Beirut, Lebanon – As Lebanon seeks to rebuild after the devastating one-year war with Israel, the question of Hezbollah’s disarmament looms larger than ever.
A newly appointed president and long-delayed municipal elections have revived hope for political stabilisation, but international donors are making one condition increasingly clear: Lebanon will not receive significant reconstruction aid unless it addresses the armed presence of Hezbollah.
For decades, the Iran-backed military and political group has exerted heavy influence over Lebanon’s decisions of war and peace. Today, however, Hezbollah is in an unprecedented state of vulnerability and weakness. Israeli strikes continue to decimate the group's arsenal south of the Litani River, and the Lebanese army has regained access to reportedly most of the group’s military bases in the area, which were once off-limits due to Hezbollah’s entrenched presence.
Lebanese voices calling on Hezbollah to relinquish its weapons have grown louder in recent years, especially after the party's involvement in foreign conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. Many argue it's time for Hezbollah to follow the path taken by other militias that disarmed after the civil war ended in 1990.
Charles Jabbour, media head for the Lebanese Forces party, believes these losses are part of a larger shift. “Hezbollah used to argue that its weapons deter Israel,” he says. “But now we see the opposite: its presence has invited deeper Israeli incursions.”
The October 2023 escalation between Hezbollah and Israel devastated southern regions, destroying or damaging nearly 40 percent of Lebanon’s housing stock—more than 163,000 units—and inflicting over $1 billion in infrastructure damage, according to Lebanese officials. Unlike after the 2006 war, foreign aid has been slow to arrive. Several Western states, including the US, have explicitly tied assistance to Hezbollah’s disarmament.
“The party can no longer act like it’s above the state,” Jabbour continues. “It must submit to the authority of the Lebanese government.”
Declining influence
Once bolstered by regional alliances, including with the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah now operates in a changed environment. Key allies are weaker or isolated, and diplomatic pressure is intensifying—both from Lebanese factions and the international community.
Recent developments suggest Hezbollah may be losing ground in both military and political terms. Observers cite the group’s reduced visibility in southern Lebanon and limited withdrawals from sensitive areas as signs of possible recalibration. Yet few interpret these moves as sincere steps toward disarmament.
These aren’t concessions—they’re tactical delays,” says journalist Alain Sarkis. “Hezbollah is under strain, but it's still calculating how to maintain leverage.”
UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for disarmament in southern Lebanon, has long gone unenforced. But with US–Iranian backchannel negotiations reportedly involving Hezbollah’s future role, many believe outside pressure could shape new outcomes.
“There may be undisclosed diplomatic understandings,” Sarkis says. “But unless they’re made binding, Hezbollah’s military presence will continue to undermine Lebanese sovereignty.”
The cost of delay
Hezbollah’s leadership remains publicly defiant. In a recent statement, deputy leader Naim Qassem categorically dismissed the idea of disarmament, calling it “unacceptable.” He reiterated the group’s framing of its weapons as a cornerstone of a so-called “defensive strategy”—a narrative Western officials and many Lebanese reject outright.
Political analyst Ali Sbaiti notes that while Hezbollah portrays itself as a security guarantor, this argument increasingly lacks public or political traction.
“Claiming the state is too weak to protect its people is no longer a viable excuse,” Sbaiti says. “The group’s existence as an armed entity outside state control is a structural problem, not a solution.”
International actors, including US envoy Morgan Ortagus, have reinforced that future aid hinges on concrete steps toward disarmament, stating the group must disarm, or the war continues.
Lebanese institutions, however, lack the capacity to enforce this demand. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has floated proposals to partially integrate into state structures—though these are widely viewed as stalling tactics rather than meaningful reform.
“It’s not a political party—it’s a militia with an independent military structure and ideology,” Sbaiti notes. “They can’t just blend in.”
No middle ground
The current standoff reflects more than an internal Lebanese debate—it is entangled in regional calculations, gas exploration deals, and Western interests in energy security. But for the Lebanese government, the fundamental issue remains clear: an armed faction operating outside state authority prevents meaningful recovery and long-term stability.
For now, talk of disarmament remains aspirational. But the convergence of military setbacks, diplomatic isolation, and economic collapse may be ushering in a new phase, one where continued ambiguity around Hezbollah’s weapons is no longer politically or economically sustainable.
As Lebanon fights for its future, the question is no longer whether Hezbollah will disarm, but whether the country can afford the cost of further delay.
This piece was published in collaboration with Egab.