Emil AvdalianiAs Eurasia’s geopolitical landscape transforms–shaped by Russia’s war in Ukraine and China's expanding Belt and Road Initiative–-Türkiye is advancing boldly into Central Asia.
Driven by deep cultural bonds and strategic ambitions, Ankara is emerging as a crucial partner for the four Turkic-speaking nations of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, as these states seek to diversify their foreign relations away from traditional dependencies on Moscow and Beijing.
Türkiye’s ambitions are embodied in the Middle Corridor—an east-west trade route that both reflects its historical ties with Central Asia and responds to current geopolitical shifts. Though Russia’s invasion of Ukraine accelerated interest in alternative trade routes, drawing investment from China and the EU, the Middle Corridor is not a post-2022 phenomenon. Türkiye and its Central Asian partners had already laid substantial groundwork, making the corridor operational and viable. Smaller transit states, too, took practical steps to ease trade flows from the Black Sea to China. What we’re seeing now is less a reaction and more the scaling-up of a vision that was already well underway.
Recent Turkish infrastructure projects, such as the modernisation of ports and railways linking Türkiye, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, and the development of logistics hubs around the Caspian Sea, have significantly boosted regional connectivity. Between January and October 2024, cargo movement increased by 68 percent. These efforts have already reduced transit times and opened new economic pathways between China and Europe, commodities that would once take 35 to 45 days to journey by sea now take just 10 to 15 days.
Türkiye has focused its efforts on enhancing this corridor. Diplomatic engagements with Central Asian governments show clear priorities, namely reducing trade barriers at borders and improving connectivity between ports.
Diversification: Energy and economic ambitions
Beyond the corridor, Türkiye is also pursuing energy diversification through deeper ties with the Caspian Basin. Despite its Black Sea gas discoveries in 2020, Ankara remains reliant on external energy supplies. It is actively advancing projects like Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), and the South Caucasus Pipeline to transport Caspian gas to Europe—helping to reduce dependence on Russia and Iran.
Efforts to bring Turkmen gas to European markets have spanned over three decades, consistently hampered by geopolitical and logistical challenges. Chief among them were Ashgabat’s strained relations with Iran—an issue now being partially mitigated through swap deals—and Tehran’s own ambitions to become a major supplier to Europe and Türkiye.
However, recent momentum suggests a shift: in March 2024, Türkiye and Turkmenistan signed a memorandum of understanding and a letter of intent aimed at expanding cooperation in the gas sector. This followed a high-level meeting in August 2023 between Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov and his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan, focused on boosting trade and economic ties—laying further groundwork for Turkmen gas exports to finally reach European markets via Türkiye.
These moves reflect Türkiye’s broader aim to position itself as an energy hub between the EU and the Caspian. In mid-May Turkish and Azerbaijani officials signed a cooperation agreement on gas transit via Azerbaijan and Georgia. This culminated in a February 11 agreement between Ankara and Ashgabat to begin Turkmen gas flows to Türkiye via Iran using the gas swap approach.
Amid today’s volatile energy landscape, this strategy aligns with Türkiye’s goal of diversifying supply sources and reducing dependence on any single supplier — particularly Russia and Iran.
The Second Karabakh War accelerated Ankara’s outreach to the region, with Azerbaijan emerging as Türkiye’s largest gas supplier in 2019-2020. That cooperation has since expanded, with Turkmenistan now playing a more active role. The January 2021 agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to jointly develop the Dostluk gas field could even revive the long-discussed Trans-Caspian Pipeline, a project long resisted by Russia and Iran, who view Turkmen gas as a threat to their influence in the European market.
Military cooperation and political alignment
Türkiye is also using military and defence ties to deepen its presence in Central Asia. Its support for Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war—where Turkish Bayraktar drones proved decisive—sparked regional interest in Turkish military technology. This momentum has since translated into broader defence partnerships.
In 2022, an agreement was reached with Kazakhstan to expand military cooperation in aerospace and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) production. Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan have also pursued defence ties with Türkiye. In Bishkek’s case, Turkish weapons are seen as a balancing factor against both Tajikistan and regional instability stemming from Afghanistan.
On the economic front, Türkiye is pushing for free trade agreements and preferential trade deals with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Ankara has revived the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), originally launched in 1985 with Iran and Pakistan—to promote greater trade. While its past influence was limited, ECO’s reactivation fits Ankara’s wider eastward strategy.
Though Türkiye cannot match the economic heft of China and Russia, it leverages strong cultural and religious ties—alongside growing strategic relevance—to deepen commercial relationships. Its exports to Central Asia reached $12 billion in 2022, a 30 percent year-on-year increase. Bilateral trade with Turkmenistan reached $2.5 billion in 2023, with both sides aiming to double that figure soon.
Türkiye has also signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Kazakhstan (2016) and Uzbekistan (2024), with the latter agreement elevating ties to strategic partnership status. In 2023, trade with Kazakhstan reached $6.4 billion, and with Uzbekistan, $3 billion—both showing marked growth from previous years.
Shifting geopolitics and opportunity
What makes Türkiye’s approach viable is that Central Asian states— especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—are actively seeking to diversify foreign partnerships. The appeal lies in gaining greater autonomy in economic and political decision-making. Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are following suit, with a growing preference for multi-vector foreign policy.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has diluted its presence in Central Asia, creating space for new players. At the same time, China’s economic dominance through the BRI continues to grow. In this context, Türkiye presents itself as a more culturally aligned, less imposing partner.
This trend is institutionalised through platforms like the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), where all Turkic-speaking countries have rallied around a shared vision, At the OTS summit in November 2024, members committed to Vision 2040—an agenda aimed at tackling climate, economic, and geopolitical challenges through Turkic cooperation.
In many ways, Türkiye’s ambitions in Central Asia and the Caspian Basin often coincide with Western geopolitical interests, particularly in reducing Russia’s and China’s influence over the region. Both Ankara and its Western partners share an interest in promoting east-west connectivity—through pipelines, railways, and trade corridors—that offer alternatives to infrastructure controlled by rival powers.
At a broader level, Türkiye’s engagement reflects the growing global importance of Central Asia itself. In recent years, major powers from Europe and the Middle East have ramped up diplomatic overtures towards the five Central Asian states. This flurry of attention is not coincidental: Central Asia now sits at the heart of a multipolar world order.
Türkiye’s assertive push into Central Asia is a response to shifting geopolitical currents—and a reflection of long-held ambitions. While it still faces significant competition from Russia and China, the space to manoeuvre is growing.
By capitalising on cultural affinity, strategic geography, and timely infrastructure and energy investments, Türkiye is positioning itself as a credible and influential player in the region. The window of opportunity is open—and Türkiye is stepping through it with purpose.
