Murat SofuogluThe long-running nuclear standoff between Iran and the West has taken a new turn, with fresh rounds of diplomacy unfolding on two fronts. While Iranian and American officials have resumed indirect talks in Muscat, Oman, after President Doanld Trump extended an “olive branch” to Tehran, a separate meeting in Istanbul between Iran and three key European nations—the UK, France, and Germany—has added a new layer of complexity.
These three countries, known collectively as the E3, were part of the original 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement also signed by the US, Russia, and China. Their talks with Iran, held this week in Istanbul, suggest a renewed push by Europe to reassert its role in shaping a potential return to the deal, or some form of successor arrangement.
Following the meeting, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi described the talks in a post on X as constructive, saying both sides were “determined to sustain and make optimal use of diplomacy.” While British envoy Christian Turner echoed the sentiment, saying the parties reaffirmed their commitment to dialogue and agreed to meet again.
Yet behind the carefully worded diplomatic language lies a more uncertain reality.
Experts point out that while the E3 were instrumental in brokering the original JCPOA, their influence has faded since the US unilaterally withdrew from the deal in 2018 under the Trump administration. Since then, the E3 has struggled to define a cohesive Iran policy of their own.
“The E3 countries have not yet managed to define a coherent and relevant ‘Iran policy.’ From Trump 1.0 to Biden, they have always been accustomed to flatly following American positions,” says Theo Nencini, an expert on Iran foreign policy.
Nencini, also a lecturer at Sciences Po Grenoble and Paris Catholic University, believes that unexpected US-Iran direct talks caught Europeans off guard, prompting them to scramble to get involved in the negotiation process despite the fact that “they have always maintained a very strict attitude towards Iran.”
Negotiators from the Shia-majority nation meet the European delegation in Istanbul as the US pushes Tehran to move quickly on Washington’s proposal.
“Today's talks can be read as an attempt by the Europeans to avoid being sidelined by a deal that could eventually reopen Iran to foreign investment,” he tells TRT World.
The Istanbul meeting was as much about political positioning as substance. For the E3, it was a way to stay relevant. For Tehran, engaging the Europeans may help strengthen its hand in parallel talks with Washington.
Other analysts agree that E3’s leverage is limited, but not irrelevant. Tehran-based journalist Fatima Karimkhan notes that any meaningful agreement will ultimately require direct US-Iran cooperation
“But the E3 is still important for Iran and they can have some effects on the US and Israel too, so they should be a part of negotiations” though not as prominent as they were through the 2015 agreement process, Karimkhan adds.
Still, the writer remains “pretty optimistic” about ongoing US-Iran talks. “The Trump administration needs a big win in the Middle East,” she tells TRT World.
An Iranian source familiar with past nuclear negotiations was more blunt. “They have always privately said that they can not deliver because the US was not there,” he says, speaking on condition of anonymity.
The source argues that Europe’s track record, particularly after the US exit from the JCPOA, has left Iranian officials sceptical of any promises made without American involvement. “Iran can’t afford to trust them,” he added.
“They (Iranians) should not expect any fruitful results from these discussions.”
Why Istanbul meet matters: Snapback mechanism
Beyond diplomatic optics, the Istanbul meeting also carried legal and strategic weight. One of the most sensitive issues on the table was the snapback mechanism, a clause in the JCPOA that allows any signatory to invoke UN sanctions if it believes another party is in serious breach of the deal.
The clause is tied to UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA ten years ago, and is set to expire in October. Under normal conditions, its expiration should lead to the lifting of all related sanctions.
But the snapback mechanism allows any signatory, like one of the E3, to argue that Iran is not in compliance and take the issue to the UN Security Council which should decide in 30 days on whether to keep or remove sanctions relief. If the Security Council could not agree on sanctions relief, then, all previous sanctions will automatically “snap back” into place.
European diplomats have indicated they may invoke this mechanism by August if Iran and the US fail to reach a new deal. However, Nencini believes that “barring any significant upheavals between now and then (which are not impossible, after all),” he does not think E3 will move to trigger it.
Their main concern remains Iran’s escalating uranium enrichment. According to IAEA estimates it’s reported to have reached 60 percent purity, far beyond the JCPOA’s original cap and uncomfortably close to weapons-grade levels.
Tehran has reacted angrily to the threat. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi warned in an article for the French weekly Le Monde that misuse of the snapback clause could “end Europe's role in the agreement” and escalate tensions in ways that may be “irreversible".
This week’s Istanbul meeting revealed both the potential and limitations of Europe’s role in the nuclear talks. While the E3 are no longer the driving force they were in 2015, their involvement still matters to Iran, to the US, and to the broader architecture of any future agreement.
With the clock ticking toward October’s expiration of Resolution 2231, and the threat of snapback sanctions looming, the window for diplomacy is narrowing. Whether Europe can help bridge the remaining gaps, or merely observe from the sidelines, remains to be seen.
