History was made at the White House when US President Donald Trump brought the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to Washington for a major peace summit — an event that appears to have finally closed one of the longest-running conflicts to emerge from the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev each signed new strategic agreements with the US before endorsing a joint declaration committing their countries to a peaceful resolution of their decades-old dispute.

Two key components of this path towards peace are the mutual recognition of each other’s internationally recognised borders—without any territorial claims—and the creation of a transit route linking Azerbaijan proper to its exclave of Nakhchivan through a narrow strip of southern Armenia. 

This corridor, to be known as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), will be managed by a US-backed business consortium for 99 years.

The idea of a transport corridor in this region is not new. In fact, such a route has existed in various forms for decades, until Armenia blocked it in the 1990s. 

Following the Second Karabakh War, the concept was revived as the Zangezur Corridor, though not much progress has been made.

But no one is complaining, as the corridor serves the interests of all sides, no matter how it is named.

What Türkiye gains

For Türkiye, there are two main geopolitical implications that arise from normalisation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The first is the possibility of greater resilience in transport routes connecting Türkiye to the heart of the Eurasian landmass. 

At present, Türkiye’s primary route runs through Georgia to Azerbaijan and then across the Caspian Sea to Central Asia. 

This route is tried and tested, and it has helped solidify Türkiye’s role as a regional transport hub. Transit links such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railroad and energy pipelines like the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and the Southern Gas Corridor have been central to Türkiye’s connectivity with global markets. 

The TRIPP is not designed to compete with these established routes, but rather to complement them. 

Adding a second route through Nakhchivan, Armenia, and then Azerbaijan proper would provide an alternative for commercial use and add redundancy, ensuring that Türkiye’s eastward trade remains secure even if regional instability or geopolitical events disrupt the Georgian corridor.

Moreover, this corridor also provides Türkiye with the most direct transit and communications link to the rest of the Turkic world in Eurasia.

This delivers a broader geopolitical achievement—closer integration within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

Since its inception as the Turkic Council in 2009, the OTS has sought to deepen shared cultural, historical, and linguistic ties, while enhancing economic and trade relations between the ethnically Turkic countries of Eurasia. 

Secondly, the normalisation between Yerevan and Baku creates more political space for normalisation between Türkiye and Armenia. 

Türkiye and Armenia have had a difficult relationship over the past few decades. Although Türkiye was one of the first countries to recognise Armenia’s independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, relations quickly soured following Armenia’s invasion of Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. 

In 1993, Türkiye co-sponsored a UN Security Council resolution calling on Armenian forces to withdraw from the Azerbaijani region of Kelbajar, which they had occupied during the fighting. 

Later that year, diplomatic relations between the two countries ended, and Türkiye closed its border with Armenia. Since then, Turkish-Armenian diplomatic engagement has been two steps forward and one step back.

Before liberating all of its territory in September 2023, Azerbaijan first regained much of the territory taken from it by Armenia in the 1990s during the Second Karabakh War in 2020. 

When Kelbajar returned to Azerbaijani control in November 2020, many wondered whether this could pave the way for renewed diplomatic engagement between Türkiye and Armenia. 

However, beyond the specific issue of Kelbajar, Ankara has consistently maintained that genuine negotiations with Yerevan could only take place once Armenia and Azerbaijan normalised relations and signed a peace agreement. 

Now that a peace treaty appears to be on track for ratification, new possibilities may be emerging for Türkiye -Armenia relations.

The big picture

It should be noted that the benefits of Armenia–Azerbaijan normalisation are not limited to Ankara and Baku. They also extend to Yerevan. 

Armenia is a poor country, and over the past three and a half decades of the frozen conflict over Karabakh, it has been excluded from many of the region’s major energy and transport infrastructure projects. 

It is difficult to quantify exactly how much foreign investment Armenia has lost as a result, but it is safe to say that billions of dollars in potential projects have bypassed the country because of its unresolved conflict with Azerbaijan.

Now that peace appears within reach and Armenia is on the verge of having normal relations with all its neighbours, it will be well-positioned to participate in new energy and trade infrastructure initiatives. 

Over time, this could bring substantial benefits to Armenia’s economy.

For Türkiye, the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement represents more than just new infrastructure — it marks a strategic opportunity to cooperate with the South Caucasus in a way that promotes stability, economic growth, and regional connectivity. 

By complementing existing transit corridors, opening the door to normalisation with Armenia, and linking the Turkic world more closely than ever before, Türkiye can help usher in a new era in the South Caucasus — one where cooperation replaces conflict and shared prosperity becomes the foundation for lasting peace.