Alexander Kurenkov flew to Baku not merely as Russia's emergency minister attending a routine session of the International Civil Defense Organization. Putin's former personal aide, a man from the innermost circle, arrived with a special mission — to extinguish a diplomatic fire threatening to burn down one of Russia's key connections to the South Caucasus.
Officially, it's about electing the organization's secretary-general, which unites emergency services from over 60 countries. Unofficially, it's Moscow's attempt to preserve relations with Azerbaijan at any cost — a country that has become critically important for a Russia facing challenges due to the Ukraine war.
The Price of Pride
Events unfolded rapidly and painfully. First, two Azerbaijanis died reportedly during detention by Russian law enforcement in Yekaterinburg. Then followed arrests of "ethnic group" members and reports of increasing scrutiny on Azerbaijanis in Russian cities. Baku responded in kind — firmly and demonstratively.
Azerbaijani media showed about a dozen detained Russians with visible signs of injury. They were accused of drug trafficking and cybercrime. Azerbaijani authorities also carried out searches at Sputnik's Baku office, leading to several detentions. Cultural events connected to Russia were put on hold. Russian citizens complained about frequent document checks in Azerbaijan "with the use of force," while officials in Baku reject all accusations.
Azerbaijan's response was firm. After the deaths of the Azerbaijanis, Baku signaled it was no longer willing to play by the old rules.
The Geopolitics of Weakness
Russia in 2025 is no longer in a position to exert the same level of influence over its partners. Four years of war in Ukraine have highlighted both military challenges and a significant reduction of influence in the post-Soviet space.
The Karabakh conflict flared up with new force just days after Russia's withdrawal from the Kharkiv region in September 2022. In November 2020, Russia was able to help broker a ceasefire between both sides. By 2023, Russian diplomats could only "express extreme concern" while watching Azerbaijan restored its constitutional order in the region with the acquiescence of Russian peacekeepers.
In spring 2024, the Russian contingent prematurely left Karabakh, transforming Russia in Azerbaijani authorities' eyes into a power that had lost initiative and influence. After the incident with the AZAL passenger plane shot down by Russian air defense, President Ilham Aliyev made it clear: he was not prepared to deal with the Russian leader's "messengers" and demanded equal dialogue.
Energy Dependence
But the main reason for Russian restraint is not diplomatic courtesy but cold economic calculation. While Moscow was earning super-profits from the European gas market, cooperation with Baku was not critically important. After losing European buyers due to sanctions, Azerbaijan with access to the Caspian Sea became a crucial alternative for Russia in restoring export volumes.
The scheme was elegant: Azerbaijan buys Russian gas for domestic needs while redirecting its own volumes through Gazprom contracts to European countries. This isn't prohibited by sanctions and could become economically mutually beneficial. Azerbaijan currently supplies almost 13 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe out of total exports of 24-25 billion — half its production. By definition, Baku cannot double supplies as promised to the EU without Russian help.
The Logistics Trap
Azerbaijan also controls the key "North-South" transport corridor for Russia. This route between Russia and Iran has three branches: the sea route through the Caspian, the road through Central Asia, and the western route through Dagestan and Azerbaijan. The latter is the most profitable due to developed infrastructure and the largest cargo volumes.
This is a critically important artery for trade with Iran and access to India. Russia has strategic plans to develop this road for access to the Persian Gulf and wealthy Arab countries. The Chinese economic corridor "One Belt, One Road" also passes through Azerbaijan, making the route especially advantageous.
The alternative route through Central Asia is much more complex and expensive due to mountains and few roads. Losing the Azerbaijani route would significantly undermine Russian plans for economic expansion southward.
Vanished Leverage
Since 2020, Russia no longer has its main leverage — the war in Karabakh. Azerbaijan solved this problem militarily and now considers itself a regional power. The country's population of 10 million exceeds that of Armenia and Georgia combined.
Since 2005, military sector financing in Azerbaijan has grown significantly. Total armed forces, including reservists, have grown to almost 400,000 people. Many officers trained in Türkiye and other NATO countries and gained real combat experience. Azerbaijan practically doesn't buy Russian weapons — its main partners are Türkiye, Israel, and Pakistan.
Given that Russia is now weaker than before 2022, it has far less military or coercive leverage compared to before 2022.
Diplomacy of Desperation
Under these conditions, Moscow is prepared to accept reputational costs. The Telegram channel "VChK-OGPU," close to intelligence services, reports that President Vladimir Putin personally wants to resolve tensions and is forming an unofficial delegation to Baku. A proposal for "prisoner exchange" may follow.
"Complications in relations with Azerbaijan are not part of the Kremlin's plans now. This is not beneficial to Moscow; it has no possibility to conflict on several fronts and lose a strategic partner in an important region," the source explains.
The Russian Foreign Ministry demonstrates "maximum restraint." Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov speaks of the need to maintain partnership relations, while Russian diplomats are actively working to free detained Russians.
New Rules of the Game
Since the 1990s, Azerbaijan has pursued a policy of balance — good relations with Russia without joining pro-Russian alliances like the CSTO or EAEU. Baku keeps its distance and balances between all powers. But now it demands a new quality of relations.
Baku's main message is simple: "Respect us as we respect you. We are an independent country." Azerbaijan has all the capabilities to maintain its independence and defend its interests. This was formulated back in 2022 by Tajikistan's president Emomali Rahmon at a meeting with Putin: "We want to be respected."
The Price of Retreat
If the diplomatic crisis doesn't end, Russia could lose much more than Azerbaijani tomatoes in stores. At stake are strategic energy projects, transport corridors, and influence over the entire South Caucasus.
After the war in Ukraine began, Russia’s appeal among Azerbaijani audiences has diminished. On the political scene — both in government and opposition — almost all politicians support either pro-Western or Russia-independent positions.
To top it all, possible peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia could further reduce the remnants of Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Thus Russia may see its remaining leverage in the region further diminished.
Forced Humility
Therefore, Alexander Kurenkov flies to Baku not as an authorised representative of a great power, but as a negotiator ready for compromises. His mission is to demonstrate Moscow’s readiness to engage on terms where Azerbaijan is treated as an equal partner.
The irony of the situation is that Russia, having sought to regain geopolitical influence through the war in Ukraine, must now manage complex diplomatic relations with a country it previously considered part of its sphere of influence. But options are limited — the price of confrontation has become too high even for a power used to asserting terms to its neighbours in the region.
