Yusef JalaliSeptember 7 was supposed to be a watershed moment in the long-winding saga of Iran's nuclear ambitions and Western interventions.
The country’s parliament had convened to vote on potentially withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which could have slammed the door on any chance for diplomacy.
Instead, the session fizzled out without a decision, postponed because the Parliament’s National Security Commission hadn't wrapped up its report.
The following day, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei struck a conciliatory tone. "Iran is a member of the NPT and committed to the safeguards agreement," he declared, emphasising that talk of withdrawal has been "raised only at a limited level in parliament, and no definitive decision has been made."
Even as hardline lawmakers reject any cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency as "illegal" under a June law that blocked the oversight body following US and Israeli strikes on nuclear sites, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met IAEA chief Rafael Grossi in Cairo on Tuesday and agreed to resume cooperation under a new framework.
It's a display of mixed signals: defiance in the Majlis, openness to diplomacy from the government, all while the clock ticks on UN ‘snapback sanctions’ that could crush Iran's economy.
Calculated chaos or internal turmoil?
Analysts see this push-pull as classic Iranian manoeuvring, keeping adversaries guessing while Tehran balances domestic pressures with international threats.
“Part of the system still doesn’t want to escalate, since NPT exit could hand Israel a pretext for attack,” Hadi Mohammadi, an Iran affairs commentator, tells TRT World.
“But another camp insists inspectors are simply giving free intelligence to the enemy for more precise future strikes.”
The fracture underscores Iran’s challenge in aligning policy between the pro-talks Pezeshkian government and parliamentary ideologues.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears weary of this ambiguity. Last week, he warned of an enemy-imposed “no war, no peace” limbo that drains Iran’s energy, framing it as a plot to weaken the Islamic Republic without full confrontation.
This explains Tehran's dual messaging: showing resilience while testing olive branches.
Iran’s NPT threats escalated after Britain, France, and Germany triggered the snapback mechanism on August 28 – a doomsday clause in the 2015 nuclear deal that allows any signatory to the accord to reinstate UN sanctions if Iran is found non-compliant.
Snapback flips the UN Security Council’s veto dynamics: Instead of needing consensus to impose penalties, sanctions automatically ‘snap back’ after 30 days unless extended – something Washington is certain to block.
That means even Russia and China cannot technically shield Iran, despite opposing the move.
Critics say the step is political.
“This was essentially a puzzle designed by the US and Israel,” says Ghasem Alidousti, an international relations professor, “forcing Iran toward talks with Washington on a win–lose basis.”
The snapback deadline gives Iran until late September to respond: either strike a deal or face renewed UN sanctions on arms, missiles, and trade, piling onto existing US penalties already suffocating oil exports.
Former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has warned hardliners that downplaying snapback’s impact ignores how European and UN sanctions would hammer ordinary Iranians, worsening currency devaluation and capital flight.
Alidousti counters that with US measures already suffocating Iran’s economy, UN sanctions “will not add significant pressure,” focusing mainly on defence sectors.
The activation has deepened Tehran’s divide: diplomacy with the IAEA intensified, even as threats like 90 percent enrichment and Strait of Hormuz closure grew louder.
Still, analysts believe these are last-resort options, not imminent steps.
“For now, Iran seems to be leaning on rationality. Listening to hardline demands would kill any chance for a peaceful solution,” Mohammadi adds.
Glimmers of progress
A flicker of hope emerged when Araghchi made a short-notice trip to Cairo, meeting with IAEA chief Grossi and agreeing to restore cooperation under a new framework.
“No precedent exists for IAEA cooperation with a member state whose safeguarded facilities were deliberately attacked,” Araghchi said, adding that Tehran and the agency are working on a mechanism to balance safeguard obligations with security concerns.
But hardliners remain sceptical, viewing cooperation as a weakness that only invites more strikes.
MP Hosseinali Haji Deligani slammed Araghchi’s Cairo visit, branding IAEA inspectors as “Israel’s spies” who only want to check what survived the June strikes to target it again.
“Distrust runs deep,” notes Mohammadi. “Tehran perceives a high risk of renewed attacks, with everyone planning based on the assumption that strikes could happen any day.”
They also argue that any Grossi–Araghchi deal is illegal, citing the June parliamentary law banning IAEA access to damaged sites.
No cameras or inspectors have entered those facilities since, with the agency desperate to gauge the fallout and locate Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile, which it claims to have swelled from 400kg before the war to 420kg at 60 percent purity.
Still, Mohammadi points out that the June law leaves wiggle room: the government can appeal to the Supreme National Security Council to bypass restrictions, giving President Pezeshkian’s team a legal lever if Cairo talks advance.
Iran now stands at a crossroads. The Pezeshkian government pins its hopes on an IAEA deal that could help reverse snapback, as promised by the E3, while hardliners sharpen sabres and warn that any hint of weakness will be punished.
The snapback threat has already shown its impacts: the rial hit record lows, hardline rhetoric surged, and diplomatic scrambling intensified.
Washington has so far ignored Iranian overtures.
Mohammadi argues that Washington has been awaiting Iran's next move, and Cairo may be a turning point.
“Iran has already responded positively to mediation offers, but so far the Americans haven’t answered. Iran now has fulfilled the primary demand of the E3, and that's cooperation with the agency,” he says.
Granting inspections could be an icebreaker for renewed negotiations with the US.
But since Tehran refuses to give up enrichment rights and the West insists on zero-enrichment, diplomats float a “third solution”: an international enrichment consortium with partners like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, China, or even the US.
That's a proposal Iran rejected in April’s Oman-mediated talks but may now consider it under the snapback threat.
Experts believe that with this shift from defiance to diplomacy, Iran - for now – does not prioritise hardline moves like quitting the NPT.
Instead, it is testing the reformists’ overture to the West, hoping to navigate the “no war, no peace” limbo.
But despite the macro decision for outreach, hardline voices remain loud, warning this is the same path that led from April’s talks to June’s strikes.
