010s and early 2020s. 

Mohammed Eslami, an Iranian academic and professor of international relations at the University of Minho, sees Iran’s move as “a softer version of withdrawal from the NPT” because the end of IAEA supervision of Tehran’s nuclear programme is a big deal for the international community.  

While the NPT allows all signatory states to develop peaceful nuclear programmes, it also imposes limitations on the proliferation of nuclear bombs by non-nuclear states and prevents nuclear states from increasing their atomic arsenal. 

“All this should be supervised by IAEA inspectors and surveillance cameras. If Iran stops collaboration with the IAEA, this means there is no international supervision over Iran's nuclear programme, which is equivalent to Israel and North Korea,” Esmail tells TRT World. 

While Israel and North Korea are not party to the NPT, Iran has a legal and ethical commitment, says the Iranian professor. 

“If Israel and the US don't escalate further, Iran wouldn’t walk away from the NPT, and probably start collaboration with the IAEA soon again,” he says. “But, if they escalate, Iran will definitely leave the NPT”, he adds. 

But under any condition, making a nuclear bomb is not on the agenda for Iran because Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has not changed the fatwa on weapons of mass destruction, according to Eslami. 

Unless the Supreme Leader discovers that “having a nuclear bomb can save the lives of Muslims,” the fatwa against the atomic bomb will stand, Eslami adds. 

History of nuclear tensions 

Under the landmark 2015 nuclear deal – officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – Iran’s uranium enrichment level is determined at 3.67 percent and Tehran pledged to keep its nuclear facilities open to IAEA inspectors. 

While Iran demonstrated its intention to fulfil its JCPOA obligations, Western sanctions largely remained. But the worst came in 2018 when the first Trump administration abruptly withdrew from the treaty, according to Ozgul. In response to the US withdrawal, Iran announced an increase in its uranium enrichment to 4.5 percent. 

Since then, there have been many “Israeli provocations against Iran”, which responded by deciding to increase its uranium enrichment levels, Ozgul says. 

In late 2020, Israel assassinated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi, considered the father of Iran’s nuclear programme. Three days after the assassination, Iranian parliament passed a law instructing the government to increase uranium enrichment from 4.5 percent to 20 percent level, says Ozgul. 

In mid-2021, the Iranian president inaugurated a new centrifuge facility in the country’s Natanz nuclear site. A day after this event, Israel launched a cyber attack on this facility, Ozgul says. After this attack, Iran decided to increase its enrichment levels to 60 percent, he adds. 

The Netanyahu government launched military attacks on Iran last month, forcing Tehran to retaliate against Israel and its allies. 

The attacks came a day after IAEA head Rafael Grossi claimed in a report that Iran was not fully complying with its nuclear obligations. Tehran saw a clear connection between the Israeli attacks and the IAEA report, questioning the agency’s integrity. Iran also criticised Grossi’s indifference to Israel-US attacks on its nuclear facilities. 

Ozgul feels that as a response to the Israeli attacks, Iran will either increase its enrichment up to weapons-grade 90 percent or act in a measured way, like suspending its IAEA cooperation. 

Despite continuing Israeli provocations, “at this stage I doubt Iran will walk away from the NPT,” says the security analyst. “Indeed, Iran has a better option than nuclear weapons, which is blocking the Strait of Hormuz to stop the flow of oil.” 

He feels that the 12-day war could just provide the spark needed for restarting the stalled nuclear negotiations and reaching a consensus between the US and Iran.