Ali Fuat KuzGreece recently announced two new national marine parks, one in the Ionian Sea and one in the Aegean, presenting them as important environmental initiatives. However, a closer look shows that this move is more of a calculated geopolitical manoeuvre than ecological stewardship.
Wrapped in appealing conservation language, the move aims to further long-held territorial goals, challenge the existing status quo in the Aegean, and unilaterally establish facts in areas with disputed sovereignty.
This action is being seen by Türkiye as not an isolated event, but as the latest in a long series of Greek efforts to change the legal and political balance in the Aegean Sea, directly violating international law and weakening the fragile trust recently built between the two countries.
In response to Greece’s unilateral declaration, Türkiye officially designated two new marine protected areas in early August.
The two new designated areas – the North Aegean MPA and the Fethiye-Kas MPA – were not just announced but also formally integrated into Türkiye's national Marine Spatial Planning Map and submitted to UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission.
Türkiye has, however, based this move on more than just geopolitics – its commitment to marine protection predates the current dispute.
The Gokceada park was first established in 1999, showing a commitment to conservation in the North Aegean for over two decades.
Similarly, the Kas-Kekova area in the Mediterranean has long been designated as a Special Environmental Protection Area. This designation has been supported by many biodiversity surveys and management plans, often in collaboration with respected international organisations.
Türkiye has presented this history as concrete evidence of a consistent, scientifically driven approach to environmental care — separate from and independent of the latest political tensions.
With this move, Türkiye also reclaimed the narrative, showcasing that it is a responsible environmental player that won’t allow the noble cause of conservation to be used as a means to undermine its fundamental sovereign rights.
A long history of dispute
The marine park declaration must be understood in the context of Greece's ongoing effort to increase its control over the Aegean Sea.
The most pressing and potentially explosive issue is the extent of territorial waters. While both Türkiye and Greece currently have a six-nautical-mile limit in the Aegean, Greece has consistently expressed its desire to extend this limit to 12 nautical miles.
Due to the Aegean's unique geography, such an extension would turn it into a ‘Greek lake’, increasing the country’s share of the sea to around 70 percent.
This would require Turkish maritime traffic, including naval ships and commercial vessels moving between its own ports, to cross through Greek territory—an unacceptable situation for any sovereign nation.
For this reason, the Turkish Grand National Assembly declared in 1995 that such a unilateral move would be a casus belli or cause for war, a stance that remains unchanged.
Greece's pattern of ignoring legal obligations is also evident in its systematic and illegal militarisation of the Eastern Aegean Islands.
The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1947 Treaty of Paris require that these islands, given to Greece, stay demilitarised. The Lausanne Treaty prohibits naval bases and fortifications on islands like Midilli (Mytilene) and Sakiz (Chios), while the Paris Treaty states that the Dodecanese islands “shall be and shall remain demilitarised”.
Despite these obligations, Greece has openly militarised these islands since the 1970s, which is a serious violation of the very treaties that grant it sovereignty over them.
In this context, the marine park initiative serves as a tool to strengthen claims over disputed geographical features.
The 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis revealed various "grey zones" — islets and rocks whose sovereignty was never explicitly assigned to Greece by international agreements.
Türkiye argues that, as the successor to the Ottoman Empire, it maintains sovereignty over any feature that was not explicitly ceded.
By declaring parks that include these disputed areas, Greece aims to assert sovereignty through administrative means, creating a situation that prejudices future negotiations.
Greece's unilateral action is contrary to international maritime law as the Aegean is classified as a "semi-enclosed sea", a specific category under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Article 123 of the convention requires bordering states to “cooperate with each other”, including “coordinating the protection and preservation of the marine environment”.
By announcing the marine parks without coordinating with Türkiye, Greece is going against the spirit of the convention that it frequently cites in support of its claims.
Perhaps the most concerning aspect of this move is how it undermines the goodwill established by the Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good-Neighbourliness, which had committed both countries to mutual respect and to avoiding actions that might erode the spirit of the agreement.
The way forward
Türkiye believes that the only way to reach a stable resolution is through direct and comprehensive dialogue.
But there are significant challenges.
First is Greek maximalism. Ankara sees Greece's legal and political stance as "maximalist," claiming the entire Aegean as a "Greek sea" while ignoring Türkiye's rights as a major coastal state.
This is illustrated by Athens' insistence on a 12 nm territorial sea and its claim that all islands, regardless of size or location, must generate full maritime zones—positions Türkiye views as fundamentally unfair and legally void.
Second is the role of the EU: Türkiye does not see the European Union as a neutral mediator in this dispute.
Instead, it views the EU as siding with Greece. Official EU statements expressing "full solidarity with Greece" in similar disputes in the past are seen by Ankara as proof of this bias.
Türkiye argues this dynamic empowers Greece to avoid meaningful negotiation, using its EU membership to impose its unfair and expansionist ambitions.
Therefore, Türkiye has explicitly advised third parties, including the EU, not to facilitate Greece's politically driven goals.
Despite these obstacles, a constructive approach could be developed for de-escalation and resolution.
First, environmental issues should be separated from political disputes.
For instance, joint bilateral technical and scientific bodies to manage the Aegean's ecosystem can be established. This would allow both countries to address shared challenges like pollution, invasive species, and overfishing.
Secondly, both countries should renew high-level negotiations with a broad and open agenda.
This process should reflect principles from past efforts, such as the 1976 Bern Agreement, which discussed the continental shelf and committed to refrain from unilateral actions. The agenda must cover all the interrelated issues tied to the Aegean dispute.
Lastly, the goal of these negotiations should be to find a fair solution. This means moving beyond rigid and mechanical applications of conventional rules to consider the Aegean's unique geographical, political, and historical factors.
The aim is to produce a result that is acceptable to both sides. In a nutshell, the future of the Aegean shouldn't be determined by unilateral actions that exploit environmentalism for geopolitical aims.
Such moves only breed distrust and make a lasting solution harder to achieve. Long-term peace, stability, and genuine protection of the Aegean's fragile ecosystem can only come through a comprehensive agreement, negotiated in good faith between the two coastal states.
This agreement must rest on mutual respect, good neighbourliness, and, above all, fairness.
Türkiye has made its stance clear: it is ready and willing to engage in sincere and comprehensive dialogue to ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for the shared seas.
