Kazim AlamIn September 2019, a sprawling football stadium in Texas buzzed with the energy of 50,000 Indian-Americans chanting “Howdy, Modi!” as US President Donald Trump – in his first term at the time – joined Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on stage.
Holding hands, Trump and Modi beamed with joy even as the US president attempted a few Hindi phrases, mangling them in a way that sparked a deluge of jests and internet memes in India and beyond.
Optics screamed camaraderie.
Fast forward to 2025. In his second term in office, the Trump-Modi bonhomie appears to be gone.
The once-warm rapport between the two leaders has been replaced by a palpable unease, marked by terse social media posts, economic jabs, and a surprising US tilt towards Pakistan, India’s arch-rival in South Asia.
So, what went wrong?
Michael Kugelman, a Washington-based analyst of South Asian affairs, says that there existed a strong personal chemistry between Trump and Modi during the US president’s first term in office.
“That was rooted in great part on the shared views that the two men had on a number of issues,” he tells TRT World, citing similar policy positions on terrorism, immigration and China’s growing influence on the global stage.
Yet, Kugelman adds, the two men have “very different personalities and very different backgrounds” despite ideological convergences.
The “Howdy, Modi!” spectacle now appears to be more theatre than substance as relations between the US and India sink to a new low.
The unravelling may have begun subtly, but gained momentum of late. One major flashpoint has been Trump’s claim – repeated nearly 30 times from the presidential pulpit in a couple of months – that he brokered peace between India and Pakistan in May 2025.
It was his mediation, insists the US president, that pulled Islamabad and New Delhi from the brink of a nuclear catastrophe after four days of military stand-off, which included the largest dogfight since World War II.
However, India vehemently denies any US mediation. This discrepancy between the US and Indian narratives has fuelled distrust. India’s insistence on rejecting Trump’s mediation claim underscores a deeper wound: the sense that the US is no longer a reliable strategic partner.
Sandip Ghose, an India-based foreign policy analyst, sees it as a pragmatic divergence rather than a betrayal. “Each one is speaking to a different audience,” Ghose tells TRT World.
“Contesting it will be a zero-sum game. India is better off speaking through actions than words,” he says.
Compounding this diplomatic affront is Trump’s economic offensive. On July 30, the US imposed a 25 percent tariff on Indian imports, a move accompanied by a salty social media post by Trump in which he called the economies of Russia and India “dead”.
Ghose downplays the long-term impact of Trump’s coldness towards India. “These are negotiating tactics, which will ultimately even out. (Trump) has himself conceded that negotiations haven’t stopped and the dialogue is ongoing,” he says.
Still, the tariffs sting. Kugelman ties this to Trump’s broader priorities. “It has a lot more to do with President Trump’s personal interests and his goals, and that includes trying to pursue a trade relationship with India that, in his view, would better serve US interests,” he says.
A strategic coup for Pakistan?
Perhaps the most galling development for Modi has been Trump’s newfound warmth towards Pakistan. During his first term, Trump’s rhetoric leaned heavily against Pakistan. But the US president is now singing a different tune, highlighting Pakistan’s potential in oil reserve development.
Trump has also cosied up to Pakistan’s top leadership, particularly General Asim Munir, who was elevated as a Field Marshal after the four-day faceoff with India.
“Pakistan has very successfully pitched itself as a useful partner to an administration that takes a very unconventional approach to diplomacy,” says Kugelman.
He adds that Pakistan’s focus on critical minerals and crypto aligns with Trump’s commercial interests, unlike India’s “more conventional and traditional approach to diplomacy”.
Mushahid Hussain Sayed, a foreign affairs expert who previously served as a senator and federal minister, frames the US policy shift as a “strategic coup” for Pakistan.
“President Trump has changed 25 years of American foreign policy,” Sayed tells TRT World. “His focus is on economy and energy, especially critical minerals. He is not a militarist. He’s a businessman,” he says.
Pakistan has adeptly seized this opportunity, presenting itself as a “winner” that can deliver on Trump’s transactional goals, Sayed says.
Meanwhile, India is left grappling with what Sayed calls a “miscalculation” of Trump’s priorities. “India is now still in a quandary. It’s still worried. It’s still surprised,” he says, pointing to New Delhi’s failure to adapt to Trump’s deal-making mindset.
This pivot to Pakistan is particularly jarring for New Delhi given the timing. India’s concerns were amplified by Trump’s high-profile meeting with General Munir, which came shortly after the India-Pakistan military conflict, Kugelman says.
The optics of Trump hosting General Munir for a White House lunch signal “significant levels of alarm”, he adds.
Sayed goes one step further, suggesting Trump’s actions are deliberately humiliating India. “He’s talking of settling the Kashmir issue. India is being embarrassed,” he says.
Optics versus reality
Smita Gupta, a New Delhi-based political commentator, offers another perspective on why the Trump-Modi rapport has frayed.
“Modi confused the optics of his much-publicised meetings with Trump…with reality,” Gupta tells TRT World.
Modi’s personal bonhomie with Trump trickled down across Indian society. Right-leaning TV anchors sang praises for Trump during his election campaigns, while supporters of Modi’s BJP Party offered prayers at temples following the attempt on his life last year.
But Gupta argues that Trump’s dealings have always been transactional, guided by US interests rather than personal loyalty.
Even during Trump’s first term, signs of this were evident when the US terminated India’s preferential trade status in 2020. Gupta points out that India’s strategic hedging – balancing ties with the US, Russia, and China – worked well until Trump’s second term.
With US-China tensions easing following a brief spat over Beijing’s suspension of rare earth exports, and Russia rebuffing Trump’s peace overtures, India became an easy target for the US president’s pressure tactics, particularly over its purchase of Russian oil.
India’s role in the Quad – a diplomatic partnership between Australia, India, Japan, and the US initiated in 2007 – was built on countering China. Kugelman insists that the “strategic convergences” between the US and India have not melted away.
Instead, the Trump administration’s focus on ending wars and prioritising domestic issues has left Asia, particularly India, on the backburner, Kugelman says.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has emerged as the nimble beneficiary of Trump’s transactional diplomacy. Sayed highlights Pakistan’s counterterrorism cooperation, such as the arrest of a key terrorist involved in the 2021 Kabul bombing, as one of the reasons for Trump’s positive view of Islamabad.
“We are doing favours to them also in that regard,” Sayed says, terming Pakistan a reliable US partner in contrast to India’s perceived “double games” with Moscow.
