Ata ŞahitSince the 1990s, Afghanistan has emerged as a pivotal actor in the global drug economy, experiencing a particularly significant increase in opium production following 2001.
By 2020, Afghanistan had become the world’s leading supplier, accounting for approximately 85 percent of the global opium supply.
This landscape began to shift with the Taliban’s return to power in 2021.
Shortly after assuming control, the Taliban administration issued a decree banning the cultivation of the poppy plant, from which opium is derived. The ban came with several punitive measures against violators.
While this decision echoes similar policies enforced during the Taliban’s initial rule between 1996 and 2001, it has been enacted within a markedly different local and global context.
Consequently, questions regarding the extent to which the Taliban’s poppy ban has been enforced, as well as its domestic and regional implications, remain at the forefront of contemporary political debates and field observations.
Then and now: what changed?
When the Taliban seized Kabul in 1996, Afghanistan had already reached a critical threshold in global opium production.
Economic collapse, the disintegration of state authority, and rising opium prices created a fertile ground for widespread poppy cultivation.
During this period, the Taliban indirectly benefited from the drug economy through taxes levied on agricultural production.
However, in 1999, with Mullah Mohammed Omar’s declaration of a poppy ban, the policy direction shifted significantly; special commissions were established, stringent sanctions were imposed, and by 2001, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), poppy cultivation had declined by approximately 91 percent.
Following the Taliban’s transition into an armed insurgency during the 2000s, the group’s relationship with the drug economy was restructured.
Revenues were increasingly derived not directly from production but from transportation, security provision, taxation, and smuggling permits.
By 2018, the Taliban reportedly earned around 20 percent of their income from the country’s narcotics market.
This financial base enabled the Taliban to enhance their military capacity and consolidate their influence on the ground. Simultaneously, it undermined popular support for the central government, further destabilising the security apparatus.
During the Taliban’s second period of governance, its leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada issued a decree on April 14, 2022, officially banning poppy cultivation and opium production in Afghanistan.
It publicly announced that violators of the ban would face seizure of their crops and severe penalties. Nevertheless, the anticipated impact of the ban was not observed in its first year. On the contrary, UNODC data indicated that poppy cultivation areas increased by 28 percent in 2022.
This situation changed significantly starting in early 2023.
According to UNODC data, the area under poppy cultivation declined sharply to 10,800 hectares in 2023 from 233,000 hectares just a year ago 2022.
Over the same period, opium production fell from 6,200 tons to 333 tons, representing a 95 percent decrease.
Independent sources conducting satellite imagery-based field analyses, such as AlcisGeo, have corroborated these findings. For example, poppy cultivation in Helmand province dropped from 129,640 hectares in 2022 to merely 740 hectares in 2023.
However, in 2024, opium production in Afghanistan increased by 30 percent compared to the previous year, reaching 433 tons. Despite this rise, the figure remains 93 percent lower than 2022 levels.
These data indicate that the Taliban administration has achieved a notable short-term success in enforcing the poppy ban. Nonetheless, the sustainability of this success depends on a transformation of the existing socioeconomic structure.
Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan’s rural economy is not merely an illegal activity but is also perceived as an indispensable form of subsistence farming.
Particularly in provinces such as Helmand, Nangarhar, and Kandahar, poppy farming has become nearly the sole source of livelihood for many farmers due to long-standing infrastructure deficits, limited state support, and restricted market access.
Therefore, for the poppy ban to remain effective in the medium and long term, agricultural reforms, market integration, and the development of alternative income sources are imperative.
Moreover, in 2024, opium cultivation shifted geographically from the traditionally dense southwest regions toward the northeast. Notably, cultivation in Badakhshan province expanded by a staggering 381 percent.
The Taliban has claimed to stamp out opium production in the past, but that's easier said than done given the massive revenue it commands.
This shift is attributed to the Taliban’s stringent control in the south, contrasted with comparatively weaker oversight in the northeast. Additionally, the northeast’s proximity to the borders of China, Tajikistan, and Pakistan has contributed to a reconfiguration of drug trafficking routes.
Furthermore, the Taliban’s historical relationship with the drug economy has not been limited to opium production alone.
Over time, it has evolved into a more complex system involving control over smuggling routes, collection of fees from drug trafficking, and management of transportation networks, which serve as sources of organisational funding.
Currently, with the decline in opium production, this structure is increasingly transitioning toward synthetic drugs.
Emerging trends in the drug economy
Although the Taliban administration’s poppy ban may be viewed as a short-term success, the transformation occurring within the country’s drug economy generates new and complex challenges for regional security and economic stability.
Recent reports issued by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reveal that, despite the ban, massive opium stockpiles accumulated over years persist, particularly in southern Afghanistan. These reserves are estimated to exceed 16,000 tons, sufficient to meet global opium demand for several years.
This situation considerably limits the impact of the poppy cultivation suspension on the global drug supply, at least in the medium term.
Moreover, the ongoing transformation in the drug economy is not solely supply-driven but also notable in terms of structural changes in production and trade.
While the Taliban prohibits opium cultivation, producers have increasingly shifted toward the manufacture of synthetic drugs, with methamphetamine production showing a marked increase in recent years.
Multiple international organisations, including the UNODC, report that methamphetamine—derived from the ephedra plant and produced at low cost—has become widespread in southeastern Afghanistan as an alternative to traditional opium trafficking.
The reports further indicate a rise in the production of synthetic tablets known locally as ‘tablet K’, which may contain methamphetamine, opioids, and MDMA, a synthetic drug known as ‘ecstasy’. This emerging trend signals a new wave of threats to both border security and regional public health.
The existence of substantial opium stockpiles alongside the rising production of methamphetamine has implications that extend beyond Afghanistan’s internal dynamics.
Neighbouring countries such as Iran, Tajikistan, and Pakistan, while affirming the Taliban’s resolve to enforce the opium ban, have reported a significant increase in synthetic drug trafficking in recent times.
Notably, methamphetamine-related drug arrests and seizures in Iran highlight the widespread nature of synthetic drug flows originating from Afghanistan.
In this context, it is evident that regional intelligence and border security mechanisms remain inadequately prepared to address the emerging threat posed by synthetic narcotics.
The Taliban’s opium ban is widely interpreted as an attempt to gain international legitimacy. However, this pursuit of legitimacy may ultimately falter in the absence of economically sustainable alternatives.
As long as alternative livelihood projects targeting rural populations remain insufficient, the likelihood of opium stockpiles being exploited in black markets or the expansion of synthetic drug production will hinder the Taliban’s ability to consistently uphold its prohibitions.
The Taliban’s efforts to control the drug economy appear unlikely to achieve long-term success if they remain confined to security-oriented measures alone.
A genuine transformation can only be realised through a comprehensive strategy encompassing rural development, agricultural reform, alternative income generation, and enhanced cross-border cooperation.
Otherwise, the poppy ban risks remaining merely a policy instrument of governance, eventually supplanted by a more complex and less controllable synthetic drug economy.
