Since 9/11, every US presidential candidate has pledged to prioritise homeland defence as a core national security objective.
In this tradition, Donald Trump made missile defence one of the cornerstones of his 2024 campaign, vowing to build “a great Iron Dome over our country, a dome like has never been seen before”. Trump portrayed the project as a symbol of national pride and industrial resurgence.
Upon returning to the office in January 2025, President Trump swiftly turned his vision into policy.
Within a week of his inauguration, he signed an executive order titled 'Iron Dome for America', instructing the Department of Defence to develop a comprehensive missile shield to defend US territory against an increasing range of airborne threats.
In the following weeks, the initiative was renamed the Golden Dome for America.
This signalled a departure from the now-famous Israeli Iron Dome, as well as an assertion of uniquely American scale, technological ambition and symbolic purpose.
New era of missile defence?
The Golden Dome project involves the development of a layered missile defence architecture combining space-based sensors, AI-driven fire control systems and a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic interceptors, which are intended to counter threats from ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missiles.
The project's most complex element is its proposed network of space-based interceptors, including lasers, which are designed to destroy warheads shortly after launch.
While Israel’s system is designed to intercept short-range rockets, the Golden Dome has a much broader scope, aiming to defend against a wider range of threats, including hypersonic missiles and space-based platforms such as the Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS).
On May 20, President Trump confirmed that Space Force General Michael Guetlein will lead the development of the Golden Dome, which he described as essential for the “success and even survival of our country”.
The programme is substantial in scale. Preliminary estimates from the Congressional Budget Office suggest that the total cost could exceed $542 billion over the next two decades.
Next year's defence budget has earmarked $25 billion for the development of key components, including satellites, space-based sensors and interceptors, and launch infrastructure.
Trump announced that the system, which is expected to cost $175 billion, should be operational within three years, marking the first time that weapons will be placed in space.
The success of the project largely depends on space-based systems for detecting and intercepting missiles, since these offer the most effective means of addressing fast, hard-to-detect and highly manoeuvrable threats, such as hypersonic weapons.
However, despite this early momentum, there are still significant questions regarding the technical feasibility and long-term strategic viability of such a complex and ambitious system.
Whether the Golden Dome will be a strategic breakthrough or an expensive gamble remains unclear. Although it promises innovation and deterrence, there is a risk that it will lead to greater dependence on private firms and provoke adversarial escalation.
Privatisation of defence
The Golden Dome project is notable not only for its size and technological ambition but also for its unprecedented reliance on the private sector, already becoming one of the most commercially attractive defence initiatives in recent US history.
More than 180 companies have expressed interest in participating in the project. Major defence contractors, including Northrop Grumman, Boeing and RTX, are expected to play key roles.
At the same time, Lockheed Martin has already launched a dedicated marketing campaign to establish a strong presence in this evolving landscape.
According to one news report, a consortium led by SpaceX and comprising Palantir and Anduril is at the forefront of the project.
Their proposal involves a constellation of hundreds of satellites in low Earth orbit, which would be used to detect, track and potentially neutralise incoming threats in real time.
This group of companies is distinguished not only by its technical capacity but also by its outsized influence on the political and strategic narrative surrounding the project.
SpaceX, Palantir and Anduril were all founded by entrepreneurs who have provided significant political support to Trump.
Elon Musk, the CEO of SpaceX, currently serves as an adviser to the Trump administration's Department of Government Efficiency. Similarly, Palantir's chair, Peter Thiel, and Anduril's leadership have maintained close ties to Trump-aligned national security circles.
Some lawmakers are concerned that the intersection of private sector ambition and political alignment could compromise the transparency and integrity of the procurement process.
Critics have warned that entrusting critical defence infrastructure to firms with perceived political affiliations could undermine the impartiality of national security decision-making.
Earlier this month, a group of 42 Democratic lawmakers formally requested an investigation into whether political considerations had unduly influenced the Golden Dome contracting process.
In their letter, the lawmakers wrote: "All of this raises concerns about whether defence contracts to build a Golden Dome are an effective way to protect Americans or are meant to enrich Mr Musk and other elites."
The increasing participation of private companies in the Golden Dome project is indicative of a broader shift in US defence planning, where commercial entities are not merely contractors, but pivotal figures in the development and deployment of military power.
This is particularly evident in SpaceX’s reported proposal for a subscription-based model, whereby the government would pay for access to privately owned satellite systems instead of owning them outright.
While this approach may offer speed and flexibility, it also introduces structural vulnerabilities, including reduced public oversight, diminished state control over critical infrastructure and increased dependence on corporate-controlled platforms.
Thus, the Golden Dome is not merely a test of missile defence. It signals a profound transformation in how the US organises, governs, and ultimately authorises the use of force in the 21st century.
Strategic fallout: Deterrence or escalation?
The stated aim of the Golden Dome is to address what US defence officials increasingly describe as a critical vulnerability in homeland security.
According to recent assessments by the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), threats from missiles to the continental US are expected to increase significantly in scale and sophistication over the next decade.
While traditional ballistic missiles remain a central concern, strategic competitors — particularly China and Russia — are developing advanced delivery systems explicitly designed to evade or overwhelm existing U.S. defences.
According to the DIA report, China could deploy up to 700 nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles by 2035. North Korea has already demonstrated ICBM capabilities that can reach the US mainland, and Iran may be positioned to develop similar capabilities by 2035 if it chooses to pursue them.
In response, the Golden Dome project proposes a layered, space-enabled missile defence architecture. However, such systems pose inherent strategic risks.
Missile defence challenges the principle of mutual vulnerability that underpins nuclear deterrence. If a nuclear-armed adversary believes that its second-strike capability — the ability to retaliate after a nuclear attack — might be neutralised, even partially, it could lead to a shift in the balance of power.
In that case, it may view the balance of power as shifting in favour of the US. Rather than strengthening stability, a system like the Golden Dome could, in such a scenario, increase the risk of crisis miscalculation or pre-emptive escalation.
The more credible and capable the system appears, the more likely it is to invite countermeasures rather than deter them.
China and Russia issued a joint statement warning that the project could destabilise global security and militarise space. Both governments described it as a substantial expansion of US strategic capabilities and urged nuclear-armed states to reject ‘Cold War mentality’ and zero-sum games.
These comments reflect the growing unease of key US competitors who may interpret the system as a potential shift in the strategic balance that warrants reciprocal countermeasures. While designed for protection, the Golden Dome could provoke adversarial escalation, ultimately making the world less secure.
The Golden Dome could well be a game-changer — but not without consequences.
By shifting key defence responsibilities to private firms and disrupting the logic of nuclear deterrence, it reveals the extent to which national security is becoming intertwined with commercial innovation and strategic uncertainty.
In this sense, the project is not merely a missile shield; it is a window into the evolving architecture of 21st-century warfare, where power is wielded not just by states but also by corporations, algorithms, and orbital platforms.