Yunus MaziGerman Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s upcoming visit to Washington has been framed by Berlin as a new chapter in transatlantic relations.
But the choreography of diplomacy may conceal a less flattering reality: Germany still leans heavily on the United States for its security, for economic ballast, and for political legitimacy.
Since taking office, Merz has thrown himself into diplomatic efforts aimed at securing a ceasefire in Ukraine while preserving Western unity behind Kiev. Last week, he hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Berlin as part of those efforts.
Germany, meanwhile, has a vested interest in easing transatlantic trade tensions, particularly those straining relations between the European Union and the United States.
While Berlin speaks of recalibrating its foreign policy, it still reacts rather than leads.
Burden-sharing debates within NATO, recurring trade disputes, and diverging priorities in global crises reveal Europe’s lingering reliance on American leadership.
Far from asserting leadership in a shifting global order, Berlin appears to be reaffirming its less-than-equal status.
Merz’s trip appears more about offering reassurance to Washington than charting a path of equal partnership. The visit follows earlier meetings between foreign minister Johann Wadephul and US secretary of state Marco Rubio, where Berlin signalled an intention to raise defence spending.
But these promises remain largely symbolic, with little to show in terms of implementation or strategic coherence necessary for meaningful transformation.
Alliance of unequals?
Merz’s stay at Blair House may carry diplomatic weight, but it affirms how much Germany has tied its foreign policy to Washington’s approval. His previous role at BlackRock reinforces perceptions of a leader steeped in transatlantic economic and political dependencies, rather than reimagining Germany’s place in a fractured world.
“He has spent 70 years in a world where certain transatlantic assumptions were taken for granted, assumptions that no longer hold,” says Uli Bruckner, professor at Stanford University’s Berlin Centre, in an interview with TRT World.
While Merz may be capable of adjusting to new geopolitical realities, Bruckner remains sceptical that he can “draw the right conclusions and implement them politically.”
Bruckner also points to the uncertainty surrounding America’s own trajectory. “Trump seeks short-term advantage through confrontation and division, not long-term trust.”
If Germany’s credibility depends on transatlantic predictability, the return of Trump could again prove destabilising.
Ulrich Schlie, Henry Kissinger Professor of Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Bonn, sees the meeting as an opportunity, but only if substance follows symbolism.
“I would hope that Chancellor Merz’s visit helps raise Germany’s weight within the Atlantic alliance. Europe’s voice will only be heard in Washington if the European Union puts more on the table in terms of security,” he tells TRT World.
Europe’s defence gap
Ukraine will likely dominate the agenda of the meeting. Germany’s recent increases in defence spending have been positioned as a commitment to NATO. But Berlin remains underprepared and underfunded.
Trump may cast doubt on American backing for Kiev; Merz, for his part, offers no robust alternative vision.
“Europe lacks everything from readiness and public awareness to weapons, munitions, and intelligence systems,” Prof. Reinhard Heinisch of the University of Salzburg, a former advisor to the US State Department and Austria’s defence ministry, tells TRT World.
“Technologically, the continent remains far behind the U.S. and China. Even with increased spending, Heinisch says, “it would take at least 15 years at current spending levels to build basic defence capabilities.” Germany’s latest moves are “not a breakthrough, just the minimum to avoid falling completely behind.”
Bruckner offers a more pragmatic view: Europe doesn’t need full independence from the US to enhance deterrence. He says that “even small steps that raise the cost of a Russian attack can matter.”
But he warns that real transformation faces deep resistance - from public opinion, political priorities, and the sluggish, inefficient reform of the Bundeswehr. “Even if leaders agree on strategic autonomy, that doesn’t mean they’ll achieve it.”
Schlie stresses the urgency even more clearly: “Europe needs a quantum leap in security policy. We can no longer rely on the United States to solve all essential security issues and provide the guarantees.”
Germany faces a war reality it isn’t ready for
The recent drone strikes on Russian airbases highlight the unpredictability of the Ukraine conflict. Berlin, meanwhile, appears unprepared for a world of shrinking US commitments and rising global instability.
Heinisch sees little room for German influence. “Merz has no international stature — neither Putin nor Trump see him as a serious actor,” says Prof Heinisch.
“Germany will likely just endorse whatever settlement others agree on and send troops.” Trump, he suggests, is in search of a deal he can sell domestically, while Putin thrives in protracted, low-cost warfare.
“Russia has better allies, advances steadily, and benefits from a cheaper drone war. It helps Putin maintain domestic support.”
Bruckner believes diplomacy remains the only path to lasting peace “but only if all parties see their interests better served without war. That moment may come suddenly, triggered by military shifts, leadership changes, or pressure from the US or China. Right now, though, we see no real indicators for such a change.”
Germany’s ability to shape any eventual settlement may rest on its standing within the alliance. As Schlie put it: “The United States holds the key to any future peace process. The more weight Germany gains in transatlantic relations, the greater its diplomatic role and influence can become.”
The Merz-Trump meeting, rather than heralding renewal, may instead expose the limits of German statecraft. As long-term war scenarios take shape on Europe’s doorstep, Berlin needs more than symbolism - it needs clarity and courage.
Heinisch questioned whether Germany could even rely on France for nuclear deterrence: “Would Paris really risk a nuclear war for Berlin?” He doubts Merz can shift Trump’s negative stance on the EU. “Trump wants to make an example of Germany - and unlike in the past, other European countries no longer need Berlin as their spokesperson.”
Absent a strategic rethink, Germany risks more than diplomatic irrelevance. It may find itself sidelined within the very alliance it still depends on for survival.
