By Mubarak Aliyu
In a world where trade wars have increasingly been shaped by geopolitics and the strategic use of tariffs, Africa has a unique opportunity to recalibrate its position in the global economy.
At the heart of this challenge and potential is a persistent flaw in the global trade architecture: the wide gap between bound and applied tariffs.
This disparity has long constrained African countries from protecting their emerging industries and capturing greater value from their exports.
While the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is often touted for its potential to boost intra-African trade, its strategic value goes beyond regional integration.
It can and must be a platform through which African countries negotiate collectively for better global trade terms that allow them to align applied tariffs more closely with their bound commitments and reclaim the policy space needed to foster industrial development.
The bound–applied tariff divide
Bound tariffs represent the maximum rates countries can charge under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, providing a buffer to support industrial policy.
Applied tariffs, however, are the actual rates used at borders. For many African nations, bound tariffs on key products like textiles, cocoa, and agricultural goods are high, often reaching 40-50%, offering theoretical space to protect strategic sectors.
Yet, under pressure from wealthier nations, aid conditions, and global trade agreements, these countries are often compelled to apply significantly lower tariffs, typically in the 5-15% range.
This practice effectively strips African governments of the tools needed to shield infant industries from premature global competition. As a result, African economies continue to serve primarily as raw material exporters, unable to climb the value chain or nurture domestic manufacturing.
Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa industry epitomises this dilemma. Despite being the world’s top cocoa producer, the West African country earns a fraction of the profits generated by the global chocolate industry.
The European Union applies zero tariffs on raw cocoa but 7-15% on processed chocolate, discouraging value addition in Côte d’Ivoire. At the same time, Côte d’Ivoire is pushed to lower its tariffs on chocolate imports, stifling domestic processing and reinforcing its role as a raw exporter.
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, which have recently formed a bloc known as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), face similar challenges, specifically in the mining sector.
Despite being Africa’s third-largest gold producer, Mali’s economy has remained heavily reliant on raw gold exports with limited local processing and value addition.
Historically, the country’s low applied tariffs and liberal investment codes, shaped by structural adjustment programmes and donor influence, have favoured foreign mining firms.
This discouraged the growth of domestic mining enterprises and limited state revenue, while creating a dependence on exporting unprocessed resources. Similar obstacles exist for Burkina Faso’s gold mines and Niger’s uranium sector.
However, AES member states have demonstrated efforts at repositioning their trade and policies. While Niger has withdrawn licenses from certain Western companies, the government still supports selective foreign investment under stricter terms, exemplified by the backing of Canada’s Global Atomic’s Dasa uranium project, which aligns with new national priorities. This signals a selective openness to foreign partners.
Mali has also been revising its mining code to increase state equity stakes and secure greater local content requirements.
Recently, the Burkinabé government has been promoting local ownership by increasing state participation in mining ventures, while renegotiating terms with foreign investors. These measures signal a shift away from passive liberalisation toward a more assertive, developmental trade posture.
Strategic role for AfCFTA
Rather than viewing the AfCFTA solely as a tool for regional trade, African leaders should position it as a mechanism for collective global trade renegotiation.
The agreement unites 54 African countries under a single market framework, giving the continent a stronger, more cohesive voice in international trade forums like the WTO.
This collective strength should be used to push back against the pressures that force African nations to undercut their own industrial policies.
By aligning national tariff schedules with AfCFTA objectives and ensuring that applied tariffs reflect the developmental needs of local industries, countries can regain critical policy space.
Moreover, AfCFTA protocols should be designed to enable tariff coordination, where applied rates are calibrated to support intra-African trade and resist exploitative external pressures.
For example, sectors identified as strategic for industrialisation, such as agro-processing, textiles, and light manufacturing, should be protected through regionally coordinated applied tariffs that reflect bound commitments.
Toward equitable trade and industrial growth
Africa’s low share of global trade, which stands at only 2%, is not merely the result of market inefficiencies but of structural imbalances codified in trade rules that work against value addition on the continent.
Trump’s tariffs on China, along with China’s retaliatory measures, have triggered ripple effects that are likely to influence Africa’s trade, investment, and broader economic development.
The persistent tariff gap is one of the most consequential manifestations of these rules, locking countries into commodity dependence and denying them the opportunity to build resilient, diversified economies.
By leveraging the AfCFTA as a bargaining bloc, African countries can begin to close this gap.
This would require not only technical coordination but political commitment to prioritise developmental trade over liberalisation for its own sake. Only then can trade serve as a tool for inclusive development, rather than a mechanism for continued dependence.
Mubarak Aliyu is a political analyst and writer with experience covering West Africa and the Sahel regions. His areas of expertise include governance and inclusive development in Africa.
