Emil AvdalianiOn June 20, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan paid an official visit to Türkiye, his first since taking office, and a first for any Armenian leader since the country’s independence from the Soviet Union.
The visit came against the backdrop of renewed efforts to recalibrate regional diplomacy. Pashinyan was accompanied by Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Ruben Rubinyan, the Vice Speaker of the National Assembly and Armenia’s special representative in the normalisation dialogue with Türkiye.
Though not entirely unprecedented – Pashinyan and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met briefly on the sidelines of international events in Prague (2022), Ankara (2023), and most recently in Albania – this visit stood out for its formality and timing. It was a calculated gesture by Yerevan, signalling readiness for deeper engagement with Ankara at a time when regional dynamics are shifting rapidly.
Türkiye and Armenia still lack formal diplomatic relations, and their shared border has remained closed since 1993 following the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. While President Erdogan has expressed openness to normalisation, Ankara continues to prioritise progress on the Armenia-Azerbaijan front before any full breakthrough with Yerevan.
This latest visit marks what is arguably the third major attempt at reconciliation. The first effort came in 2009, when the Zurich Protocols – designed to establish diplomatic ties and open the border – were signed. However, amid strong opposition from Azerbaijan and domestic hesitancy in both Ankara and Yerevan, the process stalled and was formally shelved in 2018.
A second phase began in 2021 with the appointment of Ruben Rubinyan from the Armenian side and Turkish diplomat Serdar Kılıç as special envoys.
The talks led to small but meaningful steps: direct flights resumed, and the border briefly opened in 2023 to allow Armenian humanitarian aid into earthquake-stricken regions of Türkiye.
These actions, while symbolic, underscored the potential for cooperation even in the absence of formal ties. While these developments show goodwill, the path to normalisation is constrained by complex domestic, historical, and geopolitical factors.
In a notable shift, Armenia’s leadership is no longer pushing for the events of 1915 to be recognised as a genocide, once a central issue in its foreign policy. In a March interview with Turkish journalists, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that Armenia no longer considered genocide recognition a political priority.
Even more strikingly, he questioned the centrality of Mount Ağrı (Ararat) in Armenian national identity despite its prominent place on Armenia’s coat of arms. For Türkiye, Armenia’s continued use of Mount Ağrı—a mountain located entirely within Turkish territory—as a national symbol has long raised sensitivities, especially when viewed through the lens of territorial respect and mutual recognition. Armenia’s rhetorical repositioning marks a clear move away from symbolic politics toward pragmatic statecraft.
These statements fall within the broader scope of Pashinyan’s Real Armenia program, a policy approach that prioritises present-day borders and national interests over historical grievances or irredentist versions.
The recalibration is designed not only to diffuse tensions with Türkiye but also to adapt Armenia’s foreign policy to a multipolar and rapidly evolving regional landscape. While the move has drawn criticism from some segments of the Armenian public and diaspora, it reflects a strategic pivot aimed at securing long-term peace and economic opportunity.
Geopolitical shifts
Armenia’s overtures toward Türkiye must also be understood within the larger realignment underway in the South Caucasus. All three countries in the region—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—are working to diversify their foreign policy portfolios, reaching out to partners beyond their traditional blocs.
For Georgia and Azerbaijan, this has meant building closer ties with China, Central Asian countries, and also the wealthy Persian Gulf states. For Armenia, the stakes are even higher. Long seen as wholly dependent on Russia, Yerevan is now actively seeking engagement with the United States, the EU, India, and notably, Türkiye.
The reasons are both strategic and economic. First, Armenia wants to reduce its overwhelming reliance on Georgia for trade access. Reopening the land border with Türkiye would create a direct link to the Mediterranean and Turkish markets, vastly improving Armenia’s logistical options.
Second, and most critically, improved relations with Türkiye could act as a buffer against possible military escalation with Azerbaijan. Zangezur Corridor, a proposed transport link through Armenia’s Syunik province connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan, remains a point of friction. Yerevan hopes Ankara could temper Baku’s ambitions, reducing the risk of confrontation.
Türkiye’s strategic vision
For Ankara, engagement with Armenia fits into a broader strategic outlook. Normalised ties would enhance Türkiye’s economic and geopolitical position in the South Caucasus, reinforcing its vision of a connected Eurasia.
Türkiye’s ambitions include establishing a direct land corridor to Azerbaijan via Nakhchivan, integrating transport and energy routes across the region, and projecting influence deeper into Central Asia. An open border with Armenia would not only stimulate Türkiye’s eastern provinces, particularly Kars and Iğdır, but also cement Ankara’s status as a central hub in the Middle Corridor initiative.
Additionally, Türkiye seeks to play a leading role in regional platforms such as the “3+3” format, which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia (though Tbilisi abstains), and the major regional powers: Türkiye, Russia, and Iran. A successful normalisation with Armenia would lend Ankara greater weight in these multilateral efforts.
Yet Ankara’s position remains clear: progress with Yerevan cannot be divorced from Armenia’s normalisation with Azerbaijan. This includes expectations that Armenia amend its constitution to remove language supporting the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, and jointly with Azerbaijan, formally dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group, which is now considered obsolete.
Despite five rounds of discussions between the special envoys, tangible breakthroughs have remained elusive. Proposals such as reopening the Ahurik–Akyaka railway crossing, allowing third-country nationals to cross the land border, or easing visa restrictions for diplomatic passport holders have yet to materialise.
Both sides appear to be waiting: Ankara for a signed Armenia–Azerbaijan peace deal, and Yerevan for stronger assurances that Türkiye will act as a stabilising force rather than an ally of Baku alone.
Still, the progress to date should not be underestimated. The tone of official rhetoric has softened. Symbolic gestures have built a foundation of trust. And the willingness to even pursue this process, despite political sensitivities, suggests a broader realignment is underway.
Looking ahead
The Türkiye–Armenia reconciliation process is a product of deeper changes in the regional and global order. As Russia’s influence wanes and the global system becomes more multipolar, South Caucasus nations are reassessing their strategic priorities. Türkiye, with its robust economy, growing diplomatic reach, and central geographic position, is well-placed to lead regional integration efforts.
For Armenia, normalisation offers a chance to reduce isolation, attract investment, and de-escalate threats along its borders. For Türkiye, it opens the door to new trade corridors, regional influence, and greater alignment with Western and Eurasian partners alike.
While challenges remain, especially around the unresolved Armenia–Azerbaijan file, the direction of travel is clear. The Türkiye–Armenia normalisation process is no longer unthinkable. It is unfolding, slowly but deliberately, in a region that is finally beginning to look beyond its past.
