Ata ŞahitWhen China, Pakistan and Afghanistan attended a high-level informal summit in late May, it potentially marked a significant turning point in regional diplomacy, as well as bilateral ties between the next-door neighbours.
Hosted by Afghanistan’s acting foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, the closed-door meeting was attended by China’s special envoy Yue Xiaoyong, and Pakistan’s special envoy Mohammad Sadiq.
This summit constitutes a critical component of the trilateral dialogue mechanism that has been in place since 2017.
During the summit, discussions focused on concrete measures to enhance political trust, coordinate counterterrorism efforts, and promote economic integration.
These agenda items not only reinforce China’s mediating role between Afghanistan and Pakistan but also underscore its growing influence in shaping emerging regional dynamics.
This initiative of trilateral cooperation assumes great significance as it comes against a fluid political landscape in the region, marked by the recent military conflict between India and Pakistan.
Underlying dynamics of Pakistan–Afghanistan disagreement
The tense trajectory of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan is rooted in a complex interplay of historical, ethnic, and strategic factors.
At the heart of this enduring tension lies the Durand Line Agreement, signed in 1893 between British India and the Emirate of Afghanistan.
For decades, debates surrounding the legitimacy of the Durand Line have come to symbolise broader disputes over sovereignty and national identity between the two countries.
Afghanistan has historically refused to recognise the line as an official boundary, and its longstanding aspiration to unify Pashtun communities on both sides of the border is perceived by Pakistan as a serious threat to its national security.
The Taliban administration continues to uphold this traditional stance in Afghanistan’s foreign policy.
Pakistan–Taliban relations began to take shape in the mid-1990s, a period marked by the Taliban’s rapid ascent within Afghanistan.
According to some claims reported in the media, the Pakistani state—particularly through its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—provided the Taliban with logistical, financial, and military support.
This backing played a crucial role in enabling the Taliban to gain the upper hand against the Northern Alliance. Pakistan’s support was not only strategic in nature but also reflected a form of sectarian and ideological alignment with the Taliban movement.
However, following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Pakistan’s expectations of strategic depth and operational influence over the group have remained largely unmet.
On the contrary, allegations that the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has found safe haven in Afghanistan’s border regions—and is at times indirectly supported by elements within the Taliban—have come to represent an unacceptable security risk for the government in Islamabad.
Indeed, the 35th report of the United Nations Security Council substantiates claims that the Afghan Taliban has provided the TTP with logistical, operational, and financial support.
According to the report, the TTP’s presence and operational capacity in Afghanistan remain intact, with the group carrying out over 600 attacks targeting Pakistan throughout 2024.
Furthermore, it is noted that the TTP has established new training camps in the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika (Barmal), and has also recruited militants from within the ranks of the Afghan Taliban.
The fact that a significant portion of the bomb attacks carried out in Pakistan are linked to the TTP has also triggered growing public backlash against the Afghan Taliban.
The Taliban leadership, however, categorically denies these allegations, asserting that matters concerning the TTP are internal to Pakistan.
Nevertheless, factors such as ideological affinity, militant crossovers, and weak border control mechanisms continue to cast doubt on the practical viability of this distinction on the ground.
China’s mediation amid security concerns
The trilateral summit held under China’s mediation is particularly noteworthy given its timing—amid renewed tensions between India and Pakistan, and a surge in TTP activities along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border.
In this context, the summit is viewed as a significant milestone, both in terms of regional security architecture and the functionality of trade corridors.
From a historical perspective, Pakistan has long regarded Afghanistan as a strategic rear front in its enduring rivalry with India.
This perspective, commonly referred to as the "strategic depth" doctrine, envisions securing Pakistan’s western flank in the event of a military confrontation with India.
Accordingly, ensuring Afghanistan’s neutrality—or at the very least, its indirect alignment with Pakistani interests—has constituted a consistent strategic priority for Islamabad.
On the other hand, China’s growing involvement in this equation can be interpreted as a reflection of Beijing’s increasing emphasis on securing safe investment and transport corridors across South Asia, within the broader framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China’s engagement in Afghanistan extends beyond mere economic investment; Beijing views the country as a critical gateway to West Asia under the BRI framework.
In addition to its $14 billion investment portfolio, China’s effort to establish a new transportation route through the Wakhan Corridor in Badakhshan, linking the Iran–Afghanistan–China triangle, underscores the long-term and strategic nature of its presence in Afghanistan.
While it is technically feasible to reach the Chinese border via the Wakhan Corridor, the route, however, remains virtually inaccessible in practical terms for the time being.
As a result, the bulk of trade between China and Afghanistan continues to be conducted via maritime routes through Pakistan.
Within this framework, China’s increasing diplomatic engagement with the Taliban administration and its emergence as a balancing actor between Pakistan and the Taliban assume considerable significance.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s efforts to host both Taliban and Pakistani officials in Beijing to restore diplomatic dialogue between the two sides, underscore Beijing’s intention to solidify its long-term influence in Afghanistan.
Moreover, it is evident that developments in the region transcend bilateral dynamics. China’s active mediation role between Kabul and Islamabad can also be interpreted as driven by a strategic imperative to safeguard its $50 billion investment in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
For its part, Pakistan views China’s growing presence and relations in Afghanistan as a counterweight to Indian influence, and therefore welcomes Beijing’s more active involvement in Afghan affairs.
The inclusion of security issues alongside economic topics in the agenda of the trilateral summit reflects China’s evolving posture—from that of a purely economic actor to one with an implicit regional security guarantor role.
Whether China can effectively fulfill its guarantor function will largely depend on its ability to ensure tacit commitments between the Taliban administration and Pakistan.
Furthermore, Beijing’s capacity to prevent any strategic rapprochement between the Taliban and India has emerged as a key variable that could directly influence the trajectory of regional diplomatic balances.
From a historical perspective, it is evident that in the post–Cold War era, despite the high volume of bilateral cooperation agreements, trilateral cooperation has remained notably limited.
Since 1950, more than 350 agreements have been signed between China and Pakistan, while the number stands at approximately 150 between China and Afghanistan, and 250 between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
However, the number of agreements jointly signed by all three countries remains minimal.
This indicates that regional cooperation has predominantly been pursued on a bilateral basis, with no institutionalised trilateral framework currently in place.
In other words, the China–Pakistan–Afghanistan trilateral summit is not merely a symbolic encounter; it also marks a new phase in the regional balance of power.
The decisions adopted during the summit demonstrate that China is positioning itself not only as an economic actor but also as a key player in the realms of security and diplomacy.
The steps taken to ease tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban administration and to expand economic cooperation are opening the way for deeper regional integration, while also making China’s aspirations to act as a regional guarantor increasingly visible.
However, the sustainability of this process hinges not solely on diplomatic gestures but also on the effective management of security dynamics on the ground.
For all practical purposes, the summit was a test of China’s role in shaping the regional architecture and setting the tone for future models of cooperation.
