For June middle, as Israel and Iran dey exchange missiles and drones for wetin dem call 12-day war, Iran state TV tell dia people make dem delete WhatsApp from dia phones. Dem talk say di messaging app dey leak user data go Israel and e fit be threat to national security.

Dis warning follow di Israeli attack wey target Iran senior military command with precise strikes wey make people dey wonder how Iran fit dey open to spy work like dis. Whether WhatsApp dey involved directly, nobody sabi yet. But di matter don shine light on di wahala of how people fit trust messaging apps to keep dia data private.

Di bigger question na how much access domestic and foreign governments get to di digital chats wey people dey think say na encrypted and secure. Apps like WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, and Apple iMessage don become di main way people dey communicate privately.

For recent years, dem don adopt end-to-end encryption well well, wey mean say na only di people wey dey chat fit see di message, even di app no fit decrypt am. But dis encryption dey give national security and intelligence agencies big wahala because dem no fit intercept chats like before.

Even with di encryption, security agencies don develop different ways to monitor suspects for di apps. Dem dey capture unencrypted data, collect metadata, exploit software loopholes, or even force di app companies to cooperate, whether legally or secretly.

How companies dey cooperate with governments dey different and e no dey clear sometimes. Apps wey dey promote strong encryption fit still get wahala because intelligence agencies don dey access data wey people think say secure before. Di technology wey dem dey use and di gap of wetin people sabi and wetin dey possible dey make digital privacy no dey 100% sure.

Metadata collection na one of di first things wey intelligence agencies dey use. Even if di message dey encrypted, metadata like who chat with who, when, and di size of di message still dey exposed. Dis kind information fit help dem track patterns and behaviours without even reading di message.

Former NSA and CIA chief Michael Hayden talk one time say, “We dey kill people based on metadata.” Dis show how dem dey use communication patterns to locate and target people.

For example, WhatsApp fit provide basic subscriber info and usage logs if court order dem. Dem fit even show who di person dey chat with and when. Signal, on di other hand, dey limit di metadata wey dem dey collect, so dem no fit provide much info even if dem get subpoena.

Apart from metadata, agencies fit hack di device itself. If dem fit gain access to di sender or receiver phone, dem fit read di message before encryption or after decryption. CIA Vault 7 leaks show how dem dey use malware to control phones and turn dem to listening devices.

One example na Pegasus spyware wey NSO Group develop. Dis spyware fit infect phone remotely and secretly, even if di person no answer di call. Once e enter di phone, e fit copy messages, record calls, and even track location.

Agencies fit also attack di servers of di messaging apps. Even if di messages dey encrypted, dem fit target di communication between di servers or hack di servers themselves. Snowden leaks show how NSA and GCHQ dey tap into private data links to collect information.

Post-Snowden, companies don dey try protect user privacy more, like WhatsApp encryption and Apple refusal to unlock iPhones. But if di data dey accessible, agencies fit still find way to collect am, whether legally or through hacking.

Di truth be say, privacy for digital communication no dey 100% sure. End-to-end encryption dey help, but e no fit stop agencies wey dey use metadata, device hacking, and server exploitation to bypass di encryption.

People fit think say dia chats dey private, but di real privacy depend on di device, network, and di company wey dey run di service. Make we no forget say di views for dis article no be di opinion of TRT Afrika.