While the Netanyahu government pursued regime change in Tehran, Israeli strikes have so far produced a rally-round-the-flag effect across Iran. Both sides continue to weigh their future options under an unpredictable Trump administration.

There is no doubt that Iran, a country that has long deterred Israeli threats through allies such as Hezbollah and Syria’s former Assad regime, has suffered damage inflicted by its nemesis, with US support. Iran has had to watch, as it loses top commanders and nuclear scientists alike.

But the hardline Netanyahu government also cannot claim total victory against Iran, despite his usual framing. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has shown no clear retreat from his core positions, even though he has reportedly been forced to live in a bunker.

A regime change in Iran is “all very unlikely,” says Charles Parton, a former top UK diplomat and a member of the Council on Geostrategy and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), two prominent British think tanks.

Israeli attacks, initially backed by the Trump administration, though it later pressured Israel to agree to a ceasefire, will not trigger a political process through which Tehran will “fall to the West,” Parton tells TRT World, referring to both Zionist and Western aspirations to replace the current regime in Iran.

This also marks an uncomfortable moment for the Netanyahu government, whose decades-long campaign to overturn the post-1979 regime in Tehran has not succeeded despite the Israeli and US direct strikes on Iranian targets, including nuclear facilities.

Both warring sides are now reeling from their recent violent engagement. In the short term, Trump’s strong response to ceasefire violations may have halted the recent conflict between the regional rivals. But in the long run, the future of the Tehran–Tel Aviv standoff hinges on how all sides navigate an increasingly fragile peace.

While the Israel–Iran confrontation is a long-term struggle, Israel’s failure to trigger regime change in Tehran reflects the Netanyahu government’s mounting challenges, from its war on Gaza to repressive policies in the occupied West Bank, and finally, its inconclusive strategy on Iran.

Who really won the 12-day war? 

While both sides incurred significant damage with limited gains, the 12-day war yielded no clear victory for either.

Instead, it became a staging ground for “an evolving long-term struggle” between two states with sharply different ideological and political orientations, according to Andreas Krieg, an associate professor at King’s College London and director of MENA Analytica.

“Operational victory goes to Israel. Strategic resilience and adaptive deterrence, however, lean toward Iran. Neither side achieved a decisive or total outcome, leaving the region in a state of unresolved volatility. Both claim ‘victory,’ but in truth, they remain locked in a broader contest where neither has yet decisively outmanoeuvred the other,” Krieg tells TRT World.

Aimen Jamil, an Islamabad-based expert on Iranian affairs, makes a similar assessment, saying that “the conflict produced no clear victor.”

While Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities appeared to delay Iran’s uranium enrichment program, they did not “achieve broader goals such as regime destabilisation,” Jamil tells TRT World. On the other hand, Iran was able to preserve “its core leadership,” albeit at a high economic and military cost, she adds.

During the 12-day war, Israel demonstrated its ability to deliver targeted strikes against Iran, just as it has done against other regional enemies, from Hezbollah to the Houthis, whose assets have also been hit by the Netanyahu government.

These targeted attacks allowed Israel to emerge from the conflict with a military advantage while “sustaining limited losses,” she says.

However, she also draws attention to the ground reality: Israeli military advantages have not resolved the country’s political and security issues with Iran, suggesting that “the conflict’s strategic outcome remains unsettled.”

Evaluating victory on 3 axes

A detailed assessment of the 12-day war “depends on how one evaluates the conflict across the three axes of victory: achievement, decisiveness, and success,” says Krieg, also a defence analyst.

In terms of achievement, Israel had the upper hand through its elimination of several top Iranian generals, degradation of Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure, including the highly fortified Fordow underground facility, and disruption of leadership networks, according to Krieg.

“Tactically, this was a ‘win’ for Israel, albeit with high financial costs and domestic disruptions,” he says.

But in the strategic dimension, the picture is “far murkier,” he adds. “The scales tilt toward Iran’s resilience, if not its triumph. Despite severe damage, Iran’s regime withstood a direct US and Israeli assault, demonstrating its ability to absorb shocks, manage internal cohesion, and maintain its regional influence through non-state actors.”

Krieg also highlights the “risk-tolerant” character of Iranian statecraft, which retaliated by firing on Israel and attacking a Qatar-based US military base in the Gulf. “Iran signalled that it retains escalation tools, can impose costs, and is unafraid to take risks to redefine deterrence under a new generation of IRGC leadership.”

As the hot conflict between Iran and Israel continues to evolve, experts across the board, including Krieg, caution about the young IRGC generation’s radical, risk-taking mindset.

On strategic scales, Iran demonstrated its capacities for “deterrence” and “endurance,” reframing itself “not merely as a passive target but as a reactive, risk-tolerant actor,” according to Krieg’s assessment.

While Israel’s operational advantage “blunted” Iranian strategic dominance, the Netanyahu government’s achievement might “best be described as significant but inconclusive, it hurt Iran but did not alter Tehran’s regional posture or nuclear ambitions decisively,” he adds.

On the decisiveness scale, Krieg’s analysis suggests that the 12-day war could herald “an exacerbated instability” in regional politics, without any genuine pathway to conflict resolution or sustainable peace.

If Iran is able to rebuild its power base and proxies across the region, this could lead to “a partial deterioration of the status quo.”

“The temporary ceasefire brokered via Gulf states is brittle. Hence, decisiveness remains low on both sides,” he says.

Finally, in terms of success, the recent conflict suggests “a tie, with Israel scoring higher tactically and Iran holding its ground strategically,” according to Krieg. “Israel did not lose but also cannot claim a clear victory. Iran avoided defeat and preserved strategic options, so it can claim a ‘no lose’ outcome.”