The presence of Türkiye’s foreign minister Hakan Fidan, along with a host of European leaders, at a summit earlier this year that was primarily aimed at coordinating responses to the Russia-Ukraine war was not a mere formality.
Türkiye’s strategic geography and diplomatic influence, demonstrated through its mediation between Russia and Ukraine, and its longstanding NATO membership, underscore why its participation in the London summit is symbolically significant for Europe’s strategic cohesion.
This summit aimed to demonstrate to global audiences that Europe is united and ready to confront threats posed by Russia, broader shifts in global power competition, and an accelerating international arms race.
Viewed against this backdrop, Fidan’s presence implied Türkiye’s growing importance resulting from its defence capabilities and expertise.
It became clear at the summit that a fundamental rethink of European defence was needed, given the urgency and complexity of today’s security environment, highlighted by the Ukrainian crisis and the presence of pivotal actors like Türkiye.
The result is a coordinated push for greater autonomy, resilience, and joint action — epitomised by the ReArm Europe initiative and its operational core, the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) Regulation. These measures are not just a response to immediate threats, but a blueprint for a new era in European security policy.
What SAFE and ReArm Europe represent
The discussion around “ReArm Europe” and “Made in Europe” has become more relevant since the release of a white paper in March by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
The European Union’s (EU) historical dependency on external military suppliers, notably the United States, has significantly limited its strategic autonomy. The “Made in Europe” principle directly addresses this vulnerability.
This is not a recent development, but current events — Russia-Ukraine conflict, rapid technological advancements in military AI, and geopolitical shifts — have highlighted that strategic autonomy is not just beneficial but urgent and indispensable for Europe.
The scale and urgency of the €800 billion ReArm Europe Plan, of which SAFE is a crucial component, reflect a political acknowledgement that previous security arrangements are no longer adequate for current threats.
The EU’s traditional reliance on NATO, fragmented national military procurement, and cumbersome bureaucratic processes have proven insufficient in the face of immediate security threats and rapidly changing geopolitical realities.
The first major step towards addressing these inadequacies has been the SAFE Regulation — one of the most concrete steps within the broader strategy.
SAFE aims to translate strategic autonomy from rhetoric to reality by providing financial help to EU states to swiftly address critical defence capability gaps.
It is essentially a financial tool to allow European countries — both EU members and EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries like Norway and Switzerland — to access loans from a €150 billion pool enabled by the EU.
This financial instrument aims to strengthen joint procurement, industrial scaling, and overall defence readiness across the Union.
Joint procurement standardises military equipment across member states, enhancing interoperability and rapid deployment capabilities across Europe.
Traditionally, strict EU fiscal regulations have limited defence investments and curbed innovation. SAFE circumvents these restrictions, stimulating European defence industries.
Furthermore, a clause prioritises EU-based firms with at least a 65-35 percent shareholder structure. The 65–35 threshold aims to preserve a common European defence structure by ensuring that the majority of production value—and thus critical capabilities—remains within the EU or closely aligned countries.
This ensures that sensitive components stay predominantly under European control. It also functions as a safeguard against dependencies on third-country actors, while still allowing limited external participation. Higher levels of involvement—beyond the 35% margin—are only possible for third countries that align with EU guidelines and have established a formal Security and Defence Partnership with the bloc.
Allowing a 35 percent threshold for non-EU components strategically integrates proven external technologies, such as Türkiye’s battle-tested drone technology, rapidly improving Europe’s immediate military capabilities.
Strategic autonomy — political ambition versus feasibility
Strategic autonomy should enable greater control and reduce dependency on the US and other countries. The rapid pace of artificial intelligence development by global competitors, notably China and the United States, has enhanced Europe’s urgency to achieve strategic autonomy and avoid falling behind.
However, doubts remain about whether the need for autonomy is articulated clearly enough to EU member states, considering even domestic differences on response to threats like Russia.
Internally, EU states differ sharply in threat perception — Poland and the Baltic states emphasise immediate defence measures against Russia, whereas Hungary maintains significantly warmer diplomatic ties with Moscow.
The potential problem is that rhetoric without tangible and efficient developments would undermine Europe’s credibility and embolden adversaries who seek to exploit internal divisions.
SAFE — opportunities and challenges
SAFE presents a NATO dilemma — the EU, historically not recognised as a military power and seen rather as NATO’s sibling, now complements NATO by strengthening Europe’s internal military capabilities, enhancing Europe’s leverage within NATO, and ensuring greater strategic autonomy without breaking transatlantic unity.
NATO includes non-EU actors like the US, the UK, and Türkiye, thus viewing NATO and EU defence as completely unified may be unrealistic.
Unpredictable US policies, especially during the Trump administration, have accelerated the EU’s need for greater military autonomy, making it strategically crucial for Europe to depend less on external guarantees.
Beyond diplomatic rhetoric, unresolved strategic divergences — such as approaches towards Russia and China, and burden-sharing in NATO — underline potential future tensions between the EU and the US. SAFE could even serve as a model for a “European pillar” within NATO, potentially influencing alliance dynamics.
The UK is in discussions with Brussels about involvement in this financial “prize,” but Brexit-induced scepticism complicates the UK’s access to SAFE’s financial instruments, forcing Britain and the EU into complex trade-offs regarding regulatory alignment, market access, and joint defence production.
Türkiye, on the other hand, is already deeply engaged with Europe’s defence ecosystem, which finds its involvement dependent on bilateral and multilateral frameworks with Brussels.
Türkiye’s proven defence-industry collaborations, exemplified by the Leonardo-Baykar partnership, demonstrate significant potential for mutually beneficial joint ventures that could enhance Europe’s military capabilities quickly and effectively.
While Turkish and EU perspectives may differ on values and principles, ongoing negotiations and a common understanding could allow more imminent, shared security problems to be prioritised.
Türkiye’s strategic diplomatic flexibility — evident in its mediation role in the Ukraine-Russia conflict — strengthens Europe’s geopolitical positioning, making Ankara a uniquely valuable partner for Europe’s broader security strategy.
However, political disagreements among EU states, varying threat perceptions, and an inert bureaucracy pose severe risks to the effective and timely implementation of SAFE projects.
EU bureaucracy slows funds allocation, decision-making, and innovation processes, significantly undermining Europe’s ability to swiftly respond to emerging security challenges.
Overall, SAFE is a major and concrete step that brings clarity to an unpredictable and rapidly changing world. In such turbulent times, unpreparedness is not an option.
Maintaining cohesion and realising the “Made in Europe” vision requires practical unity — building a defence infrastructure that is indispensable for member states.
By establishing a robust and effective European defence architecture, SAFE reduces the incentive for political fragmentation or for member states to drift toward geopolitical adversaries.
For Türkiye, the regulation outlines both the opportunities and the obstacles for involvement. Participation in SAFE projects becomes possible if Ankara and Brussels can meet on the same page.
However complex the ties may be, there is little doubt that the EU-Türkiye relationship is unique and mutually necessary.
With pragmatic engagement and policies shaped by empathy and realism, both sides could facilitate a more stable and effective overall security strategy.
