In a dramatic return to trade confrontation, President Donald Trump has reignited economic tensions with China through an aggressive new wave of tariffs. 

Even as he announced a 90-day pause on implementing his tariff regime on other countries, the Trump administration escalated its protectionist agenda by raising taxes on Chinese imports to as high as 145 percent, citing unfair trade practices and national security concerns. 

Branded as part of his newly-declared ‘Liberation Day’ initiative, the measures included a universal 10 percent tariff on all imports. 

Beijing swiftly responded by increasing its own tariffs on US goods to 125 percent, setting the stage for another high-stakes trade standoff. 

The revival of Trump’s combative trade strategy not only marks a pivotal moment in US-China relations but also raises urgent questions about the future of global trade stability and power competition.

At the heart of this renewed escalation lies a dispute over trade imbalances or tariffs and a broader reconfiguration of the global power struggle. 

What we are witnessing is a strategic recalibration by major actors as they attempt to reposition themselves within an emerging world order marked by uncertainty and flux. 

Unlike in the past, today’s leading powers are more assertive, centralised, and ideologically confident. This new environment oscillates between conflict and cooperation like a pendulum, continually redefining the limits and possibilities of engagement. 

As each actor projects its influence across political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions—both domestically and in their respective regions—their stability and coherence enhance their capacity to shape the global landscape. For this reason, the confrontation is unlikely to dissipate anytime soon. 

Rather, it has become an enduring feature of an international system in which rising powers are no longer merely reacting but actively rewriting the rules of the game.

What appears on the surface as a trade dispute is, in reality, a manifestation of a much deeper and more consequential struggle for global leadership. 

The fundamental hypothesis here is that this is not merely about tariffs or economic leverage—it is a contest between two systemic actors seeking to shape the architecture of a new international order. 

This confrontation is playing out most visibly in the economic and commercial realm. Still, the tools and arenas of competition are fluid. It could spill over into the political, military, or security domains at any moment. 

In fact, in the cultural and social spheres, this rivalry has been unfolding for quite some time. The persistent divergence in values, governance models, and soft power narratives underscores the intensity of the clash. 

What we are witnessing, then, is not a policy disagreement but a geopolitical power play with long-term structural implications.

More accurately, we are witnessing a form of partial decoupling—an uneasy unraveling of interdependence between the world’s two biggest economies that stops short of total disengagement. 

This process is neither linear nor absolute, and much of its ambiguity stems from the internal complexities within both countries. 

Dragon in the shadows

On the one hand, the US is grappling with deep political polarisation, recurring institutional dysfunction, and an increasingly volatile electoral climate. 

On the other hand, China is facing mounting structural challenges: an ageing population, a slowing economy, and growing tensions between state control and market flexibility. 

These internal uncertainties constrain each actor’s ability to commit to a clean break entirely and, instead, push them into a mode of selective disengagement—prioritising separation in sensitive sectors like semiconductors or data governance while remaining entangled in trade, finance, and global supply chains. 

This selective decoupling reflects not just strategic calculus but also domestic fragility masked by outward assertiveness.

As internal volatility and regional uncertainties persist, both the US and China find themselves compelled to reinforce their influence in their immediate neighbourhoods—yet neither power can take these spaces for granted.

Washington’s traditional alliances in East Asia and Europe are increasingly strained by divergent threat perceptions and shifting domestic politics, while Beijing’s sphere of influence is challenged by wary neighbours, territorial disputes, and growing resistance to its assertiveness. 

This fragility in regional alignments means that the decisive arena of great power competition is unlikely to be their respective cores but rather the peripheries—especially the Global South. 

From Africa and Latin America to Southeast Asia and the Middle East, emerging economies are becoming the primary sites of engagement, persuasion, and rivalry. 

These regions offer both markets and legitimacy, and their choices will shape the contours of the evolving world order. In this sense, the Global South is not merely a passive recipient of influence but a pivotal actor in its own right.

From Beijing’s perspective, managing the intensifying rivalry with the US requires a careful balancing act across three interrelated dimensions. 

First, on the domestic front, the Chinese Communist Party continues to project an image of control and stability yet faces mounting challenges—economic slowdown, youth unemployment, and the long-term repercussions of demographic decline. 

Second, in its immediate neighbourhood, China seeks to consolidate its strategic posture through military modernisation and regional initiatives like the Belt and Road project and the Global Security Initiative. 

However, distrust among neighbouring states and the US presence in the Indo-Pacific create a contested and unstable environment. 

Third, China is investing heavily in cultivating influence across the Global South—framing itself as an alternative to Western hegemony. 

Through development finance, digital infrastructure, and diplomatic outreach, Beijing hopes to gain not just allies but normative support for its model. Yet, even here, its assertiveness is met with mixed reception, revealing the complexities of shaping a multipolar order.

US and them

For the US, navigating the strategic contest with China also demands recalibration across domestic, regional, and global dimensions. 

Internally, the US remains mired in deep political polarisation, institutional fragility, and an increasingly transactional public discourse. While economic dynamism and innovation remain strong, the unpredictability of its democratic process raises doubts among allies and competitors alike. 

Regionally, Washington is attempting to reassure traditional partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, yet these alliances are no longer monolithic. 

Frictions over burden-sharing, diverging threat perceptions, and national priorities are eroding the once-unquestioned dominance of the US-led order. 

Consequently, like China, the US is turning more assertively toward the Global South—not only to secure economic access but to reassert normative influence. 

Through security assistance, digital investments, and renewed diplomacy, the US seeks to counter Beijing’s expanding footprint. However, the legacy of interventionism and a growing perception of strategic inconsistency complicate its efforts to re-establish trust and leadership.

When comparing the strategic positioning of the US and China across domestic resilience, regional control, and global outreach, no clear hegemon emerges. 

Both actors possess significant assets but also face structural limitations that prevent total domination. Rather than a clean decoupling or binary Cold War-style confrontation, we are witnessing a more fluid, unstable process—an era of strategic calibration. 

This concept captures the essence of the current global shift: not a division into static blocs but an evolving struggle to reconfigure influence, legitimacy, and order across overlapping spheres. 

Strategic calibration recognises that power today is diffused, relational, and adaptive; it must account for internal contradictions, contested regions, and a Global South that is no longer a passive recipient but an active arbiter. 

Through this lens—one that blends historical patterns, contemporary uncertainty, and theoretical nuance—we can better understand the emerging architecture of international politics.

In the final analysis, the world is too interconnected and interdependent to sustain a full-scale decoupling or ideological bifurcation. 

The depth of global economic, technological, and institutional linkages renders total separation not only impractical but also structurally unviable. Yet, this does not mean the system will revert to stability under the stewardship of the great powers. 

On the contrary, it will likely be the middle powers—those agile enough to mediate, adapt, and restrain—who will define the character of the coming order. 

These states, often caught in the strategic crossfire, are developing their own balancing mechanisms, regional initiatives, and diplomatic architectures. 

The emerging equilibrium we are beginning to see in the Middle East, where pragmatic engagement is tempering old rivalries, may well be a precursor to similar dynamics elsewhere. 

As the giants clash, it is the actions of those in the middle that may ultimately tether them to reason—and lay the groundwork for a new global coherence grounded not in dominance but in shared restraint.