Amid growing unease over Trump’s foreign policy and Russia’s Ukraine war, Germany is moving to rebuild its military might. But experts warn that history, bureaucracy, and politics could stall that effort. 

Since the devastation of World War II — when Nazi Germany’s invasions led to the deaths of  millions across Europe, including Germans themselves — Berlin has largely crafted policies grounded in pacifism. 

But in light of the Russia-Ukraine war and the ongoing rapprochement between US President Donald Trump and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, many German politicians are now urgently calling for a stronger military posture, to guard against potential threats from Moscow and its allies. 

Germany’s armed forces, the Buneswehr, currently count 181,174 active personnel – a modest figure compared to nearly 13 million soldiers, volunteers, and conscripts Germany fielded during WWII. For comparison, France maintains around 205,000 active personnel today, and the US has more than 1.3 million.  

Part of the struggle stems from Berlin’s 2011 decision to abolish mandatory military service, making it harder to fill ranks in an all-volunteer force. 

In 2018, Berlin set a target of expanding its military to 203,000 troops by 2025. But a recent report by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces shows that “the Bundeswehr once again failed to achieve” this, moving its target date to 2031. 

Raoul Motika, a professor of Humanities at the University of Hamburg and an expert on ​​Euro-Asiatic Studies, says that despite a growing political consensus—even among traditionally pacifist parties like the Greens—Germany faces major roadblocks in building up its armed forces. 

“In theory, there is no problem. Now the Bundestag (the German federal parliament) has decided that Germany should and could spend endless amounts of money ‘whatever it takes’ is the slogan here to spend for its defence purposes,” Motika tells TRT World. “But there are several constraints which are very difficult to overcome.”

One of the main challenges is bureaucracy. The Bundeswehr, like much of Germany’s public sector, is highly bureaucratised, making it difficult to spend large sums of money effectively in a short time, Motika explains. “The whole structure developed over the past two decades in the wrong direction—toward noble bureaucratisation.”

Abdulaziz Ahmet Yasar, a Hamburg-based expert on German and EU politics, echoes this concern. “Bureaucratic inefficiencies slow down defence procurement, making it difficult to modernise the armed forces quickly,” he tells TRT World. “Even with increased funding, structural inefficiencies in budget allocation and defence planning further hinder the effectiveness of military expansion.”

The conscription question

Given these recruitment challenges and structural obstacles, some policymakers are revisiting a once taboo idea.

Some political leaders have floated the idea of reinstating military conscription, which was suspended in 2011. But rebuilding public and logistical support for mandatory service won’t be easy. 

“Public skepticism remains a significant hurdle,” says Yasar. “Many Germans are wary of militarisation due to historical reasons.” During WWII, more than five million Germans were killed, according to some estimates.

Recruiting young people is a major challenge. A November 2023 law passed by the German cabinet introduced voluntary military service, in part to gauge the willingness of 18-year-olds to serve. But in a country facing a skilled labour shortage and aging demographics, expanding military ranks may prove difficult.

“The Bundeswehr doesn’t even have the housing, education facilities, or infrastructure needed to train and accommodate a larger force,” Motika points out.

No legal roadblocks, but plenty of pressure

Unlike Japan, which has a constitution that renounces war “as a sovereign right”, Germany faces no legal barriers to rearmament. Its military service requirement was only suspended, not abolished.

“We could restart conscription next year if needed. In theory, there's no obstacle at all,” says Motika.

While Japan’s constitution imposes strict limits on militarisation, its recent shifts in defence policy offer a revealing parallel. In response to rising tensions in the Pacific, Tokyo has moved to unify its armed forces under a joint staff leadership, signalling a significant strategic realignment.

Still, any major defence push carries symbolic weight in Germany, given its role in two world wars. Yasar notes that today’s context is very different: Germany is acting within NATO and EU frameworks, focused on collective security rather than unilateral power.

“Nevertheless, [militarisation] remains a sensitive issue, as I see Germany's role more in pacifist and diplomatic objectives than in military deterrence.”

Yet, questions remain about whether a stronger Bundeswehr could truly secure Germany—or Europe—without reliance on the US.

Can Germany defend itself without the US? 

Despite Germany’s militarisation efforts, without the US support, neither Berlin nor other Western capitals can defend themselves against an external threat, says Motika. “If we look at the facts, it's obvious that Germany or Western Europe is not in a position to defend itself without American support,” he says. 

Even the UK would struggle to defend itself against presumptive enemies like Russia, as its nuclear capabilities are intertwined with US technology, adds Motika. 

This month, French President Emmanuel Macron suggested that France’s nuclear arsenal — the largest in continental Europe — could be used to protect the EU against Russia. But insisted it would remain under French national command.

“This means Western Europe for the next few years needs American defence support against Russia, which makes the whole thing very difficult,” says Motika. “And because of this, the whole topic is putting a lot of pressure on the (European) politicians.” 

That pressure, experts say, was a key driver behind the Bundestag’s groundbreaking decision last week to lift its constitutional debt brake in order to ramp up military funding. Chancellor-in-waiting Fredrich Merz has suggested spending could rise to 3.5 percent of GDP—around $652 billion.

The decision was taken “because of the new view toward the US…  it’s no longer a reliable partner for defence against Russia,” Motika concludes.