Deception and espionage have long been tools of warfare, dating back to antiquity. In modern conflicts such tactics are regaining prominence as seen in bold and highly effective intelligence operations. Recent examples exhibit how modern technology, from drones to advanced explosives, combined with skilled spy-craft, can deliver outsized effects. 

When a swarm of drones struck deep inside Russia as a part of Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb, on June 1, destroying dozens of strategic bombers, it challenged prevailing assumptions about how power is projected and protected.  

The attack was the product of a deep-cover intelligence effort. Drones hidden inside prefabricated homes transported by trucks struck four of the five airfields, demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to reach deep into Russia’s territory. The strike damaged over 20 aircraft and destroyed at least 12, and significantly degraded Russia’s ability to launch cruise missiles, one of Moscow’s key advantages in the war.

Amid the spectacle of high-tech warfare, one detail from Operation Spiderweb stood out with quiet audacity was that Ukraine’s drones cost less than a thousand dollars apiece. At a time when governments are dramatically increasing defence spending, this event offered an uncomfortable reminder that higher expenditure does not necessarily equate to greater security.

In an age where global military expenditure at $2.7 trillion in 2024, highest level since the end of the Cold War, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the meagreness of the high-tech equipment is rather stark. Just five countries—the United States, China, Russia, Germany and India—accounted for 60% of the total. The US alone spent nearly $1 trillion.

The surge reflects shifting strategic anxieties, waning faith in legacy alliances, and growing unease about an unstable international order. Russia’s war in Ukraine, Israel’s continued attacks on Gaza, concerns over America’s reliability as a security guarantor, and the rapid spread of dual-use technologies have created a climate of uncertainty. 

Continued growth in military expenditure over the coming years would not be surprising. While the money chases familiar threats, the battlefield is mutating. Asymmetric operations, autonomous systems and algorithmic targeting are defining the new battlespace. These changes are evolving faster than the doctrines, procurement processes, and strategic frameworks that underpin most defence planning.

Absent a deliberate effort to reshape their forces with new technologies, militaries risk becoming overstretched and slow to adapt. In a security environment defined by expendable systems and algorithm-driven warfare, deterrence hinges not on mass or might – but flexibility, connectivity, and the intelligent application of innovation.

Rising defence budgets are no substitute for strategic clarity in this context. Without a shift toward decentralised, tech-enabled models of power projection, today’s investments risk ossifying into tomorrow’s vulnerabilities.

Shifting the mix

Legacy systems, tanks, fighter jets, manned naval platforms, remain central to military operations, particularly for deterrence and high-intensity engagements. But without integration into networked, multi-domain force structures, those that incorporate unmanned systems, AI-enabled command-and-control frameworks, and real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance networks, their effectiveness is rapidly eroding. 

Recent conflicts, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the skirmishes along the India–Pakistan border, have laid bare the strategic edge conferred by agility and interoperability.

The aim is not to discard traditional platforms but to rethink their role. In future conflicts, strategic advantage will depend less on the size or symbolism of individual systems and more on their adaptability and their seamless integration into a broader operational architecture. Smart investment now means enabling cross-domain interoperability, aligning command hierarchies, and acquiring emerging capabilities that enhance the whole.

This transition is no longer speculative. It is already unfolding on the battlefield, where loitering munitions, swarming drones, and AI-enabled targeting are reshaping the nature of force projection.

Some militaries are adapting. Britain’s “20-40-40” strategy, for instance, envisions 20% of its future platforms as crewed, 40% as reusable uncrewed systems, and 40% as expendable assets such as loitering munitions.

This high–low mix, where effectiveness is achieved through integration rather than reliance on a single capability, aims to combine a few high-end systems with swarms of cheaper, more flexible assets. It reflects lessons from Ukraine, where relatively inexpensive platforms have been used to disable far more advanced systems.

Operation Spiderweb: Strategic disruption

Ukraine offered a vivid demonstration of this new paradigm. Following 18 months of planning, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) smuggled 117 drones into Russia, concealing them in modified trucks.

Deployed in coordinated waves from these mobile launchers, the drones reached airfields. The targets were high-value assets: Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 bombers, A-50 airborne early warning spy aircraft, and Il-78 aerial refuelling aircraft—all of which are central to Russia’s long-range strike capability.

For many, the operation evoked the disruptive impact of Pearl Harbour, not in terms of scale, but in terms of its ability to rewrite the rules of warfare.

The drones employed a hybrid control system, combining autonomous navigation with manual oversight. Some drones reportedly used AI-driven targeting algorithms trained on decommissioned aircraft in the museums, allowing them to strike specific vulnerabilities such as fuel storage compartments and underwing pylons. Launched from within Russia, their slow speed and low profile allowed them to evade detection by air defences optimised for high-altitude threats.

For a fraction of the cost of a conventional airstrike, Ukraine inflicted billions of dollars’ worth of damage. The attack was not just tactically effective, it was strategically disruptive, challenging assumptions about the survivability of high-value platforms and the shape of deterrence itself.

 his starkly illustrated the asymmetry between traditional high-value platforms and what are increasingly referred to as attritable systems: designed for saturation attacks, with a simplistic design, rapid reproducibility, and high lethality.

Age of attritable systems

Ukraine’s success is no anomaly. Operation Spiderweb serves as a stark illustration of the evolving nature of modern warfare. The country produced over 2.2 million drones last year and plans to double that number. Shorter-range one-way attack drones and FPV drones account for up to 80 percent of frontline casualties, highlighting the shift towards precision-driven warfare.

Many defence planners remain anchored in legacy thinking and traditional platforms. Continued investment in traditional crewed systems, without corresponding doctrinal and structural reform, resembles the misplaced reliance on cavalry in the face of mechanised conflict in the 1930s.

In an environment where high-value assets can be destroyed by low-cost saturation, the vulnerability of airfields and concentrated platforms has never been more apparent. Without a clear shift towards integration, interoperability, and technological flexibility, the lesson from Spiderweb is clear: without doctrinal innovation, even the most advanced hardware is a liability.

This underscores the urgent need for layered defence systems that go beyond legacy doctrine—integrating anti-drone capabilities, hardened infrastructure, and adaptive electronic warfare.

Operation Spiderweb is creating waves through NATO circles, where Ukraine’s convergence of AI with battlefield improvisation is under close study. With fewer troops, it turned to technological edge, transforming intelligence into high impact with algorithmic precision.

What’s needed is not abandonment of traditional systems, but their reconceptualisation. Layered defences, hardened infrastructure and adaptive electronic warfare must supplement old models. The objective is integration: legacy platforms working in tandem with expendable systems, underpinned by decentralised command and data-rich targeting.

In this context, the most pressing question for defence planners is no longer how much to spend. Will tomorrow’s defence investments reflect the threats of today, or the habits of yesterday?