Last week, amid its ongoing military offensives in Gaza, the occupied West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, Israel carried out a targeted air strike near Damascus. The strike was described as a response to an alleged attack by “an outlaw group” on Syrian Druze civilians. Framing the attack as a protective measure, Israel reiterated its self-appointed role as defender of the Druze within Syrian territory. 

This saviour narrative goes back at least a century. Zionist leaders have long pursued sectarian fragmentation in the region to secure Israel’s dominance, especially in Lebanon and Syria. Early alliances with Maronite leaders and support for Phalangist militias in the Lebanese civil war reflected this strategy. In Palestine, Zionists sought to divide Christians, Muslims, and Druze, aiming to isolate the Druze as a potential ally. 

In the 1960s, when Israel occupied the Golan Heights from Syria during the Arab-Israeli War, it inherited a patchwork of communities—Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, Circassians, and Druze. Most were soon displaced. The majority of these groups were forced to abandon the Golan following the 1967 occupation. 

The Druze, however, remained, forming an uneasy coexistence with the new Israeli settlers following the territory’s illegal annexation in 1981. 

Beyond the strategic importance of the Golan, the martial qualities of the Druze caught Israel’s attention. The loyalty of Palestinian Druze to Israeli governments and the community’s generally pragmatic nature positioned Syrian Druze as a key tool in Israel’s Syria policy. Since then, the Druze—especially those across the border in Syria—have emerged as a potential lever in Israel’s regional policy, especially following the fall of the Assad regime. 

Why are Druze important to Israel?

The Druze were at the forefront of the groups participating in the victory of the major revolution in Syria on December 8, 2024. They have long maintained a cautious distance from Syria’s power struggles. Their leadership, Hikmet al-Hajari and Yousef Jabour, was accused of quietism during the civil war, particularly after the 2012 suspicious death of the spiritual guide, Sheikh Ahmed al-Hajari, and the perceived collaboration of his successor, Hikmet al-Hajari, with Bashar al-Assad. 

That changed in August 2023, when widespread protests in the Druze heartland of Suweida fractured the community’s relationship, causing a rift with the Assad regime. Consequently, the revolution’s overthrow of Assad was met with joy in Druze areas. 

Yet Hikmet al-Hajari’s refusal to engage with the Ahmed Alsharaa government and his explicit refusal to recognise it have prevented meaningful reconciliation and left the community politically adrift. They are unable to establish a dialogue with the current Syrian government.

Israel’s opportunism 

Facing its most severe security crisis in decades after October 7 attack, and wary of renewed threats from Lebanon and Syria, Netanyahu’s far-right government is seeking to exploit Syria’s post-Assad chaos. The importance of the Druze becomes evident at this juncture.

Although the influence of Iran and its regional allies has diminished, Israel is exploiting all opportunities to create cracks in Syria’s fragile structure. It views the Syrian Druze as a potential ally to destabilise Syria’s central authority. 

One option under consideration is the creation of a buffer zone in southern Syria—a modern echo of its failed “security zone” in Lebanon, dismantled in 2000. For this purpose, Israel has seized the opportunity to use its full strength against Syria for the first time since the 1967 war.

Since the 1960s, Israel has envisioned a semi-autonomous Druze enclave in southern Syria— that is informally aligned with the country. A divide-and-rule framework of autonomy could weaken the central state system and provide Israel with a pliable frontier region.

Previous efforts faltered due to the community’s reluctance to oppose Assad outright. After Druze General Selim Hatum’s defeat by Hafez al-Assad in 1966, the Druze were purged from the military and began to weaken politically. Israel sought to exploit tensions between the Druze and Hafez al-Assad, the leadership vacuum among the Druze and their refusal to fight Assad thwarted Israel’s plans.

But with violence flaring again in towns like Jaramana and Sahnaya, the old plan has regained traction. It has emboldened Israel to carry out attacks near the presidential palace in Damascus.

Beneath claims of minority protection lie broader aims. In Israel’s Druze policy, geography and infrastructure matter too. 

Suwaiida, the Druze heartland, once served as a logistics hub for Hezbollah. Although Hezbollah maintained control over only three points in Suwaida, the region was a convenient arena for cross-border smuggling operations. Israel’s goal is to sever this link. 

The Golan itself, rich in water resources, remains vital to Israel’s hydrological needs. Control over Druze-populated areas thus offers both strategic depth and resource security. 

In this context, Israel’s religious and political projects targeting the Druze are becoming clearer.

Divide and conquer strategy

After the Assad regime was overthrown, Israel began treating the new authorities in Damascus as a potential security threat, taking a series of aggressive military actions. 

By presenting itself as a defender of minority rights, Israel hopes to peel the Druze away from pan-Arab identity and toward a more sectarian, Israel-friendly posture. 

Although Druze in the Middle East are politically divided, their doctrinal unity is the most significant factor binding the community. While Israeli Druze are not as strongly tied to Arab identity as their Syrian counterparts, religious unity strengthens their connection. Recent events also reveal attempts to pit the Druze against the new government through “sectarian” rhetoric. 

Israel leverages claims that the Druze are not recognised as Muslims in Syria to exploit sectarian divides and present itself as their protector, using its legal pluralism to gain their sympathy and support.

Its facilitation of pilgrimages by Syrian Druze to the tomb of Prophet Shuayb—a site sacred to the sect—via the Golan is one such effort. It aims to cultivate cross-border solidarity between Syrian and Israeli Druze, who, though politically distinct, remain religiously unified. 

At the same time, Israeli authorities are reportedly seeking to foster ties between Hikmat al-Hajari and Muwaffaq Tarif, the state-recognised Druze spiritual leader in Israel. This could weaken the influence of Walid Jumblatt, Lebanon’s prominent (and more anti-Israel) Druze figure. 

The ultimate aim appears to be the creation of a pro-Israel Druze faction within Syria—one capable of acting as a bulwark against both the Damascus government and Hezbollah. 

The Druze’s residence in critical regions and their failure to fully reconcile with the Syrian government make them a useful tool for Netanyahu. Therefore, claims that Israel is attacking Syria to “protect” the Druze lack political logic. 

While President Alsharaa has reached out to various communities, including the Kurds, to foster national unity in Syria, the Druze community remains less concerned about past episodes of the civil war. The problem with the new government is that it is still in the process of stabilising the security situation and addressing the continued presence of foreign fighters.

The vast majority of the Druze community, aware of Israel’s intentions, opposes the fragmentation of Syria’s territorial integrity. However, the failure to address some of the Druze’s concerns could increase demands for “protection.” If Israel succeeds in its plans regarding the Druze, it will remain an occupier in southern Syria, as it has in southern Lebanon. 

Israel’s overtures are less about safeguarding a vulnerable sect than about shaping Syria’s future in a way that suits its own. Still, acknowledging and constructively responding to Druze concerns will be essential if the new regime in Damascus is to prevent external actors from exploiting these sentiments.